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LECTURES

UPON THE

TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

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LECTURES

UPON THE

TACTICS OF CAVALRY,

BY

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COUNT VON BISMARK,

COLONEL OF THE THIRD REGIMENT OF THE ROYAL WIRTEMBERG CAVALRY; BRIGADIER GENERAL; AIDE-DU-CAMP OF HIS MAJESTY; KNIGHT OF THE ROYAL WIRTEMBERG ORDER OF MERIT; DECORATED WITH THE GOLDEN MEDAL OF HONOUR OF THE FIRST CLASS; OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ORDER OF ST. GEORGE OF THE FOURTH, AND THAT OF ST. ANNE OF THE SECOND CLASS; KNIGHT OF THE IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN ORDER OF LEOPOLD; OFFICER OF THE ROYAL FRENCH ORDER OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR,

&c. &c.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

BY

MAJOR FREDERICK JOHNSTON.

LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

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TO

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN,

K.C.B. & K.C.H.

COLONEL OF THE 12th LANCERS,

AND

INSPECTING GENERAL OF CAVALRY IN GREAT BRITAIN,

THIS TRANSLATION IS

(By Permission)

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY

HIS OBEDIENT SERVANT,

THE TRANSLATOR.

PREFACE.

As another Translation of the following Work is advertised as immediately to be published by a Brother Officer, I feel I am, in some measure, called upon to explain how it happens that mine also appears at this particular moment.

Having myself derived much amusement from the perusal of Count Von Bismark's book, in the original, I deter-

mined to translate it; both as a means of improving myself in the German Language, and with a view to enabling some of my Military Friends, who do not understand that language, to become acquainted with so scientific and so interesting a Publication.

I shewed the first half of my Translation to a distinguished Officer of Cavalry, who was so much pleased with it, that he pressed me earnestly to complete and publish the Work, considering it to be one, from which the Officers of the British Cavalry might derive much useful information. I consequently had made

my arrangements for publication, when, by an accidental conversation with Major Beamish, who called on me for the purpose of obtaining some information on the subject of the Wirtemberg Exercise, I learnt that he also was about publishing a Translation of the same Work.

Having at this time, as I before stated, made my arrangements with my Publisher, I felt that, however unwilling to do what might possibly interfere with a Brother Officer, I had still gone too far to recede; and thus, at the same instant, will be given to the British

Army, two Translations of this really interesting Work.

Having thus accounted for the appearance of my Translation under such circumstances, it remains only to observe, that I have confined myself to that part of the Work which applies generally to the cavalry of any service; and have not translated the Elements of the Art of moving for a Regiment of Cavalry; as, however excellent they may be, I cannot help thinking these are sufficiently understood in our service, and a sufficient number of manœuvres to be found in our own Instructions and Regulations.

The Elements did not appear in the first German edition, but were sold separately, as an Appendix.

In conclusion, I hope that my readers will be too much interested and occupied with the sound principles and useful information of the original, to be very severe in their criticism of the Translation.

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First Lecture.

TACTICS—STRATEGY.

A DEFINITION.

People are so fond of conversing and giving opinions upon Tactics, Strategy, and the Art in general of commanding Armies, that from hence the young soldier, without the necessary preparatory instruction for understanding them, receives erroneous and incorrect notions upon the subject.

The qualities which a perfect military leader ought to possess, may be divided into two main branches, of which one may be acquired by study, but the other must be born with him—that is, the Scientific branch, or that which may be termed Mathematic; and the Philosophic, or that which depends only on a clear

conception, and the capacity for forming a sound judgment. This difference is, as infinite as that between knowing a thing abstractedly, and being able to execute it. The possession of only one branch is far from arriving at the ideal perfection; but both united in one, constitute an accomplished leader in the field.

The greatest commanders in all ages have been also scholars:—Cæsar, Turenne, Montecuculi, Frederick the Great, and others, were authors.

It has been observed, that many of the greatest generals have drawn up regulations, in which they entered into the minutest details of the service; and, on the other hand, men who never even commanded a company, have written on the highest branches of the art of war, and have projected plans for the remodelling whole armies—aye, many sit only behind their desk, and compile, from the official reports of the army, critical histories of wars.

The fundamental rules, the mere inanimate notions, the mathematical forms, with respect

to war, may be considered as science, developed by correct inference, and laid down as principles; but the talent of applying them at the head o an army—of putting in full practice what the science of war has taught in theory, is more than science—is that great art, which Theobald calls the Sublime of the Art of War.

It is an imperfect undertaking to write the history of a war in which one has not been personally engaged, and for which one has not obtained the necessary documents from the commander-in-chief. The commanding general is himself under the controul of the commissaries—the commissariat rules with despotic power over his resolutions. Observers far removed from the theatre of war are continually finding fault with the commander, who does not keep alive the intense interest they take in the occurrences of the campaign, by rapid movements and engagements following each other in quick succession. They are totally ignorant of the infinite difficulties which operate against him:—falls of rain, and roads destroyed, which often, in

eight days, change the moral condition of the troops so as not to be recognisable;—whilst the soldier is exposed to all weathers—by day marching through morasses, in cold nights sleeping on the damp earth, in tattered clothes and without shoes, wan and disfigured; the horses unshod and without forage; and the men fighting against hunger;—whilst the provision waggons are stuck fast in the rear: whilst the army has to contend against all these difficulties, and by them is crippled in its operations,—all this escapes the critic at a distance, because, in the published reports, the real condition of the army, from prudential motives, is concealed.

But it is, in general, easy to judge of events by the consequences*. More difficult is it to feel, and form a correct opinion upon present

* Voltaire says, "A victorious general has committed no faults in the eyes of the public; in like manner, a beaten general is always in the wrong, however prudent may have been his conduct." And Frederick the Great says, "In reality, Fortune alone decides upon a man's renown; he whom she favours is applauded, and he whom she neglects is blamed."

critical cases; to form a promising plan of operations with prudence; and to carry it into execution with vigour and promptitude. There is no art which stands in need of more natural endowments than the art of war. Mind and body act here conjointly—both must be healthy and vigorous. The quality, rightly to seize and discover, with the glance of an eye as it were, the advantages and disadvantages which ground and troops offer *(coup d'œil)*, characterises the man who is born a soldier.

This widely comprehensive "*coup d'œil*," which, in unexpected results, and amidst the most stormy vicissitudes of fortune and calculations, rapidly and correctly perceives its real situation, and then, firm, and trusting to itself alone, extorts, as it were, from Fortune, what she does not voluntarily concede; or, crafty and prudent, extricates itself from a dangerous position. This is not to be taught—can be reduced to no general rule, or be drawn upon slates and plans, but it is quite exclusively Military Genius!!

But this genius should be improved by cultivation: without reflection and experience, and unless enriched and given a proper direction by science, genius is only a fortunate site.

Tactics is the art of disposing and moving, for an engagement, Troops with advantage. The simple disposition and movements of troops are called Evolutions, and the combination of evolutions, a Manœuvre; and the art of applying these manœuvres to the operations of war, for the purpose of attaining a *proposed end*, are Tactics.

Strategy is the science of projecting and arranging the plan and course of operations of a war.

Tactics are the Art, Strategy the Science, of war.

The Science, as the produce of the understanding, can only be acquired by study; but to the Art belongs an innate talent, which, indeed, can and must be brought to perfection by study; which, however, he who does not possess the necessary *foundation*, can never

learn, any more than he who has no perception of tune can become a great composer. This is evident; and daily experience shows, that very well-informed officers, who draw out unexceptionable plans for military operations, do not possess the art either to direct or employ troops on the field of battle;—aye, many officers of rank are incompetent to moving a squadron on the drill-ground; whilst, on the contrary, officers have led troops to victory in the day of battle with unusual ability, without being able to prepare a plan of operations.

From hence will the boundary line between Tactics and Strategy be more distinctly drawn. Strategy is the conception, Tactics the execution, of warlike operations.

Tactics, or the art of war, require high and rare natural abilities—Strategy, or the science of war, a well-regulated, quick understanding.

To complete the Tactician, great experience and actual warfare are necessary; in time of peace, camps of instruction and Autumn manœuvres are his school. The Strategist can pursue his studies in his chamber, at all

seasons of the year; for "Tactics are the art of leading troops in the field—Strategy, the science of projecting the plan of military operations*."

Are both the art and science united in one general?—then is he an accomplished commander—the highest "*idéal.*"

The difference between Art and Science is, in itself, clear. When the human mind, not by inference and judgment, but by an innate, inventive and creative faculty, produces works which strike the senses, so that from them certain general principles may be abstracted, and systematically laid down, that is an Art; but when one, chiefly through the help of higher intellectual capacities, *i. e.* through the understanding, deduces and establishes a system of truths, by means of just combinations, out of the simplest and most undeniable principles, that is a Science.

The art changes or renews itself as often as the elements themselves, from which it arises: painting, sculpture, music, for ex-

* "Principles of Strategy."

ample, vary in proportion as the art retrogrades or advances.

What is scientific is "*à priori*" absolute and clear; and continues in itself, and through itself, alone, immutable. Euclid's Elements exist still, after centuries, a lasting *Norm*.

This definition of art and science explains, at once, the art of war, tactics, and the science of war: strategy simplifies the ideas, and makes the inferences clear and intelligible.

Tactics, or the art of war, suffer changes through every system which a new war produces: strategy, or the science of war, proceeds upon immutable rules.

The object of an engagement is always the same; but the manner of engaging is subject to changes.

The tactics of the ancients consisted in the impression made by a shock. At length, however, the invincible Macedonian phalanx was compelled to give way to the Roman tactics. The perfection of fire-arms has supplanted the deep formation; the heavy artillery has transformed the walls of masonry into bastions formed of earth; and the inven-

tion of the ricochet-shot has *covered* these again with traverses.

The wars of the French revolution point out the seventh epocha of the art of war since the invention of gunpowder; and it will not be the last.

Strategy, containing acknowledged truths, points out on every theatre of war the points and lines which must be maintained in a defensive, and taken possession of in an offensive war. It is not in the power of leaders to alter these strategetic points and lines: the commander who deviates from them, must always be overcome by him who acts according to them; unless it be, that one commander make an incursion from his base of operation with such an immense preponderance as to overturn all the rules of defence of his opponent. Is the preponderance of the one so decisive, that he may venture, without danger, to hurry on, by the shortest road, to the ultimate object of his operations, and there dictate peace? Then, indeed, neither fortifications nor armies stop him in his monstrous career; and he is to be conquered by nothing but by a war of the

people,—a rising *en masse* of the whole population.

It is remarkable how much trouble people have given themselves to point out, and firmly establish, the boundaries between tactics and strategy. They made a distinction between strategetic and tactical manœuvres; they named at one time, indeed, the manœuvres beyond the range of cannon shot, or beyond the *reach of sight* of the enemy, strategetic; and those within that circle, tactical. They said, farther, that tactics were the teaching the movements of an army, where an actual engagement was the immediate object; that strategy, on the contrary, comprehended the movements of an army, as far as they might be accomplished by marches. They also made a distinction between the art of war and tactics; and imagined different sorts of contradictions between them. They are, notwithstanding, one and the same thing. Finally, they have rejected (the term) strategy as inappropriate, and only introduced from the Greek (in which Strategos signifies a leader of an army), and will have High and Low Tactics.

Every warlike operation, and every movement of an army, which has the enemy for its object, is, according to Bulow, a military Operation, and can only be considered judicious when it is both adopted and conducted upon the fundamental principles of strategy and those of tactics; that means, first, strategetically; the conditions of a perfect security of operations are fulfilled, when the preponderating object and lines are chosen, and the enemy cannot be beforehand with us on any side or point. Secondly, tactically, when the movements of the troops, as well as their disposition, be it moveable camps, or camps of position, or cantonments, are ordered according to such rules of the art as furnish, at any moment, opportunity for an advantageous engagement.

Every military operation, therefore, or manœuvre, must be founded on strategetic principles, and carried on according to the art which is taught by tactics.

As strategy projects not only the plan of operations of a campaign, but also every individual military operation; as it designates the commanding points and lines, the possession

of which is necessary towards attaining a proposed end; so tactics teach by what positions, movements, and engagements, these strategetic plans are to be carried into execution.

When a commander neglects the application of strategetic principles, one sees him fight battles which have no other end than that of raising his military fame by a new victory.

History describes entire campaigns, in which many bloody battles have been fought, but without any brilliant results; because these battles did not take place on strategetic principles.

A military operation, as well in a strategetic as a tactical point of view, may be divided into three parts: strategetical, into the subject or ground-work of the operation; the base of the operations; the object of the operations; and the line of operations; tactically, into positions, movements, and engagements. By base of operations is understood the strategetic points which are connected with each other by well-secured lines (lines of communication). These points (subjects) must be fortified, for

the purpose of collecting the indispensable means of carrying on the war, and to secure them against the enterprises of the enemy.

The army acts defensively when it confines itself to maintaining strategetic points which it already possessed internally; on the contrary, offensively when it advances from these to gain possession of other strategetic points. These strategetic points to be gained possession of in offensive wars, are called Objects of operation; and the lines (roads) by which one arrives at them, are called Lines of operation.

Let *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, be strategetic points, which are maintained in a defensive, but from whence one moves out in offensive war; then will they, in the first case, with the line *A B*, by which they are united one with another, become the foremost Line of Defence; in the latter, the Base of operations. When one advances offensively against the object of operation *C*, then the lines *a C*, *b C*, *c C*, *d C*, come Lines of operation.

Second Lecture.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CAVALRY.

Every military constitution depends on the accordance of three powers.

a. The physical—that is, the soldier in the vigour of his age, well cloth d, provided with every necessary for the *offensive and defensive.*

b. The moral—that is, the courage and good will of the soldier, both previous to, and in action.

c. The intellectual—that is, the talent and the genius of its leaders.

The physical power is, as it were, the body; the moral, the mind; and the intellectual, the spirit; of the military organic frame. The

well-proportioned perfection of all three powers alone produces a total—a warlike *being*—an army.

All three powers are necessary conditions to the existence of this *being*. In music, two tones do not produce a chord. If one carries this analysis further, then an army is composed of three distinct sorts of troops; artillery, cavalry, infantry. Each description of troops forms a total for itself; each has its peculiar property. The artillerist, for example, comes into action, guided only by the art which he practises; the infantry, by its duty, calm and collected; the cavalry, by excitement, daring and impetuous.

From these characteristics may be deduced the qualities which the leaders of the different descriptions of troops ought to possess.

A large proportion of the people of antiquity were in favour of cavalry; and, as long as the art of war was in its infancy, or rather, more correctly, as long as side-arms, bodily strength, dexterity, and personal courage, wrested the victory in the fray, it for the most part decided battles. But it is psycologically

evident, that the fire of youth, which so sensibly characterises cavalry, easily burns out, especially since we have departed from the deeply deliberated custom of the ancients, to entrust the chief command of this arm only to the youthful and highly-promising talent of a real warlike character.

Amongst the ancients, the Commander of the cavalry was always the second in command in the army. This post was given to the most brilliant genius; and was looked upon as the school for Commanders-in-chief. Hannibal commanded the cavalry in his father's army; and when he had himself obtained the chief command, he entrusted the cavalry to his brother Asdrubal.

The greatest generals of modern times must have discovered this truth—for Seidlitz, in the thirtieth year of his age, was, by his great king, appointed general of the cavalry. Buonaparte discovered and followed this maxim, but was less fortunate in his choice, for Murat was nothing but a *daring swordsman*, ("bon sabreur,") without talent as a leader.

It requires more exertion of strength, more youth*, to attack, than to defend. Defence is often only a case of necessity. The individual man is easily moved to repulse an attack, but the attack itself always requires resolution; consequently, attack presupposes greater confidence in oneself (quite a peculiar property of youth) than defence.

The predominant principle of cavalry consists in attack, for, even in a defensive position, it can only repulse the actual attack of its adversary, by meeting him with an attack. Herein, exactly, lies the characteristic of this arm; and it is now easy to infer why it so rarely has distinguished leaders, especially in those armies where chance of seniority nominates the leader of the cavalry. Unless dashingly led, cavalry will accomplish nothing worthy of being noted in the annals of history; and a general who does not par-

* By youth, nothing is understood here, but that force of purpose which is peculiar to the real warlike character at every period of life—there are boys at sixty years of age, and grey beards at twenty.

ticipate in this conviction, will only conquer on those occasions where his adversary has still more incorrect and duller views—is even more unskilful, more inactive than himself.

If it must be admitted, that cavalry, in the late wars, rarely achieved actions rich in the results, and decisive of battles, still the cause lay less in the cavalry than in the manner it was led; and here, exactly, people appear to have committed an act of injustice, when they blame a whole body for the crime of an individual. This injustice has been continued, for the unskilful generals remained, and the cavalry kept losing ground. Thus will what is immortal, be neglected for, and sacrificed to what is mortal,—the thing, on account of the person. It was desirable, in the mean time, to place the issue of engagements beyond the reach of chance; and people turned their attention to infantry, which is not indeed so brilliantly decisive, but possesses more certainty, and precisely on that account must be considered the main arm of an army. The superiority of infantry has remained in all times nearly the same; whilst cavalry has

always made strides commensurate to the talents of its leaders.

It is, in the highest degree, rare to find, in ordinary life, a rational *person inconsiderate; but so much the more common, are rational considerate people.* All armies have had skilful leaders of infantry in sufficient numbers, and at all periods, but seldom *one* of the cavalry.

The celebrated Macedonian phalanx withstood the numerous cavalry of Darius. The Swiss gave an example that good infantry is invincible.

The English, in India, and French, in Egypt, never feared those swarms of cavalry which Lloyd considers the best, because they attack "en fourageurs."

Murat, with his cavalry, was unable to break into a compact mass of 10,000 men of Russian infantry, which, being isolated on the 14th August, 1812, retired over the small plains on the other side of Krasnoi, like a ball vomiting fire.

When such examples are supported by the calculations how expensive cavalry is in comparison to infantry, it follows, as a natural

consequence, that cavalry daily loses its consideration.

Cavalry will, probably, in the next age, only be ranked with frigates, and no more occupy a place in the order of battle; it will only be considered as useful in reconnoitring, out-post duty, advanced and rear guards, covering retreats, &c.; until some eminent talent on a throne discovering its strength, selects from the whole number of his officers, the most skilful, firmest, most resolute and dashing, to place them at its head; and in the next wars, overthrows the nations, who (following the spirit of our time in which real warlike characters become every day more scarce) neglect their cavalry*.

The greatest commanders, of all ages, have ever been convinced of the importance of cavalry, and sought to give it a preponderance. —Epaminondas was indebted to the Thessa-

* According to Wilson, the Russians have 80,000 regular, and 40,000 irregular cavalry. Were a Seidlitz at its head, what results would not the world see with astonishment in the next war?

lian horse for the greatest part of his reputation. King Philip, and his son Alexander, sought the friendship and assistance of this distinguished cavalry, which had so essentially contributed to their victories: but every commander of an army has not known how to take advantage of his cavalry, an arm which is most calculated for great and rapid undertakings; and few have understood the art of using it at the proper moment; and, again, on the other hand, when to spare it. Hannibal shines as possessing distinguished talent in both these relations. He knew how to take advantage of the superiority of his cavalry in the day of battle; and if he did not always entirely gain his most brilliant victories, yet constantly prepared the way to, and afterwards completed them with it. The engagement over, he constantly directed his particular attention towards the maintenance of this decisive, but very expensive and delicate arm. After the battle of Thrasymene, where he overcame Flaminius, and when he had reached the territory of Adria, he had the horses washed with old wine; and devoted the greatest

care to the healing their wounds and saddle-galls.

The Romans paid often very dear for the want of, and bad organization of their cavalry; and Hannibal said of it, that he feared it as little as if it was bound hand and foot. Hannibal, the renowned Hannibal, was intimately acquainted with cavalry, and knew how to use it. He understood how to derive great advantages even from the Numidian cavalry, of which historians say, that it was not possible to find worse in appearance, and which might be compared to the irregular Cossacks of the present time. The horses of these Numidians were thin, small, without saddles, and stuck their noses into the air; the riders were badly clothed, and guided their horses with one rein, or a switch. The victories of the formidable Hannibal, which laid Italy waste, first drew the attention of the Romans to their cavalry; and they began to increase and improve it. The battle, in which the Carthaginian general, Xantippus, took Regulus prisoner, was decided by cavalry.

The Carthaginians reckoned in this battle, 12,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry; the Romans 15,000 foot soldiers, and 500 horse. The Romans were old tried soldiers; Xantippus had just formed his army, but he trusted to his cavalry, chose a plain, and won the battle.

Hannibal won the battle of Tessino, in Italy, with his cavalry alone. Polybius says, emphatically, "The Carthaginians were indebted to the superiority of their cavalry, not only for the victory of Cannæ, but all their earlier successes; and thus gave a lesson to all nations, what an advantage it is to be superior to one's enemy in cavalry."

The best Roman generals of that time, Fabius, Plancus, &c. owing to their want of cavalry, avoided the plains, and took up their positions in the mountainous country.

Meantime, the Romans endeavoured to repair their faults, and, by degrees, to establish a better proportion between their infantry and cavalry. At the battle of Zama, in Africa, the cavalry of Scipio amounted to the fourth

part of his army. Hannibal's was not so numerous, was routed, and the victorious cavalry of the Romans, returning from the pursuit of it, attacked the phalanx of the Carthaginians in flank and rear; in an instant 20,000 men were laid low, and Carthage subdued by Rome.

It would be an easy matter to select still many more examples from that great age, in which the characteristic of cavalry displays itself as that glorious development of an energetic Will*, which, since fire-arms keep engagements at a distance, is gradually falling into decay.

People now lay greater stress upon positions than actions, and consider it greater, indeed often more honourable, to refuse, than to give battle. All examples from above are followed by those below; it is, therefore, not to be wondered at, when individual divisions of troops display more dexterity in avoiding than in executing a charge. In fact, the examples

* "The *will* to do, the soul to dare."
Lady of the Lake.

of troops actually coming to close contact, and engaging with side-arms, will become daily more rare. It is the age of prudence; and the corps which, without awaiting its opponent's attack, goes about, always excuses itself on that score.

One still dwells with pleasure on that fine period when chivalry was the predominant system of warfare in Europe.

Tactics consisted, at this epoch, in knightly combat; — personal bravery, bodily strength, and dexterity, decided battles. The knights were covered with iron, rode nothing but stallions, and carried lance, sword, and club.

One is forcibly struck with the magnanimity of this, in its peculiar sense, iron age. Although the so called spirit of chivalry may appear fantastic, still it must ever remain high-minded to fight for one's opinions, when one is convinced that they are true and just. No character is worthy of attention which has not an opinion of its own; and no independent character is free from peculiarities and singularities. The more insipid the individual, the more insignificant the national character: the

individual Englishman is a strange being: but there exists in England a strong national character.

Feuds were a pleasure to the knight of old; but he fought by preference in defence of his opinion: the more adventurous the occasion, the more agreeable to him. This spirit was heightened by Religion: she had her stoutest defenders amongst the knights. Love for their prince, and friendship, were sacred amongst them, and the colours of their lady what they most prized; and just the reverse of our youth of the present day, whom love renders effeminate, or our men, who think it their duty to withdraw themselves from dangers on account of their wives and children: by these considerations their valour was increased.

Tacitus, in his time, relates of the Germans:—"On the day of battle, it is a disgrace for a chief to be surpassed in bravery; a disgrace to his followers not to equal him in bravery. The majority of the young nobility attach themselves as volunteers to other tribes, which are engaged in any war, when that to

which they belong has been for some time in peace; for repose is disagreeable to these nations, and amidst dangers honour is more easily obtained. The companions of a prince rival each other to obtain the preference in his favour. To have survived him in an engagement, and return, is ignominious, and disgraces them for ever: to combat for and defend him, placing their own heroic actions to the account of his glory, is their most sacred duty. The princes fight for victory; their companions for the princes."

Who does not dwell with pleasure on such fine pictures? Truly, we should not endeavour to exterminate what little we have inherited of that period: it is force; and Germany stands in need of that force.

Chivalry did not disappear all at once; but gradually assumed the form of our cavalry of the present day.

Charles VII. of France, first established permanent cavalry, in the year 1445. This example met with approbation, and was so much the more easily imitated, as the increased power of the great monarchs would

not permit the knights any longer to make war on their own account; they, therefore, willingly entered into service, by which they procured occupation and pay for the maintenance of their thirst of glory.

Amongst all nations, of ancient and modern times, which have had cavalry, the Europeans, and amongst these the Germans, are they who have brought it to the highest state (of perfection), not in numbers, but *intrinsic condition;* and who have accomplished the boldest undertakings with it.

The Spaniards, in the conquest of America, were indebted to their artillery, but especially their cavalry, for their victories, owing to the dread which the horses impressed upon the inhabitants of Mexico and Peru; to whom these animals were entirely unknown.*

In the battle of Ceuta, which the Prince Eugene gained against the Sultan Kaara Mustapha, the German cavalry cut to pieces more than 10,000 Turks, or drove them

* In the present wars of the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country, almost all the victories of the patriots were decided by their cavalry.

into the Theisse. In 1567, when the Duke of Alva proceeded to the Low Countries, he brought with him ten squadrons of Lancers. This Alva was, indeed, the first who arrived at making his cavalry act with regularity, and in masses; but his adversary, Maurice of Orange, surpassed him. As in the beginning he wanted cavalry, he caused the Netherlanders to recruit horsemen in Germany, who no longer wore complete armour or carried lances, but had made themselves famous under the title of German Riders;—even the French called them *Reitres*. By the superiority which Maurice contrived to give this German cavalry, he conquered in the fields of Tornhout, Tiel, &c. In the battle of Leipsic, or Breitenfeld, 7th September, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus had great anxiety on account of the excellent Austrian cavalry, which seemed to him very formidable under the command of the valiant Pappenheim. His cavalry, 9,000 horses strong, in proportion to 13,000 infantry, without the 15,000 Saxons, was not indeed inferior, in discipline and bravery, to the cavalry of Tilly, which numbered 13,000

horses, but it was not so well mounted. If Tilly lost the battle in which both armies were of equal strength, namely, 37,000 men, the cause of it is not to be imputed to his cavalry, but to the faults which he himself committed, and which the most devoted bravery of his old and well-tried regiments could not make good.

Charles XII. occupied himself in a most particular manner with his cavalry, and taught it to perform evolutions with incredible rapidity. In 1707, he rode two horses to death in reviewing a regiment;—in the winter of 1705, he composed a new system of exercise; and, in fact, under him the cavalry attained a lustre never before known; and, in his Northern wars, he brought it to a formidable state of perfection.

Under the government of Frederick the Great, the cavalry attained the highest degree of perfection, and became, in its proper sense, invincible.

Led by its general, Seidlitz, the cavalry no longer appeared as a so often inactive stop-gap in the order of battle, but an efficient co-operator to victory, which, with irresistible

force, like the river overflowing its banks, destroyed all before it, and carried every thing along with it. General Seidlitz constantly kept a mass of cavalry together, and knew the secret rightly to hit upon the moments for daring, and those of prudence. How dashing and brilliant he appears at Rosbach and Zorndorf!—how deliberately temporising at Kunersdorf! But Seidlitz was a perfect general of cavalry; and a century often passes away before a second is formed in the same army. This is not hypothesis, but experience. A great general of cavalry (I mean, a general who possesses the talent of moving masses of cavalry) is even as rare a phenomenon as a great commander-in-chief*.

* It is incorrect when it is maintained, that the word General, an ordinary officer, means one who has the art of leading troops of all arms. The leader of an orchestra has never been expected to play a solo on every instrument of his orchestra. Every general should know the use and application of each arm collectively; but the knowing how to lead each separately, is as different as theory and practice. Frederick the Great said to the Prince de Ligne, "Your general, Nadasty, appeared to me to be a great general of cavalry."

The movement of cavalry requires a *quick eye*, a calm, determined spirit—on many occasions adventurous bravery—on many, prudent courage;—with one word, very many talents. The boldness which, exerted in proper time, is often decisive, is at other times fatal—when the leader allows himself and his troops to be carried away by it inopportunely.

The movement of cavalry at a trot is three times quicker than that of infantry in marching pace; therefore, that holds good for a cavalry general which Ziethen answered to his king: "the moment I see the enemy, my dispositions are already made."

As these Lectures, as the title announces, are only meant to treat of the Tactics of Cavalry, the author cannot be misunderstood, if his proposed plan does not allow him to develop the intelligence and necessity for deep study which are requisite to the leaders of infantry, especially in unsuccessful engagements, from which infantry extricates itself with much greater difficulty than cavalry.

The reputation of cavalry does not suffer, even if it does retire a little in disorder. From

infantry, obstinate resistance is expected, even under the most unfavourable circumstances. It cannot, with impunity, allow itself to be brought into confusion; and, once driven in disorder out of a position, it is difficult to re-establish order amongst it. With cavalry, unsteadiness does not produce such destructive consequences; and a brigade, just put to flight, often re-appears a few minutes afterwards, confident and victorious. This lies in the rapidity of its movements; whilst, on the contrary, the slowness of the movements of infantry render the most practised cold-bloodedness indispensable to discover the real moment which decides an engagement.

A plain open country is the sort of ground on which cavalry appears in its full splendour. The greatest rapidity is its first and most admirable quality, and that by which it has maintained that superiority which so many fields of battle attest. A leader only is necessary, in whose personal qualities lies the inexhaustible source of all success.

This is universally acknowledged, and is admitted even by those who are prejudiced

against cavalry; as, for example, M. de Folard, who, indeed, is convinced that it is of little value, and thinks an army might maintain itself right well without it, nevertheless very candidly confesses, that cavalry which is good and brave, and whose leader knows its force, and has courage to set it in motion, would at all times ride over the thin battalions.

"Infantry," says Folard, in another place, "can never stand against cavalry; and still less since it has thrown away the pike. In the Spanish War of Succession, one has seen how a Spanish officer, with 100 horse, rode through a battalion of English (which troops are not to be despised), and turned about to try it once again." General Lloyd, also, who will only allow a few cavalry, "as it is very expensive, and of little use," contradicts himself eight pages further—saying, "is your infantry bad?—then you must augment your cavalry and artillery, which are two means of keeping the enemy at a certain distance from you."

Montecuculi knew exactly the advantages of cavalry. "The most important commerce

of an army," says this general, "is a battle, and the most effective troops that trade in it are cavalry—these must turn the scale. Is the cavalry overcome?—then is the battle lost without hope. Is it, on the contrary, fortunate?—then is the victory always complete."

The battle of Wurtzburg, in 1796, speaks in support of this position—it was decided by cavalry; but the battle of Marengo, in 1800, proves how little the cavalry accomplishes when a *genial* leader is wanting.

The false point of view in which so many leaders of cavalry see their arm, has already often done more harm than can ever be made good. Cavalry must not be spared on the day of battle—the happy opportunity for reaping a harvest of renown; but the greatest pains must be applied to bring it forth, on such a day, in full force.

Now, this can only be the case when the horses are well taken care of; for the difference is important, and must, on no account, be misunderstood, that the moral force of feeling has no influence on the horse; and the good will

here cannot come into calculation. One can stir up the spirit of the soldier by harangues; and, by flattering his feeling of honour, awaken him to new action and fresh exertions—but not so the horse. Cavalry, exhausted by unaccustomed fatigues, requires months to restore it. Horses may have harder natures than men, but extraordinary exertions have also their limits to be taken into calculation. Does one drive it to this extreme, then the decay, which arises from horses over-fatigued and exhausted by want of forage, amounts often, in a few nights, to what is incredible; and the bivouacks quitted in the morning present a picture of horror. A horse, for example, whose shoeing has been neglected, is commonly useless for the whole campaign. By far the greater number of horses which the cavalry send to the depôts, have complaints in the hoof;—from that cause more than half of them fall. The fine imposing carriage of the cavalry is lost for the whole campaign. That this is the case, will be acknowledged, and cannot be denied; but the real cause of it is not sought for in its

original source—the personal influence of its leader.

This object is so interesting, so important, so characteristic, and has so decisive an influence on the success or failure of military operations (as the history of all ages demonstrates), that it appears not unnecessary to have drawn the attention to it.

Third Lecture

TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

Tactics are divided into the art of positions, that of movements, and that of fighting.

There are positions and movements out of an action, and in the engagement itself. In the following Lectures, we shall return to the former; but, first, only treat of the critical periods of positions and movements in action, and the action itself.

The establishment, arrangement, and all that belongs to the equipment and formation of the individual man and horse, for the purpose of bringing a regiment to that point of uniformity—identity, that it should be in the hands of a general, like an easily moveable machine, will be here taken for granted.

These are, properly, the elements of the service, and are grounded partly on the spirit of the nation, and partly on the taste and will of its military rulers. People generally consider these elements as belonging to tactics, and name them elementary tactics; but if tactics are the art of war, then can that, which is here understood by the elements of the service, not be reckoned as belonging to tactics.

The equipment and formation of a recruit is no art, or else every contractor and every corporal must be a tactician.

Although Marshal Saxe may derive the word "tactic" from the march of the Romans, according to time (tact); yet, in these times, we understand something more by tactics, than mere horse and foot drills—this is the mechanism of the military body. Equitation, particularly the formation of the horseman, is of great importance, and may be considered the ground-work of the tactical edifice; but it is *as little tactics themselves*, as a foundation is an edifice. With reference to troops, nothing belongs to tactics, but military ope-

rations in actual war. In peace, there can exist neither tactics nor strategy; for military operations naturally cannot be executed in peace time. Strategetic objects can only be attained in actual war, by the positions, movements, and engagements of troops.

The elements of service should now be promulgated in every army by regulations, and should be brought to such a state of perfection, that all the degrees of service, from the private dragoon to the colonel of the regiment, should be defined, and clearly expressed. One might, perhaps, divide them in the following manner:—

ELEMENTS OF THE SERVICE OF CAVALRY.

First Book, or Military Code.

a. Military law.

b. Discipline clearly defined, and developed as the basis of the military system.

c. Justice; that is, the development of the relations between the military and civil criminal law; together with a form of proceeding for the courts martial in all trials.

It should be defined where the soldier is subject to the civil law as a citizen, as it would be unjust to punish him for delinquency, which is not military, with the severity which characterises military punishment; one would, therefore, classify the faults into military and civil.

Second, or Service Book, in two Divisions.

First Division.—General relations of service, or standing orders; with forms of reports, lists, and returns.

Second Division.—Regimental standing orders, or interior duty of a regiment; with drawings and descriptions of the arms and equipments of man and horse.

Third, or Drill Instruction Book, in four Divisions.

First Division.—Instruction of the dragoon.

First Section.—Instruction of the dragoon on foot.

Second Section.—Instruction of the dragoon on horseback.

Third Section.—Breaking of the remount horses.

Fourth Section.—Use of arms on horseback.

Second Division.—Instruction of the squadron.

First Section.—Squadron drill on foot.
Second Section.—Squadron drill on horseback.
Third Section.—Formation of the flankers.

Third Division.—Drill of the regiment, or evolutions.

First Section.—Change of position from line into column.
One Movement.
Second Section.—Formation of lines
Three Movements.
Third Section.—Movements in line.
Five Movements.
Fourth Section.—Of reviews, and marching past.

Fourth Division.—Art of moving in more extended lines.

First Section.—Formation of columns.
One Movement.
Second Section.—Deployment of columns.
Two Movements.
Third Section.—Movements of lines.
Six Movements.

Fourth, or Field Service Book, containing the entire Out-post Duty; or Partisan Warfare (Petite Guerre).

Advanced Guards.
Rear Guards.

Grand Guards.
Posts of Support.
Detached Posts.
Patrols.
Reconnoissances.
Escorting Convoys.
Requisitions.
Occupation of Winter Quarters.
Surprises, &c*.

One might demonstrate the rules with examples taken from the history of the national wars; and by registering the names of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, who have distinguished themselves on service, one would stimulate the ambition of the young soldier, and elevate this fourth book of the Elements of the Service to (in its proper sense) the pedigree book of the army.

If, with respect to artillery, one distinguishes the matériel from the personel; and comprehends under the former, guns, ammunition,

* The author has published the third and fourth books according to the given form.

carriages, the train-horses, and under the latter, the artillery-soldiers; and if, according to Theobald, this distinction applies generally to the military body, since one reckons the means of fighting and subsistence as the matériel, and the army itself the personel of war; so, in a more confined sense, may this distinction be not inappropriately applied to cavalry.

The horses, then, horse-equipment, and arms, would be the matériel, and the dragoon (properly so called), the personel; in fact, each is easily distinguished from the other.

As little as the most expert artillerists can accomplish with useless guns, so little courage will the best-formed dragoons have on bad horses; and dismounted cavalry is not in the least formidable to an enemy, as the war of 1812 has proved.

Napoleon had formed in Moscow about 10,000 dismounted dragoons (to whom the author, at that time sick, was attached) into companies, battalions, and regiments, and armed them like infantry; but after the three first days' march out of the Kremlin, this fine work, like many others, was annihilated. They

marauded singly near the main road, hunting for the means of subsistence; and either fell into the hands of the Cossacks, or were slain by the natives.

Of how much greater importance the cavalry itself considers the matériel, may be proved, from the circumstance of reckoning, not, as in infantry, by the number of men, but of horses *.

Gustavus Adolphus, before the battle of Leipsic, recommended his dragoons to aim oblique cuts at the head and neck of the enemies horses, and, by wounding them, bring disorder into the ranks of their adversaries. And, in later times, officers commanding battalions have, with great success, ordered their men to aim at the horses of the advancing cavalry, upon the principle, that when the horse falls the rider is no longer formidable.

Bulow describes circumstantially, in his "Spirit of the Modern System of War," the influence which the scarcity of forage has on

* The infantry reckons its strength by bayonets, the artillery by guns, cavalry by horses.

the movements of an army. "One thinks oneself ruined," says he, "when one reads the calculations of General Templehof, and perceives the immense number of horses which an army requires: one fears they might devour the produce of a whole quarter of the globe."

The very first care of officers of cavalry must be to preserve their matériel. The horses must have rest, and time to feed; they must be constantly kept well shod, and the horse-appointments in the best order. Cavalry seldom finds itself in a situation to send sound horses to the rear; for want of them, it much oftener happens that healthy men are dismounted.

The "personel" appears of less consequence, not on account of itself, but because, when the means of maintaining the "matériel" are at hand, that (the personel) is not wanting. In fact, the dragoons, under pretence of fetching forage for their horses, know how to take care of themselves; hence arises so often the complaint, the cavalry plunder; whilst the officers rather wink at what is not entirely to be put a stop to, than neglect their duty—the main-

tenance of the materiel:—this is one of the evils attendant upon war.

A.—THE ART OF POSITIONS OF CAVALRY.

Cavalry can only act with effect on the offensive: the offensive requires force and energy; the defensive, prudence and circumspection. It must have open ground before it, in order to develop its force, and be able to apply its energies. According to Theobald, it requires an even, hard ground, or a gentle ascent. The point it is to defend it must have on its front, or on one side, for the purpose of being able, when threatened, to act by the force of its shock; while exactly the reverse, infantry must be placed on the line which it is to defend.

From hence it follows, that cavalry is never judiciously posted when in front of obstacles, such as villages, defiles, coppices, &c., but must always be at a distance behind, that full scope may be given for the force of its charge. The placing cavalry too near behind guns, to protect them, is only sacrificing it without an object: it would be better placed sideways—

as it acts still more efficiently by a flank attack, particularly in an oblique line.

On the day of battle, the very first consideration must be, to assemble a large mass of cavalry on one point, but disposed in several lines, which, under the command of *one* leader, turns the moment of eruption to account with the swiftness of lightning. This leader should receive no order but from the commander-in-chief, and be, in the proper sense, general of the cavalry.

People are not quite agreed, upon the place the cavalry should occupy in the order of battle. It was a long time customary to place it on the wings, but from that arises the disadvantage, that the troops cannot reciprocally support each other; and if the cavalry is beaten, the wings of the infantry remain *without a leaning point.* It is probable, that this separation of the cavalry from the infantry had its origin from the prepossession against the necessity for cavalry; and, in fact, disposed in this manner, the two arms appeared like corps acting for themselves, which supported each other so little, that each arm seemed to

fight singly on its own account. If the cavalry was beaten, the infantry thought itself lost, and would not stand any more; therefore the general directed his attention to the cavalry, and where he had the superiority in that arm, endeavoured first to conquer the cavalry of his adversary, in order to be sure of the result of the action.

In the thirty years' war, Gustavus Adolphus usually placed divisions of infantry in the intervals between his squadrons, wishing by this to give greater strength to his cavalry, as that of the Austrians was superior to it. This very close combination of the two arms has found its supporters, but unjustly;—was the cavalry broken, then was the infantry, which was of no use to the cavalry, lost.

Frederick imitated this disposition in the battle of Mollwitz, but confesses it was defective.

The field of battle itself, in most cases, points out to the cavalry its place; when this is not the case, it should be formed in a mass behind the infantry. The rapidity of its movements admits of its being moved, undi-

vided, to several points during the engagement.

By this, more firmness will be given to the line of battle. One cannot but suppose that the soldier in the first line will fight with more courage when he observes numerous lines behind him in support, which will produce the opposite effect on his opponents. Whoever has observed the reflections of the common soldier, will acknowledge the truth and justice of this. "A few divisions of light cavalry," says the Archduke Charles, "detached, or behind the first line of infantry, are sufficient to rush through the intervals, when the enemy advancing, or thrown back in disorder, present weak points."

If one follows this maxim, and, uniting the remaining mass of cavalry on one point, give it a highly talented leader, it will work *wonders*.

The Archduke Charles says, further, "The general, to whom the commander-in-chief entrusts the cavalry on the day of battle, should not allow himself to be led away by any representations of the other generals to divide his

mass, and with its fragments render unmeaning assistance. The Austrian generals seldom followed these principles. On all open tracts of a position, and on all plains which a column might march through, the cavalry was divided amongst the infantry; the latter lost its habit of standing by itself, and the former did not decide battles."

B.—ART OF MOVING OF CAVALRY.

Evolutions.

The movements of cavalry must be surprising and rapid, and bear the character of resolute confidence. One must endeavour, by outflanking the enemy, to fall so unexpectedly on his flank as not to leave him any time for a counter-manœuvre: against cavalry itself, this is easier than against infantry, for this can always form itself into a square before the cavalry can execute its charge. It seems, therefore, more prudent, first of all, to try the steadiness of the infantry by isolated *swarm* attacks, and by these means to tire it out, and thus let the moment for the charge

depend on one's self; for it is vexatious, and works disadvantageously on the rear, when an attack fails.

The echelon manœuvre will attain this object with the greatest certainty. Some innovators have, indeed, been of opinion, that one ought to apply the close column against infantry, as the rear-divisions, having suffered loss from the fire, propel those in front, after the proverb,—"One wedge drives another;" but since the perfection of fire-arms, the deep formation for the actual attack has fallen into disuse.

There are cases where an *impetuous* attack will be so decisive, that it would be a fault, and the favourable moment be lost, if one waited to deploy; then is it indifferent how one falls upon the enemy, in open or close column, or in line, in order or in disorder. Of this, the conduct of General von Rœmer, in the battle of Mollwitz, is an example. This, however, is no rule, but an exception. The Austrian army, under field-marshal Neuperg, was almost surprised by the king, at Mollwitz,

10th April, 1741: General von Schulemberg commanded the Prussian, General von Rœmer the Austrian cavalry. As General von Rœmer came up, he observed that the Prussian cavalry was wheeled, by squadrons, to the right, for the purpose of gaining the village of Herrendorf, against which its right wing was to lean. Without deploying, in column as he was, General von Rœmer fell upon his adversary with loose reins, and naturally put him completely to the rout. The cavalry generals on both sides fell in this battle.

Flank manœuvres may be executed in several ways. The Archduke Charles, and Theobald, recommend, with reason, the causing regiments in column to follow behind the wings of the first line. One can, especially if opposed to cavalry, surprise one's adversary by a change of front, executed at a gallop, or by a formation in oblique line; but this requires well-drilled and tried regiments, as may be supposed.

The echelon manœuvres have many advantages, as they favour the formation of an

oblique line. An advance in echelon, from the centre, would very much facilitate out-flanking.

C.—COMBATS OF CAVALRY.

A charge of cavalry is very uncertain, and often splits upon the smallest obstacle which it encounters unexpectedly. From hence it follows as a rule, if possible, to surprise one's adversary; but to place oneself secure against such an event.

The first can be accomplished by rapid movements, executed upon one or both flanks of one's adversary; aye, even upon his second line, when one is superior in numbers, since one goes round one or both wings: but the latter is effected by uniting the whole of one's cavalry to secure oneself the preponderance; and drawing it up, according to circumstances, in two or even three lines, with the flanks well protected.

The attack itself must be made with that impetuosity which alone gives room to expect a fortunate result. But as the shock requires the use of every *faculty*, as it brings the

cavalry into a state of excitement, which is followed by the opposite extremes, apathy or exhaustion; and as the successful charge, which is the result of the greatest exertions, occasions disorder, especially from this, that, owing to the inequality in the strength of the horses, the line is lost, no means must be left untried, at the moment of breaking from the gallop into the charge, to stir up, even to ferocity, the state of enthusiasm into which a brave cavalry usually rises during the attack. Force exhausts itself in proportion as it is used; so that the maximum of exertion is followed by that of exhaustion*. One must, therefore, endeavour to ensure the result before the ecstasy evaporates.

Cavalry is never weaker, or more easily conquered, than after a successful charge. Before the horses recover their wind, and the dragoons from their exertions, one hears a wild shout, whilst each individual wishes to relate to his friends and comrades what has happened to him; but no word of command

* "Principles of Strategy."

is understood. In vain the trumpeters sound the rally (*appel*); in vain the officers exert themselves to reform the line. If, at such a moment, a fresh body of the enemy appears, the movement to the rear is quite as rapid as a few minutes before it was to the front. But a second line, brought up at a trot, is a secure disposition against such mishaps.

Could one entangle one's adversary at all points in an action, and then first bring up a fresh line, then, indeed, as at Wurtzburg, must the victory ever be certain.

Whoever has seen the numerous and fine cavalry of the Allied Powers, in 1813 and 1814, must regret that no general-in-chief was placed at its head. What could not such a cavalry have accomplished! A victory is not brilliant, not complete, which has not been turned to account by the cavalry; but the loss of a battle, which has been decided by cavalry, is ruinous and fatal to its adversaries.

Fourth Lecture.

CHARACTERISTIC OF ENGAGEMENTS.

To give instruction upon engagements is the most difficult part of tactics. The critical moments of engagements may be developed like those of positions or movements; but the action itself is no more under the controul of that calmness and self-possession which is, however, so necessary to rescue the issue from uncertainty. The human heart plays too important a part on such an occasion, to bring this branch of the art of war under any regular point of view.

When two lines, determined to charge, advance upon each other, and when within fifty or sixty paces of each other, one side wheels about, and takes to flight, the cause is to be found nowhere else than in the human heart.

Must one not also allow, that many commanding officers, instead of remaining cool and resigned, grow feverish,—shout, instead of commanding,—and, by these means, confuse not only their men, but also themselves, so that at last they no longer know where their head stands? It cannot be doubted that courage has its caprices; and troops fight much more stout-heartedly one day than another.

Since Marshal Saxe has already observed, that the same troops which were beaten behind fortifications, would have been victorious had they made the attack, one may agree with him, that nothing is more fickle than the courage of a soldier.

It is no easy matter (to use the language of the fencing-school) not to confound the days of boldness with those of shyness; the high example, the equal calmness, and cool presence of mind of the officer who finds himself at the head of a troop; the confidence of the private soldier in his leader, and conviction that he does nothing without an object, master

the irresolution of the soldier, and are the means of securing one against the caprices of courage. The leader, as has been observed, must do every thing to animate the spirits of his troops at the moment of charging; but he must not conceive it necessary to increase his own courage. The soldier is a severe observer and judge of his officer. He does not require from him the qualities of a combatant; but with so much more reason, those of a commander.

It might be interesting to the philosopher to observe the moments in which battles are decided. They take the young soldier by surprise, while the veteran sees them long before; 'aye, even often knows the issue of an affair before it has begun.

This possibility of prophesying lies partly in the moral frame of mind, which may have arisen from previous reverses, or the want of the means of subsistence; but still oftener when troops have a want of confidence in the abilities of their leader.

Not unfrequently does the loss or gain of a

battle depend on very trivial circumstances, unconnected with the calculations of the commanders*.

The causes from which troops lose their countenance are often inexplicable. Marshal Villars relates, that in the battle of Friedlingen the French infantry had already broken

* M. de Brettschneider relates: "The great discovery which I publish to the world, more than fifty years after the affair, is nothing less than the cause of the gain of the battle of Kollin. I was at that time in the Saxon light horse. We remained on this hot day, from early till after mid-day, in line, on a rising ground indeed, but yet a little covered by the outstretched summit of the hill, behind which we could see as little of the enemy as they of us. On the right wing the cannon thundered so incessantly, that we heard very little of the musquetry. Just next us was a village on fire, which the Croats had occupied; but we stood perfectly quiet, without any thing to do. Directly in front of me, as I stood in the ranks, was a shady tree, under which Colonel Benkendorf, of Prince Charles's regiment, had his dinner-table laid out. This circumstance made a deep impression on my memory; as at that moment the ham which the colonel devoured, and canteens which he emptied, seemed of greater consequence than any thing else. Scarcely had he finished his bottles, than, lo! an aide-du-camp of field-marshal Daun, passing down the lines, brought the order to all the com-

through the Austrian, and pursued it through a wood into the plains on the other side, when, suddenly, some one cried out, "We are cut off." Some squadrons which this victorious infantry, at this moment, observed in its rear, and erroneously took for the enemy's cavalry, made it take to flight, in the greatest disorder;

manders of brigades and regiments to retire; and named the places where each was to form again. Scarce was he gone by, when Colonel Benkendorf rode quite on to the rising ground, came back with an inflamed countenance, and roared aloud, 'The enemy is advancing against us: let those who choose retire; but whoever is a brave fellow, let him follow me;' and so, as we were all brave fellows, we followed him also. We, Saxons, broke into the infantry, and cut them to pieces. The Austrian regiment, St. Ignon, which stood next us, followed our example; and, one after another, the whole of Nadasty's corps of cavalry. The battle was gained: had we obeyed the aide-du-camp, it would have been lost. Now this is the great problem, whether Colonel Benkendorf, if he had not finished his last bottle, would have ventured on this bold step? I say, not. Since it even still vexes me, that that man eat and drank before my nose, in the extreme craving of my stomach, without taking the smallest notice of my necessity. So may the victory of Kolin, like many thousand other great occurrences of this world, be ascribed to the bottle."

and, without being attacked or pursued; and totally regardless of all the exertions of the marshal, and other generals, it could not be brought to stand again. Had not the French cavalry, at the same time, completely beaten the Austrian, and held the victory fast, Marshal Villars would have lost the battle.

More modern history furnishes examples enough of troops, which, firm as rocks, could not be conquered, and had calmly endured the heaviest fire; yet still have gone to the rear, in too great a hurry, when the general had ordered a retrograde movement.

The whole scene changes. A few minutes before, one saw great lines; now the army, doubled up in columns of retreat, seems to have vanished; the thunder of cannon ceases; all is deep stillness. One can comprehend the effect all this produces on the minds of the soldiers; and this is the Psycology of war.

The battle once decidedly lost, every attempt to re-establish it is in vain. The bravest regiments yield to the attack, even when the advantage of numbers preponderates on their side.

The entire frame of mind changes as quick as fortune. Where the man has no more hope of gaining any thing, every exertion is irksome to him; and he shies danger. A few determined characters, alone, withstand this impulse; but they are borne away in the throng.

This explains the astonishing results of the battle of Waterloo. The moral force of the armies, on each side, was equal. The French had still one motive more:—it fought for its existence. The physical force itself did not, in the evening, preponderate to the disadvantage of the French, for they deployed against the attack on their right flank a new corps d'armée, which had not yet been under fire; nevertheless, when once the line of battle was lost, what unexampled disorder and flight!

In Genappe, with 15,000 or 20,000 men, disposed in good order, and resolved to meet their death there, or arrest the victory of their adversaries, one might have prevented any further misfortune. A few cannon shot, and the bugles of the Prussians, were sufficient to make the flight general.

Where else, but in the human heart, are the causes of this to be found? Psycology, alone, gives the solution.

The moment on which the loss or gain of a battle depends, requires great previous preparation.

The commander, when the action has been extended already some hours along the whole front, endeavours to spy out some weak point in his adversary's line; and this is exactly that high talent, that cool, well-exercised eye, that genial "*coup d'œil*," (which can be acquired by no study, but must be innate,) not only not to miss the point and the moment, but also so to have arranged the disposable forces, and to be able to command them so instantaneously, that they can act on the exact point, and at the exact moment.

On this account prudent generals endeavour, when this decisive moment approaches, and they discover the superiority of their adversary's force, to avoid this crisis, by withdrawing the army from the field of battle before the shock ensues, and their line is broken; and this is called refusing battle.

But it requires a soul perfectly free from passion, a real military character, to form this resolution, and to execute it with dexterity.

The Crown Prince (at present, King of Wirtemberg) appears so great, by conduct like this at Monterau, 18th of February, 1814. The battle of Witepsk, in July 1812, was refused, in a similar manner, by the Russians.

Whilst the conqueror, satisfied with the advantage he has gained over his adversary, triumphantly marches over the field of battle, the latter has time to continue, without much loss, his retreat, which cannot be endangered, as his regiments, being in order, are still capable of fighting. By this decision, the commander-in-chief loses the confidence of his army as little as the army loses its courage; which, however, would have certainly happened, had he awaited the forcible decision, as this is constantly accompanied by great loss.

In official reports, therefore, this is termed, "Out of higher considerations, retiring to a stronger position:" and this is, in most cases, true; since such an army, in a very short time

afterwards, again assumes the offensive, in an imposing manner.

When both sides have exerted themselves with obstinacy, to give the battle a decisive character, without that result, that is a drawn battle; when, therefore, both armies claim the victory, not entirely without reason, since neither is conquered, both commanders-in-chief date their dispatches from the field of battle, and after that each retires, as was the case at Eylau, in Prussia, in February 1807.

The most difficult part in the instruction for cavalry actions, is to decide how infantry may be most safely and most advantageously attacked. According to Theobald, the attack cannot well take place before the infantry shows openings and disorder; and this appears correct. It is true, that, according to the laws of mechanics, it seems as if cavalry, set in motion, must ride over a line of infantry: if, putting psycological considerations out of the question, one might venture to assume, that troops might be converted into complete machines. When it is necessary to attain a great result, there is no doubt but that a brave

cavalry, headed by a resolute leader, driven on by this necessity, will overcome every infantry: but the loss in accomplishing this will be great.

Owing to the improved tactics of infantry, which give it a great superiority, it is very difficult for cavalry to attack it with advantage. This superiority of tactics of infantry, consists in a more rapid formation of masses, accompanied by a very destructive and well-maintained fire. On this account, two grand fundamental principles are to be laid down for cavalry, in all attacks upon infantry; it being understood that external impressions, for instance, constant rainy weather, by which the muskets miss fire (as at Grossbeeren and Dresden, in August 1813), or long-continued want and reverses, have not weakened the moral elements: in these cases, cavalry has only boldly to advance, to obtain successful results. Where, on the contrary, the moral elements are in full force, a charge of cavalry, in one line, will seldom succeed. In the Ninth Lecture we shall return to this subject; but here we mention, as the first rule to be observed,

to cause the operation of artillery (grape and cannister) to precede the charge; and, as a second, not to attack infantry when it has taken up a position on favourable ground, with a resolute countenance which says, "Come on!" Much rather, let cavalry endeavour to surprise infantry on its march.

When the infantry to be attacked shows a good countenance, and no openings, it is not so much prudence, as one's duty, to allow the consideration, whether the loss will bear comparison with the gain, to precede the charge. In such cases, one often attains the same end, by manœuvering to surround the enemy; by which, indeed, the pastime of a massacre is spared. There are officers who set a great value on such a massacre, and on every occasion desire this spectacle from the cavalry.

It is certainly a beautiful thing to see, when a line of cavalry resolved to charge, rushes over a plain like a whirlwind, and breaks into the infantry, which it destroys like a hurricane.

On the 25th March, 1814, at La Fère Champénoise, several French squares were entirely cut to pieces. In the battle of

Dennewitz, 6th September, 1813, the Prussian cavalry rode down two infantry regiments. On the 1st of May, 1809, at Riedau, the Baden regiment of dragoons, commanded by Colonel von Heimroth, charged a battalion in square, which was entirely annihilated.

At the battle of Cateau, in Flanders, 26th April, 1794, Colonel the Prince of Schwartzburg, at the head of six Austrian and twelve English squadrons, attacked a column of French infantry; 2,000 men were cut down, 22 cannon, 29 ammunition-waggons, with 136 horses, captured; the general commanding this column (Chapuy), and 277 men made prisoners. On the 22nd of August, 1796, the Archduke Charles beat Bernadotte, with cavalry, at Triningen. Marshal Saxe relates, that in the battle of Belgrade two Austrian brigades were cut to pieces by a swarm of Turks. "Besides Count Neuperg, who commanded these battalions, and, luckily, had a horse, and an ensign, who, with his colours, held on to the tail of my horse, and impeded me very much, no one escaped."

At Melazzo, the victorious Austrian infantry, in spite of its fire and steadiness, was

surrounded and cut to pieces by the Spanish cavalry. At Fehrbellin, the elector, Frederick William the Great, with 5,000 horse and 12 cannon, beat the Swedes, although they were much stronger. The Duke of Vendôme, with his cavalry, annihilated the Spanish infantry at Marseilles. At the battle of Mons en Puelle, the cavalry of Philip the Fair cut to pieces the Flemish infantry; its leader, William of Juliers, and the greater part of his men, fell on the field. Many examples of this sort are to be found in history; but those are still more numerous, where attacks of cavalry upon infantry have failed. At Waterloo, all the exertions of the French cavalry were fruitless.

It is, therefore, always necessary to observe if the signs are favourable; and for this, exactly (as the beginning of this Lecture says) no rules can be laid down: it requires innate talent, and is the most difficult problem of the art of war. The fortunate event of the battle lies in a judicious disposition, previously arranged. Whoever attacks without these favourable auspices, acts with passion; and passion plunges into destruction.

When the disposition for a battle is judiciously formed, upon tactical principles and psycological considerations, indecision ceases; and the execution of the attack itself must bear the impression of that impetuosity, and that daring confidence, which, as has been pointed out, always forcibly secures the victory. Without this impetuosity, the attacks of cavalry are followed by no brilliant consequences. A leader must only allow time for deliberation, before the execution of a charge; but as soon as he has given the signal for it by the trumpets, all deliberation must cease, that only excepted of animating his men.

At this moment, he must resemble a high-spirited, thoughtless youth, to whom the issue of his actions is quite indifferent: like the Counts of Alençon and Flanders, at the battle of Crecy, on the 26th of August, 1346, who rushed upon the enemy with their cavalry, with the exclamation, "To death!"—"*A la mort!*"

The importance of certain days is felt. On this account, on the day of battle, generals remind their troops of former days of triumph,

that they may impart the same disposition which on those occasions produced the victory.

"The sun of Austerlitz rises!" was the cry at the battle of the Moskwa, on the 7th of September, 1812. At the battle of Vittoria, 21st of June, 1813, Lord Wellington reminded his army, "that they were the brothers of the heroes of Trafalgar, and had the troops before them which they had conquered at Salamanca."

History has preserved the most important harangues which commanders, on similar occasions, have held to their troops. "Soldiers!" said Buonaparte, at the battle of Marengo, as he rode through the ranks, about six o'clock in the evening, "Soldiers! remember that it is my custom to sleep on the field of battle;" and the battle, which, up to that time, had been against him, took a turn in his favour.

Hannibal, and Scipio, each endeavoured to animate their armies before the battle, at the river Tessin: the former caused some prisoners to fight with each other, in front of the line, for the purpose of inflaming his troops

by the sight of a combat. It is essential to excite the moral force before an action. Napoleon, on marching out of Paris, in 1815, had the eagles of the guard veiled with crape, which was not to be taken off before the enemy was beaten.

The moral force of the soldier is often increased by strengthening the physical. Before the battle of Hochstedt, in 1704, Marlborough sat quietly in his carriage, occupied with his dress; and answered the generals who reported to him that all was prepared for the attack, and that the army was waiting with impatience for the signal,—"The rations are not yet given out."

Before the battle of Leuthen, 5th December, 1757, Frederick the Unique tried all measures to reanimate the sunken courage of the Silesian army. "The king addressed himself to the feeling of honour of the officers; spoke individually to the private soldiers; and caused provisions to be delivered out to them, and wine, also, as an auxiliary, to reanimate the depressed spirits of the troops*."

* "History of my own Time."

After a good breakfast, one goes much more courageously into action. The action on the 3rd of May, 1809, near Ebersberg, on the Traun, would not have taken place, had not Massena made an excellent breakfast in Lintz, which the town furnished *Gratis*.

The actions after mid-day are, generally, hotter than those which begin with sun-rise; but the latter are more decisive. A battle decided about mid-day is, generally, dangerous to the defeated army; in proportion as the force is exhausted, the courage slackens. To him, who has found himself in such a situation, the miracle of Joshua is comprehensible: one really thinks the sun stands still.

If, in earlier times, commanders* have placed dependance upon certain favourable signs, to a degree amounting to superstition, this, truly, may have only been in order to make themselves masters of the disposition of the army: but there dwells in men a feel, which foretells good and bad luck.

* Wallenstein.

Physical force exhausts itself, and so does good fortune. As long as a commander enjoys the favours of fate, even trivial circumstances combine to produce fortunate results. If, however, at a later period, the wrath of fate pursues the same commander, then, indeed, the best dispositions, the most judicious plans of operation,—in a word, the speculations of strategy,—split upon the smallest obstacles which occur in the tactical execution, and unite to overwhelm him with misfortune. If ever a commander lived to witness this assemblage of unfortunate circumstances, it was Buonaparte (who so long hung on the girdle of fortune), on the opening of the campaign of 1815.

The truth of that old saying in the Bible, "And they were smote with blindness," is proved in the life of almost every individual: great and small, distinguished and unknown; almost every man lives up to one moment, when a mistaken view of his own situation leads him on to faults which undermine his good fortune, and, like a storm, drive him out of his course.

The higher the point on which the man stands, the more critical is this moment. Commanders generally have a presentiment of the crisis of their good fortune.

Thus Hannibal had a presentiment of the loss of the battle of Zama: he endeavoured to negotiate, but the haughty Scipio demanded too hard conditions. Tilly, the till then unconquered Tilly, was temporising and undecided before the battle of Leipsic; he committed faults;—an inward feel foretold his ill-luck. Attila prudently turned about with his victorious army from before the walls of Rome, as an inward feel told him he should in Rome meet disgrace and death. Frederick the Great acknowledged, in the War of Succession of Bavaria, that "Fortune was no longer favourable to him."

When Fortune deserts commanders, it is time for them to cover themselves with the cloak of wisdom and moderation:—we mean, make peace.

It is certainly difficult to discover, justly, the crisis of fortune, and treat it judiciously; and the more so, as the passions, especially

ambition and pride, those dangerous allies (which are much too fond of being companions), diminish the influence of reason, flatter and corrupt the understanding, and thus interrupt the cool calculation of what is to come. A too fiery force of imagination, which resists the authority of reason, always inflicts its own punishment.

Fifth Lecture.

FORMATION OF CAVALRY.

The annals of history teach us, that great generals have usually handed down their wars and actions to posterity in memoirs only, but for the most part without developing the principles upon which they have acted.

The art of war was grounded on custom and prejudice. Those commanders who were at the same time authors, sought rather to please than instruct; perhaps, indeed, did not understand the art of teaching, and therefore only handed down *their* customs and *their* prejudices. Systems first arose, when, in later times, by the study of every memorable event, they were espoused by a party.

Whilst there was still no fixed form of instruction, either in the art or in the science of war—whilst, particularly, very little of the scientific part of war was known, and therefore people only spoke and wrote on the *handicraft* of war,—then existed a sort of anarchy; and each defended the customs and prejudices of that leader he had chosen for his model. The animation and enthusiasm for the chosen model, arose in proportion as clearness was wanting in the conceptions which their own judgment produced. The fewer original ideas a man has, the more vehemently he defends those of other people.

That period is now particularly interesting, from being the commencement of the clearing up of the scientific horizen; but one meets with not only great errors, but also that which is ever the consequence of anarchy—great bitterness between the opposite parties. Brézé, for instance, takes it very ill of Folard that he declares himself in favour of small squadrons, and absolutely condemns all his logic, because he (Folard) is bold enough to say, that what the great Condé had said on the subject of

large squadrons, was not an article of belief. Brézé considers this position as logically false, as that by which St. Augustine (who is one of the few men who has written a real confession), in the fifth century, endeavours to prove, that Mary had only one son, consequently Christ could have no brother. "The mother of our Saviour," wrote St. Augustine, "had only one son, for the lioness bears only one cub."

Brézé is further of opinion, that the Prince of Condé, who had often fought at the head of the French cavalry, had more right to decide upon it than Folard, who never even led one squadron.

Paradoxes always arise out of theories which are not the result of experience. M. de la Balme takes the field still more vehemently against the Chevalier (de Folard), and denies him the least judgment. The Marquis de Silva and Bonneville, on the other hand, support him; the former, in order to dispense with cavalry, proposes placing chevaux de frise before the infantry first line—the latter would lengthen the weapons of the second and third ranks,

for the purpose of keeping off the charge of the cavalry.

This period, in which the partisans of particular customs and prejudices endeavoured to reduce these into systems, and were constantly squabbling, each in defence of his own, proves the want of established fundamental principles. This period, in the mean time, is not very long gone by; and one must say, unfortunately, that certain prejudices prevail even at present, not only with respect to formation and tactics, but also between the different arms, with respect to each other.

The infantry officer, conscious of his own value (since every regular engagement develops the infantry masses, and the maintaining or carrying strong or commanding points in the line of battle, and, above all, since, in particular, the gaining the victory are the glorious deeds of infantry), is, by these considerations, easily induced to believe, that, with the exception of a few light cavalry to clear the way *(éclairer)*, the rest may be dispensed with.

The cavalry officer, proud of the history of

all ages, which incontestibly proves, that, without cavalry, no victory can be brilliant, and that a beaten army, unless pursued by cavalry, cannot be considered conquered, but that a victory, decided by cavalry, is always complete, falls not unfrequently into blameable presumption. Towards artillery, both arms conduct themselves without jealousy; and only in rapid retreats, where it is often so difficult to defend or save it, wish it far away.

In addition to these prejudices, come also those which are re-echoed through all Europe against standing armies; and on which subject, even in the armies themselves, exist divided opinions.

The old disciplined soldiers of Philip II., under an Alva, say they, were subdued by the Netherlanders, when they took up arms in defence of liberty.

The Americans, fighting for freedom, resisted the standing armies of Great Britain.

The celebrated armies of Germany, with their experienced tactics, could not withstand the French National Guards.

The much-admired Prussian army was con-

quered, in one battle, by those soldiers whom liberty had formed. But when these old children of liberty lay buried on the fields of battle, and the succeeding French armies were organised like every other standing army, in which the soldier, without this phantom—without excitement, merely obeys from cold duty;—these celebrated armies, which had been accustomed to march victorious through all Europe, were conquered, in part, by militia, who rushed to arms inflamed by hatred and revenge.

In Spain, similar causes have produced similar results; and in South America, a war of the same sort is not yet ended. These facts, by which people support their opinion without estimating the causes from whence they have proceeded, are what seem to give weight to the prejudice against standing armies. The Institution of Landwehr, as at present existing in many German states, was only called forth by a momentary paroxysm. In peaceable times it must necessarily sink, when this paroxysm, which alone raised it, has subsided—even without taking into calculation the expenditure entailed on the subjects

for equipment, and maintaining fortresses, which threatens the political economy; and as the days of exercise are mostly Sundays, it undermines religion and morals: so that, through these circumstances, the happiness of families is destroyed, and consequently the welfare of the state is shaken in its foundations.

Ten years of peace will reduce the Landwehr men to the level of the former town soldiers *(stadt soldaten)*; and a Landwehr army will resemble an army of the Circles. A state, whose whole defence reposes on a Landwehr establishment, will be subdued by any invader in one rapid operation. War alone brings such institutions to perfection. This is proved by history. What a length of time elapsed, and how many faults were necessary on the Spanish side, before the Revolution of the Netherlands obtained a consistency. Without the assistance of France, the United States of America would perhaps never have secured their liberty. The French National Guards only were victorious through the want of union amongst the Allied Powers. The loss of the battle of Jena

was less the result of better tactics than of superior strategy. The Prussian army was not formed in order of battle, but was attacked on its march, and beaten in detail. In 1813 and 1814, the French armies yielded to superiority of forces;—at the same time, the genius of good fortune deserted them. In Spain, the Duke of Wellington, not the Spaniards, conquered the French. In South America, there is very little opposition to the Independents. Years of devastation, anxiety, and terror, are necessary to awaken that degree of heroism which at length produces great results. Heroism is a hot-house plant, which does not thrive without fostering care.

War, as the last resource of a state, requires preparation. The art of government and the art of war must act in concert, in order to attain the end proposed in entering upon the war. Should a minister of war, without consideration for the resources of the state, plan a war establishment, and set up the principle, that the expenditure in support of it was indispensable to the state, whilst the general sense of the country was opposed to it, as

uselessly consuming a very considerable part of its resources, the harmony of this concert would be incomplete. The welfare of the state ought to be a sovereign's first object. External security forms an essential part of this welfare; but, on the other hand, this external security must not be attained at the expense of internal prosperity. A standing army must not be elevated into the object, but only appear as a means of attaining this object. The problem, therefore, consists in this—to convert the standing military force into a real establishment of education for war, in which, not merely a small number of citizens, but the whole population, should be trained to military service, and where every one capable of bearing arms should perform his course of exercise for a year. A state can only look to its young citizens for the defence of its independence; but then they must have some military education, which is only possible by their being removed, for a year at least, from the paternal home.

Such a regulation, or war establishment, would assign its proper station to the class which has the honourable and important desti-

nation of exposing life and property for the external safety of the state. The soldier, having completed this course and period of service in the line, would enter the militia, which is only destined for a defensive war.

Thus the establishment for the protection of a state would be divided into two classes—the offensive and defensive. No state can isolate itself, and act upon an entirely offensive, or entirely defensive system: each must therefore be combined with the other. But it is only meant here to point out the possibility of forming this establishment—not to prove it.

Cavalry belongs to the offensive means, as infantry to the defensive means, of the armed power. The necessity of preserving a permanent body of cavalry is universally acknowledged, and even admitted by those who are of opinion that the defensive means alone are sufficient for a state.

Cavalry presupposes a careful organization, and cannot be formed in a moment, on the breaking out of a war.

Upon the Formation of Cavalry, there exist as many different views and opinions as there can be points of view in which one can consider it. Various periods, with respect to this formation, having elapsed; after having gone backwards and forwards from the deep formation to the shallow, people are at length convinced, that the front rank alone can contribute to the shock; and that no impression, no impulsion, is produced by the ranks formed behind it, nor is the celerity augmented, as may possibly be supposed in infantry.

The experience of so many centuries has produced this result—that the cavalry of all European nations, except the Turks, is formed in two ranks.

It is, therefore, unnecessary to say any thing more upon this, or one might easily extract from history the various epochs of this arm. We confine ourselves to the present time.

The English, French, and Hanoverians, are divided into troops, two of which form a squadron; the strength of a troop is usually from 75 to 80 horses, consequently a squadron 150 or 160 horses. The Austrians form

themselves in squadrons, two of which make a division; the strength of the Austrian regiments renders this division necessary; and that of a division often amounts from 300 to 400 horses. The Prussian cavalry always was, and still is, formed in squadrons of from 120 to 170 horses. Whatever variety may exist in their constitution, the important part must not be forgotten, which ensures the two conditions:—

a. The Tactical.

b. The Œconomical.

The whole may be reduced to the following brief positions:—

1. A regiment of more than 1,000 horses, loses more in facility of moving than it gains in strength.

The colonel can neither, in respect of discipline nor of manœuvre, *have the necessary superintendence over it.*

2. A regiment, under 700 horses, possesses no force for the shock; and after being a few times engaged, becomes too weak to maintain its place in line as a regiment.

3. The same holds good with respect to squadrons above 250, or under 150 horses.

4. A regiment divided into four squadrons, seems to possess the greatest facility of movement; the squadron into four divisions, each division into two subdivisions; and besides that into four sections, each of four files. The No. 4 is very appropriate, easy to divide, and was adopted as early as by the Greeks. The formation is very much simplified by this constant repetition of fours. The squadron thus consists of 128 privates.

This formation, as well as the denomination, regiment, is of German origin. Prince Maurice of Orange issued commissions to certain officers to raise cavalry in Germany, of which, by virtue of their agreement, they had the government *(das regiment)*, the uncontrolled command, with all prerogatives. The colonels then called the troop of horse, which they had themselves formed, their "regiment." The regiment was divided into four divisions, which were called squadrons, or *(rittschaften)*; over each of which a *rittmeister (chef d'escadron)* had the command. The colonel had, as an assistant, and to supply his place during illness or absence, a lieutenant, the Lieutenant-colo-

nel; further, an officer, who superintended the interior service, guards, &c., this was the major *(oberst wachtmeister)*. The officer commanding a squadron, had in like manner his lieutenant and a quarter-master *(wachtmeister)*; the cornet carried the standard. Four squadrons made a regiment, which never exceeded 1000 horses.

The Greeks, already in their time, and the Romans, gave to their cavalry of the line, small troops of light horsemen—the archers and slingers.

The knights of old had their squires and archers.

Louis XIV. drafted from each troop the best riders and shots, formed them into small divisions, and called them carbineers, and used them as flankers. The Hungarian hussars are the real European light cavalry; skirmishers and skirmishing were introduced from their original manner of fighting.

The Prussian and Hanoverian cavalry, when they had adopted the broad-sword as

their main weapon, trained a number of the best horsemen to skirmish. In 1812, the French, in Russia, had a troop of lancers to every cuirassier regiment. In modern times, the Cossacks have created a sensation. It is easy to conceive the advantages which a certain number of flankers *(schützen)*, that is, dragoons, who have attained a great degree of dexterity in horsemanship, and have been particularly trained to fighting in open ranks, "*à la débandade*"—insure to their squadrons. But as whole regiments and squadrons, both with respect of the *personel* as the *matériel*, will never attain complete perfection in this, especially where there is no longer a national cavalry, such as the Cossacks, Mamelukes, &c. the best method seems to be, to select only those who possess the necessary qualifications. Should one at present form whole squadrons of flankers or riflemen, they would soon resemble the body squadrons *(leib schwadron)*, or squadrons *d'élite*, which only maintained a preference on parade, but not in action.

Did one draft the men and horses for these squadrons from the others, this measure would

be as difficult as imperfect. Every commander of a squadron considers as totally lost (although for the benefit of the whole), what he loses from his squadron; he therefore endeavours, by round-about means, to retain his best men and horses, in whom he places his confidence in the day of danger. But it is quite another thing, when he himself is allowed to form a fifth or flank division, which he considers as his own property, which does him good service, and will be a point of honour for him. If a squadron is detached, this division goes with it; the squadron officer can now make changes, in proportion as any one of his flankers does not answer the expectations he had formed of his bravery and dexterity, or, by misconduct, has rendered himself unworthy of the honour of being a flanker. Besides, the complete instruction of the whole is not excluded by this, only the flankers will be those men who make most progress in their training, and are brought nearest to perfection.

By these means this institution will attain a degree of perfection which neither distinct flank squadrons, nor entire, so called light

regiments, ever arrive at. As soon as the regiment manœuvres before the enemy, these fifth divisions, formed into one squadron, will follow the directions of the colonel. With respect to interior economy and formation, these flank divisions belong to their respective squadrons; with respect to tactics, they form a particular squadron, under the command of an intelligent field-officer, or squadron officer *en second*. The colonel, consequently, has two species of arm: a regiment of four squadrons of line cavalry for the shock in close order; and a squadron of four divisions of light horsemen for skirmishing. This system unites the means of fighting in close and open lines in a high degree of perfection. The engagement in close line is the charge—the front rank with lances at the guard, executed with that impetuosity, which at all times has been attended with success; the engagement in open line is with fire-arms—the carbine, which, used with dexterity, is always destructive in its effects. Gustavus Adolphus considered the uniting the charge of cavalry with fire-arms as judicious; and, therefore, as

has been already observed, disposed sections of infantry in the intervals of the cavalry, which custom, since the battle of Mollwitz, has fallen into disuse, merely on account of the inconvenience and danger for the infantry. By the system developed here, the same advantages are attained without the disadvantages. These divisions of flankers are never to fall into line with the regiment.

There arises, besides the union of the two arms, the great advantage, that the reciprocal support attained by it gives to the cavalry a power of acting unsupported, which must produce most important results. Whilst the regiment makes a charge, the flankers fall on the enemy in flank and rear. They prepare the attack of the regiment by their efficient fire, which tires out the enemy's line, and brings it into disorder; as they are mounted on the best horses, they can go to work with daring resolution. In retreats, their service will be still more important.

Let no one say that they would not be of consequence in a general action, and produce no effects—they would not indeed decide a

battle; but we have yet to learn, that the decision of a battle ever was expected of the light folks. According to circumstances, one can also unite the flanker divisions of the whole, or part of the cavalry of an army, for particularly daring enterprises. Whoever knows, from his own experience, how much must be united—man, horse, arms—to form flankers, such as are proposed in this plan—whoever has witnessed how much labour such an organization costs, and which is not to be attained by whole regiments or squadrons, he will certainly acknowledge the judiciousness of this system of divisions of flankers, and not squadrons of them. These flankers, or fifth men, are, in respect, as well of the *matériel* as of the *personel*, a real selection—*élite*—and will become a powerful lever for the emulation of the soldier.

For the German nations, this organization seems particularly appropriate; and one would gain the advantage of no longer being obliged to imitate other nations, but form a national cavalry, which would soon distinguish itself;

taking it for granted, that to the body is united the soul—a well-chosen leader.

As soon as the regiment forms line, the four divisions of flankers from the four squadrons form one squadron, which, for parades, forms on the right of the regiment; for action, one half behind the right, the other half behind the left flank.—*(See Plan.)*

By this, the squadrons acquire greater strength than is usual in modern times.

The establishment of a squadron, from the quarter-master downwards, will be as follows:—

1 Squadron Serjeant-major—*(Oberwachtmeister.)*
1 Quarter-master—*(Quartiermeister.)*
5 Serjeant-majors—*(Wachtmeister.)*
5 Trumpeters.
10 Serjeants—*(Ober Rottmeister.)*
10 Corporals—*(Rottmeister.)*
32 Flankers—*(Schützen.)*
128 Privates.
2 Surgeons.
2 Farriers.
1 Sadler.
10 Supernumerary } calculated for the first deficiency, which happens after a few marches.—Total, 207.

The establishment in war time will, with the staff, amount from 860 to 870 horses. If three regiments are formed as a brigade, it would, at the opening of a campaign, bring into the field 2,500 horses, *viz.* four-fifths cavalry of the line, and one-fifth light cavalry; a body which, set in motion at the proper time, often decides a battle. The commander of such a brigade may daringly and confidently venture on every undertaking; for whilst he moves and attacks with his phalanx of lancers, 2,000 men strong, 500 such light horse swarm around *(umschwärmen)*, and secure his flanks and rear.

Sixth Lecture.

CONTINUATION.

THREE horses' breadth are reckoned one horse's length; a horse's breadth one pace; a horse's length three paces; the pace at two feet and a half. To have the necessary space between the ranks for moving (as the ground on which one manœuvres before the enemy is rarely as even as the exercising ground in peace), one must allow one pace, and then four horses' breadth make a horse's length. The result of this calculation leads to the dividing by fours; which, however, on account of the inconvenient reining back of the rear rank in the wheels, has in all times found opponents. This reining back of the rear

rank not only fatigues the horses, but, in uneven or very boggy ground, is difficult or impossible to execute.

Kalkreuth, therefore, conceived the idea of telling off by threes, as by this it can be accomplished by an almost imperceptible backing of the dragoon No. 1*, of each three, during the wheel.

Other nations imitated the Prussian cavalry.

Experience, in the meantime, proves that, in marching to a flank with threes, the intervals very easily increase, or the horses trample on each other. Both methods have disadvantages, particularly in quick deployments from close column; properly, the only movement where the flank march with threes or fours is of consequence.

Before the enemy, the wheel *about* is not advisable, either with threes or fours, as then the leaders of divisions do not remain in front of their divisions; and the colonel, on this occasion, is left at the mercy of the rear rank

* Foreign cavalry tell of 1, 2, 3—not right, centre left.—*T.*

At the battle of Dennewitz, 6th September, 1813, a regiment of light horse, of the army which Marshal Ney commanded, went to the right-about with fours, under a fire of grape and canister; and in presence of a numerous enemy's cavalry, which was advancing in line. It was a tried regiment, commanded by old officers, which only eight days before had gallantly fought a brilliant action against a four-fold superiority of force. It did not now fall into disorder; and continued, during its retreat, as ordered, at a walk, but it did not halt again. It was not until the colonel and officers rode round the flanks before the rear rank that it halted and obeyed orders; therefore many cavalry officers prefer manœuvring in action by divisions.

These considerations lead to the dividing by half or sub-divisions. According to the proposed strength of the squadrons, the divisions would consist of sixteen files, consequently the sub-divisions eight files. With eight files, one can wheel with ranks well locked up, in all directions in line, in open or close column; and, in the flank march, one

occupies no more breadth than in a wheel to the right or left with fours, which equally gives a front of eight men. In the wheel about, the division-leaders remain in front of their divisions, as they wheel with one of the sub-divisions; in the flank march they remain on the side of the base.

This tactical dividing by sub-divisions, enables us to dispense with those of threes or fours, and not only simplifies the movements, but gains in quickness and exactness. The telling off by threes or fours need only be retained for marching.

It remains still to answer the objection that the divisions of sixteen files are too strong, and those of twelve more convenient for moving, which, however, is just the reverse.

The march in column of divisions at a trot is considered one of the most difficult movements of cavalry; and the cause of this lies exactly in the weakness of the usual divisions of twelve files; for in squadrons this movement goes well. From hence it arises that one hears so often, in manœuvring,

the colonels crying out, "Distances, Gentlemen; don't lose your distances:" and the distances are generally lost at every wheeling point; then appears a wavering *(flottiren)*, and all goes wrong; the greater number of regiments, and the longer the column, the more difficult to re-establish the beauty and regularity of the movement. It is easily explained.

A division of twelve files, with the non-commissioned officer on the flank, has a front of thirteen paces. In column, one allows for the horse of the division *leader*, four paces; for those of the two ranks, eight paces; this makes, together, twelve paces; consequently, only *one* pace remains for the movement. A march, therefore, in column, of divisions of twelve files, is, strictly, a march in close column. It is easy to perceive that, at a trot or gallop, this is very difficult, and, at every change of direction, produces checking: on that account, the Saxon cavalry manœuvres with half squadrons. By divisions of sixteen files, which, with the non-commissioned officers or coverers on the flanks, have a front

of eighteen paces, one obtains advantages, whichever way it is considered, without any disadvantages.

The officers of Cavalry ought, on all occasions, to be before the front, and only in a retreat in line may the colonel and squadron officers be behind the front, that is, on the side nearest the enemy, for the purpose of not losing sight of him, and remaining masters of the moment for acting.

A battalion of infantry, in 1814, which, during a sharp action, was retiring in close column, and marched through a defilé, was overtaken by the pursuing cavalry, and cut to pieces, while the officer commanding was at its head, where he could hear and see nothing, and not at its rear, which, during a retreat, was his proper place.

Those who prefer the officers of cavalry being placed in the line, at the flanks of their divisions, give, as a reason, that the front appears much clearer, and looks handsomer, which, in the mean time, is by no means proved: but, admitting this, the most proper

method of attaining the object ought alone to decide.

The officers are the leaders, the souls of the line, and must, therefore (especially with an arm which, like cavalry, produces even more effect by moral than physical force), be in that place where they can exercise their influence free and unimpeded. This, however, cannot be done *in* the line, but only in *front* of the line of sight. The officers in the ranks can no longer be considered as leaders, but only fellow-combatants. The Prussian cavalry, which, in virtue of its brilliant exploits, may be quoted as an example, has always had its officers before the front rank. The knights of old were always in front of their banners. That the officers, by this disposition, are exposed to greater danger cannot be denied; but it would give no high opinion of an army, that, in its formation, the placing the officers in security were made a subject of much consideration. This pretext itself appears also groundless, since there is no security against bullets but luck!!! On the other hand, the

advantages of a formation, where the officers are before the line of sight, speak for themselves. These (the officers) master, in the proper sense, the front rank: are the leaders brave, and that one takes for granted, then will the entire line be brave: the officers, now observed by their men, cut a brilliant figure before the front, in a charge; the line in their rear will be their judge; the honourable ambition of being admired by those under their command urges them forward, and they become what they ought to be—an inflaming example to their troops.

The moral force of a regiment consists in the confidence of the leaders, in those under their command, and *vice versa;* the colonel of a regiment is the soul of this moral force. What a regiment! what a family of officers and soldiers! where each, animated by bold confidence in the other, have nothing before their eyes but military glory and renown.

The manner in which cavalry should be armed, is still not quite definitively settled. The sword has great varieties in its construction. That which may be equally used to cut

and point, seems to offer the greatest advantage, as the dragoon, in single combat, must combine the cut and thrust, and be prepared for both from his adversary. The pistol can only be considered as a weapon in case of necessity. The pistol-shot is uncertain, short, and seldom has any effect: one is enough for a dragoon; and the second holster can be arranged for carrying his cleaning apparatus. The carbine is an important arm for engagements in extended line of flankers. Well established experiments have proved, that a rifled barrel is not applicable to cavalry, on account of the difficulty in loading. By the application, however, of an improved trigger to the lock of the carbine, that easiness and play may be given, without which the shot has no certainty. A precaution stop-spring, which keeps the cock firm at the half-cock, will prevent its going off unintentionally. The lance is only for attack—for the shock—and only applicable in closed lines. The lance, eleven feet long, is the proper offensive weapon for cavalry against infantry. In the history of modern wars, the French cuirassiers have made an

epocha. At Essling, on the 21st May, 1809, their *firmness* (*selbstandigkeit*) saved the army from destruction. Had they had lances, like the knights of earlier times, they would have been very nearly a perfect cavalry; and, from their moral force, no infantry could have withstood them. The long lance, used in close line, will again enable cavalry to attack infantry with success.

The English foot soldiers, under Wellington, in Spain and Portugal, only cared for lancers. The chief weapon, then, for the flanker, would be the carbine: he must be well drilled to shoot with it, and hit from horseback; for the dragoon, in the ranks, a lance, eleven feet long, such as the Polish cavalry carry.

It is against the proposed plan to treat, in this place, of all the objects belonging to cavalry, such as clothing, horse appointments, &c. inasmuch as these depend upon the character of the nation, and taste and will of its rulers. A few remarks only may stand here, on the subject of recruiting and remounts. It is of great consequence to select for the cavalry none

but volunteers, or the sons of farmers, who, from their infancy, have been accustomed to horses; just as those only become good sailors who have been at sea from childhood. What is to be expected from the stocking or linen weaver, who regards the horse as a wild animal. Experience has shown, that such people are never attached to their horse, but consider it as their first and greatest enemy, against whom they fight their whole life through. They can never learn to ride—never preserve their equilibrium, but hang like an awkward log upon their horse; which, for the purpose of keeping the equilibrium, unnecessarily exhausts a great part of its strength, and from this cause is soon fatigued. On this account, one always finds in a squadron, some horses which sweat, and are surprisingly fatigued at the slowest pace. The horse at length becomes restiff, against the awkward heavy hand of his rider; it hangs on the bit, overcome by the pain in his mouth; goes crooked, trips, &c. The rider, whose embarrassment and fear increases, sticks closer, and squeezes him with knee and heel, to save himself from falling off. The most patient

horse becomes, at last, sulky under such treatment, and tries to ease himself of his burthen, or run away. One such awkward horseman often brings a whole squadron into disorder; which, especially in a charge, may be of the most fatal consequences: and it is not to be supposed that a man who cannot manage his horse, can do much harm to the enemy.

The choice of horses is not less an object of attention. One should, if possible, have in the kingdom a military breeding stud, where the horses might run wild, and never come into a stable till they were passed in the regiments. In peace, one is apt to coddle the horses too much, and anxiously avoid their getting warm, that they may not catch cold. As soon as one takes the field, they are no longer spared,—must often remain in bivouac unnecessarily. What extremes, and what contradictions! "The cavalry," says Marshal Saxe, "should be mounted on light horses, accustomed to fatigue, carry little baggage, and avoid the error of having their horses too fat and blown out."

Seventh Lecture.

POSITIONS OF CAVALRY.

There are Positions out of action, and for actual engagement.

To the former belong positions for encampment, and for cantonments (of repose).

In encamped positions, cavalry must never have obstacles of ground, defiles, morasses, lakes, woods, rivers, villages, &c. near its rear. If an unexpected attack, or one with superior force, or a surprise by night, occurs, one runs the risk of being disgracefully routed amongst such obstacles, before one has had time to form.

In cantonments, for the same reason, one never places the alarm-post on the side next

the enemy, but to the rear of villages and small towns. The infantry, exactly the reverse, can defend a village, town, and especially a defile, better at the entrance than at the sortie. Well-chosen positions often compel the enemy to leave his, or give up his plan of attacking. General Moore, in his celebrated retreat to Corunna, always took up such advantageous positions, that the French, notwithstanding their superior force, never ventured to attack him. Wellington, in his position by Lisbon, was inattackable.

Frederick the Great's camp, at Bunzelwitz; the celebrated camps of Gustavus Adolphus near Werden and Nurnberg; and that of Wallenstein, not far from the latter town, appear to be the highest idéal of the art of positions.

With regard to forming line for engagement, it is to be decided whether intervals between the squadrons are necessary and useful. Absolutely necessary they are not; but their being

adopted by almost all the European cavalry, testifies their utility.

The Austrians have intervals between their divisions, the French between their squadrons; and so almost all cavalry.

The facility of moving is increased by the intervals, but they must not be too great, if the cavalry is not to lose any of its essential strength—the close shock. The Prussian cavalry, at the time of its greatest glory, was formed in close line. Nine paces distance between the squadrons, which is the breadth of a sub-division, may be allowed; and as, in a charge, crowding generally happens, which lies in the nature of the horse, who is too ready to close in on the others, this interval is, in most cases, useful. In proportion as the horse exerts himself, and increases his pace, he requires more space than whilst standing still, or at a walk. During the trot, therefore, already, and still more during the gallop, the intervals close of themselves; so that there can be no question of gaps which the enemy can turn to account. These intervals (nine geo-

metrical paces), that is, the breadth of the smallest division of manœuvre (a sub-division), increase the facility of manœuvre in a very great degree.

Without, however, confining oneself too strictly to this rule, the intervals must depend much more on the ground, on the enemy's order of battle, and, above all, on those circumstances from which every action takes its peculiar character. Acting on the defensive, cavalry may take larger intervals; but, on the offensive, it must form itself more compact.

In peace, one can manœuvre sometimes with, sometimes without intervals, and at times with intervals changing alternatively, at pleasure. For as many, and as different, as are the sorts of action, so many and varied must be the positions and movements which the art develops; and the troops must be thoroughly exercised in them in peace.

If the commander-in-chief orders the general to whom the cavalry is entrusted on the day of battle, to make a demonstration, to occupy the enemy on any one point, and to rivet his attention there, for the purpose of diverting it

from other points where he may wish to strike a decisive blow with another arm, the cavalry-general must dispose his troops in illusive and threatening lines. Here the *échelon* position is so judicious: it enables him to increase the intervals, and by this means lengthen the lines; and yet they appear compact and multiplied. He directs the head of the *échelons* against the point he wishes to threaten:—by this disposition he is entirely master of his manœuvre, and is able to do what he wishes—threaten, without actually attacking. As this disposition enables one to make an attack as easily as to avoid one, it with good reason inspires one's adversary with anxiety, obliges him to make counter-dispositions, and thus perfectly answers the proposed end of a demonstration (feint). A mixed ground can be used, with great advantage, to make one's strength appear greater than it really is, and to increase the deception.

When, for example, one causes two lines to lose themselves, about their centre behind heights, the enemy will think that the space between these two visible ending points in rear

of the heights is also filled up. In retreats, this sort of disposition often enables one to gain half a day. On the 4th September, 1812, the Russian cavalry manœuvred in this manner with great skill; it was drawn out apparently in great lines; the intersected environs prevented a free and commanding view; their lines lost themselves in all parts behind the heights and small woods. The French cavalry, which in this memorable war always marched under Murat, in great masses, at the head of the army, was obliged by this circumstance to make a halt of some hours, until the first *corps d'armée*, under Davoust, came up, and a réconnoissance was made. During this interval, the visible lines of the Russians retired; and when, at last, the French advanced, all had disappeared. In broken ground, therefore, one may increase the intervals of squadrons without disadvantage. In a plain, one must form as close as possible. But the art of positions is materially affected by the description of the ground on which one finds oneself; and by the positions which the enemy is about to occupy, or has already taken

up. Much also depends upon whether one means to execute a charge oneself, or only to avoid that of the enemy. A leader who has only a certain number of regulation positions and movements in his head, is easily embarrassed; since what is exercised on the drill-ground will not answer in all emergencies. Real genius unfolds, in every new situation, new manœuvres appropriate to circumstances. The general principles of positions, movements, and actions, are only clues to talent—only an introduction to the perfect practice of tactics; for this perfect practice itself depends upon the fertility of the genius. The elements of the service are only the form to which genius first gives animation. The gift of forming combinations raises a general above the mere precepts of a regulation book. The leader who has once attained this height is, in the full sense of the word, *of age*. Peace, indeed, may keep him in the back-ground; but war will restore the just proportion, and produce the conviction, that the service does not confer *éclat* on him, but he on the service.

Peace disperses the names that stood high,

during war, and sets others in their places; since, according to Lloyd, the principal talent in peace consists in the art of pleasing, and the useful is neglected for the agreeable. "War clears away the ignoble part, and classes people according to their personal value*."

Where cavalry is to be drawn out alone in a plain, with the intention of maintaining its position, one does well to place the first line extended, and with large intervals; but the second compressed, with twelve-pounder batteries mingled in it; and in a third line, a reserve of single regiments in column, as points.

The second line thus contains all the peculiar force for the shock. When now the enemy advances, one can harass him in many ways with the first line (the flankers), embarrass him with partial combats; but if the force of the enemy keeps unfolding itself more and more, one can fall back with this line, all at

* War for real soldiers (*krieg fürwahre krieger*).

once, upon both flanks of the second line; by this means unmask it, and expose the enemy to the fire of the artillery. By these measures, one finds oneself in a particularly favourable position, as one strengthens the flanks of one's line particularly intended for charging, "*shock-linie*," and threatens the enemy's flanks, and can set oneself in motion for the attack at one's own convenience. The first and second line, united in one, now form, of themselves, the line of battle, in shape of an inverted bow *(ordre courbe)*. Does the enemy continue his movement, and make a show of attacking in earnest, one advances to meet him, and attacks, according to circumstances, with one or both wings. When one attacks with one wing only, one must have given the wing, destined to that purpose, strength sufficient to considerably outflank that of the enemy, and endeavour to surround him. If this flank attack succeeds, then is the time to make a movement in advance, with the whole line, to take advantage of the flank attack; if it fails, the repulsed wing rallies by the reserve.

Does the enemy still wish to advance with his whole line, one must fall on him impetuously with the wing which has not yet fought. In this case, the artillery, at the moment of the shock, goes to the rear, but the reserve advances; and at the point where both meet, they form line.

If a plain is to be taken possession of, one places the artillery in the first line, and forms it as the attacking line *(shock-linie)* with small intervals; but the second line must not be kept too far in the rear; so that when the first sets itself in motion, for the purpose of charging, this (the second) can immediately advance to the artillery. It is of great consequence to make such a disposition that the flanks cannot be endangered, but rather that one may be able quickly to lengthen one's own line, so as to out-flank that of the enemy.

On the 10th of October, 1813, General Sebastiani manœuvred in this manner with his corps of cavalry, near Schilda, against General Sacken, with success. Whilst he was placing his heavy cavalry in the centre, and his artillery in battery, in front of this line, he

pushed both his wings forward, extending them, and, in a short time, compelled General Sacken to quit his position.

When the Crown Prince, at present King of Wirtemberg, with the fourth and sixth corps of the grand army, attacked the army division of Marshal Marmont, on the 25th of March, 1814, near Sondé Ste. Croix, on the march from Vitry to Paris, the cuirassier division of General Comte Nostitz deployed in the centre, General Comte Pahlen's division deployed to the right, and that division of light cavalry, commanded by Prince Adam of Wirtemberg, to the left. The Wirtemberg horse artillery, twelve guns, placed itself on a height, in the centre of this position, and opened a cannonade; at the same moment, the Russian cavalry advanced, in *échelon*, right in front—the Wirtemberg, in like order, left in front. This disposition of the Crown Prince instantaneously obliged Marshal Marmont to quit his position, although he had a numerous corps of all arms. The Crown Prince, without waiting for his infantry, at the head of his cavalry (to which later the

Archduke Constantine united himself with the light cavalry of the guard) pursued the enemy as far as Allemens, a distance of full eight leagues. It is true, the French formed repeatedly at Sommesons, Conantrai, and la Fère Champénoise: the Crown Prince, however, gave them no time, but attacked, with his accustomed impetuosity; two great squares were cut to pieces, Marshal Marmont lost the greater part of his artillery, and nothing but the approach of night enabled him to reach the heights of Allemens with the remains of his corps. This day will remain for ever memorable in the history of the world, for it decided the whole campaign: Buonaparte, without being present, was conquered here.

In a general engagement, the cavalry must be drawn up in reserve*. In the beginning of

* One means here, always, not that cavalry which is divided amongst the different *corps d'armée*, but that which, united in a mass, is known by the name of Reserve Cavalry.

an engagement, it must neither be exposed to the fire of artillery, nor, on any account, brought into action. This rule seldom admits of an exception. Cavalry will only produce great effect when the line of battle wavers—the fire of the artillery slackens,—when particular points are become naked—when the infantry, fatigued and exhausted, and their muskets, by continued firing, no longer going regularly off, ceases to keep up a well-directed fire. These are the moments when infantry may be attacked with success; and the cavalry, in mass, must break suddenly loose, and take the enemy by surprise. The hearing of the soldier suffers from the thunder of the cannon, and continued fire of the small arms, so that the word of command becomes more and more difficult to be heard and understood. The smoke of the powder favours the unperceived advance of the cavalry; all which are co-operating reasons why the mere sight of the cavalry, when it appears unexpectedly, intimidates the infantry, and makes the victory easy. At the battle of Waterloo, a division of French infantry took to flight, without firing a shot, before two

regiments of English cavalry, and left thirty guns in the lurch.

Before the invention of gunpowder, cavalry was employed at the very first onset; but at present, in most cases, it can only be used with advantage at the end of an action, for the purpose of securing the victory, and turning it to account. The disposition of cavalry, even in reserve, must always be in several lines. It would display very little talent to draw it up on ground where it can be of no use.

Frederick the Great says upon this, in his "Instructions sur la Guerre:"—"When one places one's cavalry behind a morass, one can make no use of it; if too near a wood, the enemy can conceal his infantry in it, which fires upon the cavalry and brings it into disorder, without its being able to defend itself."

In positions where the only object is to support troops of another arm, the cavalry should be placed at such a distance as to enable it to execute its charge with its whole force. On these occasions, the advantages of the ground must be taken into consideration;

for a few hundred paces more distance is no fault with cavalry, as it soon leaves these behind. In retreats, cavalry must never form in front of a debouchée, but in its rear and at charging distance, so that one can fall upon the enemy, who is debouchéeing, with impetuosity, before he has effected his formation. The cavalry action at Zedenick, in 1806, where the French distinguished themselves so much, was the natural result of a faulty position which General Schimmelpennick had taken up, directly in front of a wood. Instead of retiring, as quick as possible, through this wood, as soon as he was sure of the approach of the enemy, he accepted battle, in this most unfavourable position, from an enemy so superior in force.

Eighth Lecture.

THE ART OF MOVING CAVALRY.

The art of moving may be divided into two parts:—

a. Moving as March.

b. Moving as Manœuvre.

When troops quit their positions, whether camps or cantonments, to occupy others, this moving into a new position is a march.

When troops, in the position already taken, or during the march towards it, form line, and dispose themselves for engagement, the movements by which this object is attained, and which are the consequences of it, constitute a manœuvre.

Strategy points out the necessity of a change

of position. Positions ought only to be taken on strategetic points.*

The moving from one position to another may contain several marches. These successive marches become then an operation. The new position, which is to be occupied, is the object of this operation. When strategy has pointed out the necessity, the direction, and the object of this operation, tactics occupy themselves with the execution of it. They break the army into columns, according to circumstances; these circumstances are the ground to be marched over, and the number of the roads practicable for columns, as well as the greater or less probability of being attacked by the enemy during the movement. Further, tactics place the columns together according to the different arms, and with the double object of the security of the movement, and the con-

* Strategetic differ from unstrategetic points, in this, that they cannot be left in the rear with impunity. An army, which has taken up a position on an unstrategetic point, will be compelled to quit it, by the manœuvres of a skilful adversary; or, if it remains, will be taken as if in a *cul-de-sac*.

venience of the troops during the same. These can be combined when the country is open, and the cavalry moves at the head of the column. In a mountainous country, one is obliged to allow the infantry to march in front, and then the convenience is interrupted. Security is the first consideration—convenience the second. The distinction is very important, whether the movement is an advance or a retreat.

In the tactical arrangement of these various considerations extreme precision is necessary. The smallest omission often produces the greatest disorder. One of the most difficult problems is the conveying forward, in good order, the immense baggage with which armies load themselves. The quarter-master-general, to whose department the arrangement of this belongs, not unfrequently meets with almost insurmountable difficulties. In few armies is the train tolerably organized. Too much baggage is allowed to the officers: their baggage-waggons, anxious to follow the regiments, force themselves between the columns, and stop up the *defilés*.

The wants of modern large armies exceed all calculation. The reserve ammunition alone is very heavy, and not unfrequently hinders the movements of the army; but the provision-waggons, which trail after in columns of a week long, and at an immense expense, bring often nothing but mouldy bread, or meal which has long been unfit for use, are only a heavy burthen to the country, without being useful to the army. The herds of cattle introduce infectious disorders into the country, die on the roads, are seldom of use, as they move so slowly, and produce irreparable devastation, as by contagion they annihilate the beasts of the army, and of all the countries through which they pass. Until the so called column-magazines are confined to four days provision (biscuit, rice, oats, and brandy), and this conveyed as compact as possible on permanently established waggons; until, with the exception of this, and what belongs to the artillery, all other wheeled carriages are done away with, the operations of the army will always be very much paralysed. The soldier can carry

four days rations with him, consequently the army can be supplied for eight days. With this provision, and a judicious employment of the resources of the country, one can execute any rapid operation in our well cultivated countries.

War consists of a continuation of operations, after every one of which, one takes a few days rest, even without an action having taken place; for the forces of an army have their term. During these rest days, one completes the means for fighting, consequently one's provisions; in defensive war, from the magazines, in offensive, from the captured places and provinces. If, during the operation itself, one chooses the rations to be delivered daily from the column-magazine, this can only be done at the expense of the failure of the operation, which it deprives of its quickness and with that of its force.

There are no more recruited soldiers, except in England; therefore, since armies are become national, the system of confining the soldier to his meagre ration, consequently

letting him be almost in want in the middle of a country commanding abundance of every thing, is so much the less feasible, as in the day of action one is so anxious to inflame his mind by the love of his native country.

The time is gone by, when the warrior fought merely for gold, and for any body's interest. The military state has ceased to be an enlistment for life, but is become once more, as in the time of the ancient Germans, a paramount duty of every citizen. A warm feeling of love for his country animates the soldier, because he is also a citizen.

For the purpose of raising still higher this patriotism, one has by means of honourable distinctions, by the excitement of promotion, given even to the private soldier encouragements, which, until these times, were unknown. The French were indebted to this system for their victories during the war against feudal rights; the nations in the last wars had to thank this system for liberation from French tyranny. That wall of separation between the arbitrary power of the officers

and slavish obedience of the soldiers, has disappeared. The officers can now, by exalted bravery alone, and superior talents, shine pre-eminently above their soldiers; every other illusion misses its object. Obedience may be extorted, but confidence cannot.

The opinion and judgment of the common soldier upon his leaders, are often more just and valuable than that of the superior officers, or those of the same rank; whom jealousy, not unfrequently, leads into reprehensible meanness. Emulation urges the soldier to actions for the purpose of equalling his noble leaders: he may boldly lift his eyes up to his colonel, and hope to arrive at his rank.

The general sees amongst those under his command hundreds of rivals in glory — what reciprocal motives for noble deeds! But if this spirit, which is grounded on past noble actions, procures to the military state general consideration, it must also secure to it honourable treatment. One expects from it the highest exertions, must therefore also

take care to provide most fully for its maintenance and support.

It is possible, in an army constituted like the English by enlistment, the system of scanty rations may be sustained as long as the soldier, by his good pay, possesses the means of purchasing articles in addition to his rations, without depending upon the convoys of stores, which always paralyse the movements, and, as is proved, devastate the countries by the immense consumption of forage, and the little order and discipline which reigns amongst them, to establish a system of requisitions, by which the army, during the execution of an operation, may be subsisted without ruining the country in which it is carried on: but the soldier must not be allowed to help himself.

Discipline is quite another thing from what is generally supposed. The citizen is of opinion that it consists in the commander-in-chief's compelling the soldier to be satisfied with his ration. If the army suffers through fatigues, through the want of ne-

cessary nourishment, through privation of supplies and covering; if from having bivouacked in the worst season of the year, infectious disorders prevail, courage slumbers, and at last an army is dispersed, or only to be found in hospitals, and thus the object of the war being missed, the evil is prolonged: all these considerations do not operate upon the citizen. He does not look to the consequences of which he must eventually himself become the victim, but considers only the pressure of the moment. He does not honour, and see in the soldiers, men to whom, exhausted by painful and dangerous exertion, and weakened by exposure to weather, hunger, and thirst, a friendly reception combined with a meal to which hospitality gives a relish is due. Gaiety and a disposition to be easily satisfied is the property of the soldier. But the citizen does not consider him in this point of view—he sees only in soldiers a horde of savage ruffians, sent upon the earth for its scourge and punishment—he receives them coldly and testily; stingily and niggardly,

throws down before them what the regulation prescribes: no friendly word or soothing service excuses the want of a better meal. He knows not how to take advantage of the loquacity of the soldier, praising the exploits of the army: in a word, the citizen is often himself to blame when the soldier becomes that, for which he takes him without proof, namely, savage.

Discipline is that order, by means of which, troops under the most unfavourable circumstances, true to their duty and their colours, persevere in the execution of the orders they have received. It is that firmness which can be shaken by no idea of approaching or certain death. It is that exalted *sang froid* which never loses its presence of mind, and by which the firm order, calmness, and that hanging together is engendered, which makes it impossible to bring a body of troops into complete disorder. It is that union of all the moral powers to a height to which all the physical are subordinate.

It is manly, it is noble, it is praiseworthy, when the commander-in-chief strives to de-

serve the benedictions of the country which has the misfortune to become the theatre of war,—it does honour to his heart; but when these benedictions are only to be obtained by the ruin and maledictions of his army, this goodness of heart is in danger of being called *weakness*, and he neglects one of his first duties. The general in chief only appears when war is decided upon, and inevitable. The reproach of this war, the misfortune of nations, the devastation of countries, is not attributable to him: he has not to answer for the crimes, the disorders, the plagues and sufferings of every sort, the destruction of morals, the burthens and general consequences of the war: he advances on the scene of action as the extreme measure of states: he and his army constitute a separate world: he marches through the country as cool, as collected, as quiet, as if as few hearts bled as upon the map of the theatre of war stretched out before him: he spares the country with only one object, that of securing its resources and his army to himself: he rejoices, and his heart beats with extacy, when with this high and paramount end he

can unite the good of the country; but as soon as a higher object predominates, he lays it waste and grieves in silence. Thus Wellington in Portugal, and Rostopchin at Moscow. The commander-in-chief, during his command, stands *above* men. Peace alone restores him to his place amongst them.

The art of movement of cavalry, as manœuvre, consists in

a. The art of forming lines from column (deployments, formations).

b. The art of moving lines in all directions (*and shapes*).

c. The art of doubling lines up again into column (formation of close columns).

a. Formation of Line (Aufmärsche).

Troops arrive in columns of march, on the ground where an engagement is to take place with the enemy, who is, first, posted already; secondly, in the act of marching on to the ground; or, thirdly, when he is to be expected. In the first case, has the enemy already formed his line of battle? one

must reconnoitre him under cover of the advanced guard, and seek out the attackable points—keys of the position. It is essential, indeed necessary, that the general commanding the cavalry of the army should be present at these reconnoissances, in order to have the superintendence of the whole, when the commander-in-chief plans the dispositions for the engagement.

In the formation of his lines, the leader of the cavalry has to make a great difference according to the orders he has received, whether on the movement being completed he is to proceed immediately to attack, or whether it is only intended he should paralyse the opposite lines, or keep them in check.

In the first case, only small intervals (nine paces) must be taken by the squadrons of the first line; he calculates his lines for strength alone, and does not avoid the fire of the guns. In the second, these intervals may be greater; he calculates his lines for deceiving the enemy, and keeps them out of fire.

If one wishes to attack the moment the line is formed, one endeavours, by a rapid deployment, to surprise the enemy and outflank him; by which the victory is often prepared, rendered more easy, or completely gained. This manœuvre often succeeded with Frederick the Great. Here cavalry, owing to its rapidity of movement, appears so brilliant. General Seidlitz decided the battle of Rosbach by a sudden deployment of the cavalry under his command, which took the enemy by surprise.

If, secondly, as one arrives at the field of battle, the enemy is in like manner marching up, the commander-in-chief has full freedom for forming his line of battle, according to the circumstances most favourable to it. In this case the cavalry generally comes into action quite at the beginning of the engagement; since by its quick deployment, and still quicker movements, it gains the heights and plains lying a little in front. From hence, the battle not unfrequently takes a favourable turn from the very outset. The leader of the cavalry takes care to

throw out his lines in such figures, that they cover the army like a curtain (als Rideau), behind which it can complete its order of battle unmolested.

The third moment — where one waits for the enemy in a position to offer him battle, allows of the formation of lines at one's own convenience.

b. Movement of Lines.

Lines are divided, first, into direct, secondly, into diagonal, thirdly, into curved lines.

When our line is drawn out parallel with that of the enemy, it is called a direct line. If one brings forward one wing of this direct line to attack the enemy, keeping the other back, our line of sight will make an angle with that of the enemy, then the diagonal line is formed — "Ligne oblique."

Curved lines occur when one moves both wings against the enemy, whilst the centre is kept back — this is the concave order; or when one pushes the centre forward, and refuses both wings — this is the convex order.

I. The movements with direct lines, are the march to the front, the charge (shock), and the march to the rear.

The greatest possible simplicity is the groundwork of all movements. To the march of a line to the front, uniformity of pace or time, calmness, resolution, and silence, are indispensible conditions.

The contrast is often miraculous between the thunder of the artillery, the murderous confusion of the battle, and the advance of such a line of troops, calmly and silently marching through death and destruction, under a heavy shower of cannon-balls, regardless of those falling next to, and all around them, of the groans of their wounded, dying, or mutilated companions—it commands respect. The march in line, executed in this manner, is the most remunerating result of military discipline and organization. The charge is the greatest effort of force of a line of cavalry. Its success depends on the justly calculated, gradual increase of speed, united with the most perfect dressing. The greater the length of the charging line, the

less precipitate may this movement be: the more rapid the pace, the more is compactness and order lost. The line about to charge breaks into a trot at the distance of 300 yards from the enemy. The commander, by the previous caution, "the line will attack" (lances guard), or "draw swords," increases the impulse of the men. It evinces a coolness when the offensive weapon remains at ease until the moment of the shock. The artillery only loads, and the infantry only makes ready when the attack actually begins. At one hundred paces from the enemy the gallop is sounded, which, with a brave cavalry, increases in speed, in proportion as it comes nearer the enemy. Bravery and cowardice each increase respectively in equal proportion as the moment of action approaches. The bravest leader will in most cases be victorious, since it is to be supposed that his example will be a law for the lines in his rear.

A retreat requires presence of mind; it is made either "en echiquier," or in echelon, by which means one part can always oppose

the pressing on of the enemy, whilst the other retires. It is important and decisive in a retreat constantly to follow the principle, *never* to allow oneself to be attacked; but as soon as one's adversary sets himself in motion to charge, to advance to meet him, and suddenly taking him by surprise, charge him vigorously oneself. This is no easy matter, and requires well-tried regiments and determined colonels. In a charge of this sort, one must not stop to follow up the enemy; but, when it has succeeded, one must retire in good order without loss of time. Were one on such occasions to pursue, one should stumble upon new lines and destroy oneself. In retreats, one seeks only by a charge to gain time for a quiet march to the rear, and to gain the enemy's respect.

In the Duke of Wellington's retrogade movement, on the 17th June, 1815, from Quatre Bras into the position at Waterloo, the English Life Guards made a brilliant and successful charge, which completely dispersed the leading French squadrons, and checked their pursuit. A retreat requires

the highest intelligence—prudence combined with daring courage is more requisite here than in any other movement.

2. Movements with diagonal lines are the echelon manœuvre. These echelon marches, in which one wing is refused, whilst the other moves against the enemy, has been chosen by all the most talented leaders, as one of the most peculiarly advantageous movements for cavalry. With echelons one can for a long time deceive, for a long time manœuvre, without essentially changing one's position, or considerably losing or gaining ground. One can at pleasure and easily change the line of sight, and thus quickly gain the enemy's flank. The diagonal lines or echelon movements unite the advantages—of being able to show a front to all sides, of rapidly turning the enemy's weakness to account, of choosing the points and moments of attack (for one can easily also move the echelon in the opposite direction from the enemy), of taking one's adversary by surprise, but not allowing oneself to be surprised. Finally, one may

apply them with success in both retreats and attacks.

The manœuvres of the French at the battle of Marengo, 14th June, 1800, are a proof of this. Those manœuvres themselves also deserve the highest admiration.

3. The curved lines are in like manner formed by movements in echelon.

The march of both wings to the front in echelon forms the concave arc, the advance in echelon from the centre forms the convex: both are movements for attack.

Further, cavalry is often obliged to change its front, or wheel. This change of front, particularly that backwards, is very important, since it is almost the only means of securing oneself against the enemy's intention of outflanking. The flanks are the weakest parts of a line of cavalry, since it cannot, like infantry, quickly form "*en potence*", or if it can, it finds no security in it. The infantry having formed "*en potence*," has its fire for its defence; to the cavalry, this formation leaves nothing but the probability, if it stands still to receive the enemy's charge,

of being thrown into disorder. The ruling principle of cavalry is movement, that of infantry position.

Each endeavours therefore to gain the other's flank, to surround the other; and he, who gains this advantage over his adversary, in most cases has to rejoice in the victory.

A change of front forwards upon any division of the line which may be most convenient, executed with the rapidity of lightning, is so much the more favourable to surprising one's adversary, as it brings one part of one's line to act upon his flank, whilst a corresponding movement backwards secures one against any possible movement on his part. Suppose a movement (see plan, first movement) of attack with the right wing, *A*, behind which a column of attack, *C*, is formed. The column *C* deploys (second movement) diagonally *a*, *b*, upon the left flank of the enemy, *D*, *E*. Has he missed the moment, neither firmness nor bravery can save him, he must be thrown into disorder by a bold and rapid attack. In order to op-

pose this attack with success, it must be promptly discovered, and at the proper moment.

The enemy must bring his left flank *E* (third movement) into the position *c*, *d*, by a change of front backwards, executed at a gallop. This movement must be covered by the flankers, whose efficient fire makes more difficult, or altogether interrupts the deployment of the column *C*. Simultaneously with this movement (fourth movement) a regiment *G* of the reserve must form column of attack (close column from the centre), advance at a gallop into *e*, *f*,—form line, or what is still better, fall at once upon the enemy.

Note.—"The execution of these different movements is detailed in the third and fourth part of the Exercise Book. In the cavalry action near Mory, 20th March, 1814, Prince Adam of Wirtemberg's division of light cavalry, observed the first and second movement, and routed the cavalry of the French guard."

In action, minutes decide, and to discover these minutes, and turn them to account, is the talent of a leader.

c. *Breaking from Line* (Abmärsche).

On the conclusion of a successful combat, the marching off from the field of battle to pursue the enemy is very simple. But such a marching off is difficult, when one has been beaten. No military operation is so critical as a retreat in sight of a victorious enemy; but by none does a fruitful genius show itself to greater advantage.

If *concentric* lines are favourable to attack, *excentric* are favourable for retreat*.

The more roads practicable for columns which are to be found in rear of the line of battle, the more advantageous if one has suffered a defeat.

Detachments of pioneers, conducted by officers of the general staff, proceed in advance to point out, and clear the different lines of retreat. These are followed by the baggage, and all the train of modern times

* Bulow.

connected with it. The reserve ammunition and heavy ordnance follow these. A few squadrons of cavalry are necessary to keep all this train of baggage, &c. in order.

In retreats, one finds out the fatal effects of too numerous a train of wheel carriages.

Severe orders, and severe officers, who execute them without consideration of persons, are necessary to prevent stoppages, which may be productive of great misfortunes.

If even in advance against the enemy, defilés are often blocked up by the wheel carriages, what must it be in a retreat, where for the most part a panic fright seizes this spiritless train, where cowardice is to be found incorporated.

Whatever cannot be got forward, must be abandoned without mercy.

If the field of battle is open, the cavalry covers the retreat of the army.

High military talent in the leaders, and capability of manœuvre in the regiments, both develop themselves brilliantly on such occasions, which furnish a favourable opportunity for reaping a harvest of rewards and renown.

The nearer the moment approaches when the cavalry really is to commence its retreat, the more important is a firm countenance. A body which on such an occasion loses its countenance, not only ruins the others, but itself along with them.

In a retreat in line, we have already mentioned the movements by which a plain is to be traversed.

Has one to pass a defilé? as soon as one knows it to be clear of the other troops of the army, for a certain distance, one breaks off by regiments at a quick pace, and they place themselves in columns towards the rear, according as their turn comes in the line. This movement must be concealed as long as possible from the enemy by illusive manœuvres.

If one stands in front of a defilé in parallel lines, the most awkward of any, one breaks to the rear from both wings. The breadth of the defilé decides that of the divisions in which one sets oneself in column. If at such moments (as may be expected) the enemy presses on very close; and one thinks one shall not have time to get the whole clear

off; one part must make a charge, in order to drive the enemy back, whilst the other proceeds to gain the defilé, and pass it. There are even cases, where a general must almost sacrifice one part, to save the other. Without cavalry a retreat is difficult.

Xenophon, in the celebrated retreat of the 10,000 Greeks, had a painful experience of the want of cavalry. On consideration that the enemy, hovering around, teased him, and harassed his troops, that by this his march was rendered difficult and delayed, and that, according to his own expression, nothing was to be gained by a victory, but every thing to be lost by a defeat, therefore he would not venture a battle; he formed a body of horsemen by selecting the best horses belonging to the officers and baggage, and mounted the most courageous of the army upon them.

The last French bulletins of the war in Russia, confess, that the want of cavalry during the retreat from Moscow, hindered them obtaining intelligence of the enemy's motions.

Ninth Lecture.

ENGAGEMENTS OF CAVALRY.

THE engagement separates itself into two main divisions.

a. Engagement in open lines—manner that flankers engage.

b. Engagement in closed lines—the charge.

The perfect formation of the flankers is very important. In the third section of the second chapter of the Exercise Book this is developed. The shooting and hitting with the carbine from horseback is of great consequence. The firing, whilst the horse is in motion, is ineffectual and must not be allowed.

The flanker should ride forward to within

a suitable distance of his adversary, halt, and turn his horse to the right; raise immediately the carbine to his cheek, bring quickly the sight and breech in line with the object of his aim, and pull the trigger. Habit must bring him to such facility in this, that stopping his horse, taking aim, and firing, must form but *one* operation. This one calls taking a shot.

In most armies too little attention is paid to the formation of flankers, yet it is of very great consequence.

We have lived to see flankers, dismounted and leading their horses, creep forward in broken ground, and cause whole troops to give way.

In 1815, in Alsace, the flankers of the Wirtemberg cavalry, by their efficient fire, obliged six French squadrons to give way, near Nieder Otterbach, in front of Weissenburg; and a few days later the Crown Prince caused the market-town of Brumpt to be taken by the flankers dismounted, although it was defended by infantry.

The style of fighting of flankers does not allow of keeping the line very regular. The

flankers dispose themselves in two ranks. In open ground there may be a distance of fifteen paces between the ranks, and as much from man to man.

All the flankers of the front rank are told off No. 1; those of the rear rank, No. 2. No. 1 and 2 are to be considered as two inseparable friends—a principal and his second.

Flankers must never remain long in the same position; on firing they circle to the right.

The so called "appel" sound to rally is essentially for flankers. Engagements inflame the soldier's passion, especially when they are successful. This passion rises in proportion to the preceding opposition. When at length the enemy begins to give way, thoughtless, and without looking about him, each hunts out his adversary—by this easily gets separated from his regiment, and expiates his carelessness by captivity or death. Has the enemy anywhere a reserve, all those who have pressed on in this manner are lost.

The most important destination of flankers

is to commence and keep up the engagement, to cover the troops whilst forming or breaking from line, to fall on the enemy in flank and rear during the action, to divide themselves on a march, in order to explore the country to the right and left in front of the army, to observe the enemy, to pursue him, form advanced and rear guards, detachments, &c.—services, in which bravery, coolness, intelligence, cunning, activity, expertness in the use of arms and horsemanship on the side of the man, and hardy, light, manageable, quiet horses, and such as one calls good feeders, are requisite.

Were the necessary attention applied to the formation of flankers, did one endeavour to instil into them a real warlike character, they would soon shine forth as a model to the rest of the cavalry, and raise still higher the renown of the arm to which they belong.

Flankers should be the favourite children of the regiment, educated in, and animated with, a high spirit of honour; with these one might execute the boldest and most hazardous enterprises.

The charge is the grand movement of cavalry. In the middle age, the cavalry on both sides approached within thirty paces, then fired upon one another with their long pistols, upon which one side wheeled about, and the other stood still. Even in the first Silesian war the imperial cavalry retained the custom of advancing at a trot within thirty paces of the enemy, first firing off a pistol, and then only drawing their swords. But Frederick the Great ordered his cavalry to rush impetuously upon the enemy, sword in hand, which was generally crowned with success. His cavalry, which in his first wars was very ordinary, soon acquired by this mode of attack a greater degree of superiority than any cavalry of ancient or modern times has attained.

Seidlitz taught it to execute the evolutions of infantry.

The battle of Rosbach is an incontestable example of the advantages of great capability of manœuvre and bravery, united with the greatest possible rapidity, in a cavalry attack. The king, to all appearance, not venturing to

engage with an enemy so superior in force as the combined armies of the French and the Empire were, retired with all the signs of precipitation, and took up a position behind some eminences which concealed the greater part of his army. On the 3d September, 1757, towards mid-day, the enemy, confiding in his superiority of force, advanced against the Prussians, with the intention of turning their left flank. The enemy's columns, in whose front the cavalry marched, approached full of confidence; suddenly General Seidlitz dashed out with the cavalry which had been concealed behind the heights, fell upon the enemy with such vigorous bravery and success, that he gained one of the most brilliant victories ever known; and the name of Rosbach is become a proverb amongst historians.

There are four sorts of charge or shock.

1. The charge in direct line.
2. The charge in diagonal line.
3. The charge in echelon.
4. The charge in column.

The charge in line is the peculiar mode of attack against cavalry. That in echelon and

in column against infantry. The charge in line, parallel to that of the enemy, is always the most certain when one's cavalry is animated with a good spirit and powerful *will*. Cavalry can here exert its whole force, impetuosity—which is unparalysed by any thing artificial. The charge in diagonal line is peculiarly appropriate when our line is smaller than that of our adversary, in order by this movement to extend one's line beyond his flank, and beat him; but a diagonal line (oblique) which is not formed by echelons, requires, in action, great exertion to preserve it, and disjunction is too apt to be the consequence.

The charge with echelons has the essential advantage of never exposing more than one part to the uncertainty of action. One can fatigue the enemy, and spare one's own force. These successive attacks applied against infantry unsettle the soldier, and induce him to expose himself by too early a discharge.

The charge in column is to be practised against infantry standing in mass.

The Emperor Leo was of opinion, that in

an attack one ought to regulate one's own formation — deep or shallow — by that of one's enemy, and that in general good troops should be formed shallow and bad ones deep.

Infantry will never wait to receive an attack of cavalry in a shallow line, but throws itself into column or squares. Cavalry, therefore, when it has to attack infantry standing in mass, must form in open column of squadrons with double distance, and attack in succession.

The leading squadron receives the entire first fire. If it continues firm, and breaks in, the second and third squadrons follow it up quick and complete the defeat.

If on the contrary the squadron making the first attack gives way (which in most cases may be expected), it must break off from each flank, in order to unmask the second squadron, and rally or re-form in rear of the column. The second squadron must now execute its charge with such promptitude, that the infantry has no time to load again. One may, without illusion, take it for granted, that infantry, which believing the cavalry put to

flight by its fire, pays no more attention to it, will be shook, when, whilst busy in loading, it suddenly sees through the smoke a new line of cavalry advancing upon it.

When one wishes to attack guns one must begin by beating the troops which protect them.

One attacks guns, which are separated from the main body, in open lines—*(á la débandade)*.

The flankers advance in the shape of a bow, both ends of which move forwards; they fire little, but advance apparently without any fixed object, until they are nearly within range of the enemy's fire; they then rush upon the battery with the rapidity of lightning, cut down the bombardiers, and compel the drivers to bring the guns over to our side.

In the affair near Strasburg, on the 28th June 1815, five guns were taken by the flankers of the Wirtemberg cavalry in this manner.

Artillery is not near so formidable as is generally believed, and does not deserve the

respect which troops generally show it. Guns can only practise with success upon immoveable bodies, those in motion are difficult to hit.

Six pounders work point blank from about eight to nine hundred paces; cavalry gets over six hundred paces at a trot in two minutes. How uncertain must be the line of fire against the body in continued motion. A line of cavalry charging vigorously, will suffer very little from the fire of guns.

"Vous m'avez donné un trés beau spectacle," said Buonaparte at the battle of Eckmühl, to the Bavarian general, who, with his brigade of cavalry, had taken a battery of thirty guns.

Cavalry must never set itself in motion to charge with indecision, in order first to try whether the enemy will stand; that must be considered *beforehand.* There is no dishonour in being worsted in open combat; but a line which advances with apparent bravery, and faintheartedly goes about when the enemy shows resolution, dishonours and disgraces itself for ever.

If a charge is successful, one must allow the enemy no time to recollect himself. "Nothing is done as long as any thing remains undone," said Frederick. The impression which a victorious charge of cavalry produces upon the enemy, must quickly be turned to account, in order to give a decisive turn to the engagement.

Were the cavalry enabled to remark the sensation its imposing appearance so often produces upon the enemy, and did it know how to take advantage of it *in proper time*, the examples would be more numerous in which it decides battles. Here it is the talent of the leader which decides, for individual regiments and corps often enough burn with desire to measure themselves with the enemy; but leaders, destitute of warlike character, are at their head, and waste the valuable, irrecoverable moments in empty considerations of the fors and againsts—"pours et contres."

The Prince of Condé, only twenty-two years old, beat the Spaniards at Rocroy on

the 19th May 1643, by the impetuosity with which he executed his attacks at the head of his cavalry.

He opened the engagement by cutting to pieces a body of musketeers on his right flank, which Don Francisco de Melos, the commander-in-chief of the Spaniards, had placed in an ambuscade. Upon this he attacked the cavalry on the left wing of his adversary, drove it upon the second line, and routed this also at the same time. Whilst the prince sent one part of his victorious cavalry in pursuit of the fugitives, having brought up the squadrons of his second line, and wheeled them to the left, he attacked the enemy's infantry on its exposed left flank.

Several battalions were already broken when he received intelligence that his left wing was unsuccessful, and giving way in disorder. With the rapidity of lightning he led his cavalry thither, and in a favourable moment charged the Spanish cavalry of the right wing (a little in disorder after a successful charge), freed the prisoners, and put

to flight all that escaped the sword. The Spanish infantry, deprived of its cavalry, formed a deep column, and began its retreat.

Many attacks of the French cavalry were received with discharges of whole parks of artillery and small arms, and repulsed. At length, however, this old and steady infantry was compelled to yield to the incessant and repeated attacks of the prince's cavalry; and twenty thousand of the best infantry of that time, which, under Charles V. and Philip II had made all Europe tremble, was almost entirely annihilated by cavalry, exasperated to the highest pitch by the loss it had sustained.

The rapidity of cavalry often converts an unfortunate affair into a fortunate one; when the leader of the divisions which have not yet been engaged retains his presence of mind! on such occasions, all depends upon his falling with violence, and at the precise moment, upon the enemy, who is pursuing our squadrons with all the intoxication of success.

These moments cannot be described—they

must be felt—one single squadron may, at a critical moment, effect miracles. In the battle of Medellin, on the Guadiana, 1809, which Marshal Victor gained against the Spanish general Cuesta, the French were already giving way on all points, when a captain, at the head of one squadron of hussars, attacked six Spanish squadrons, which were pursuing vigorously, and put them to the rout. General Lasalle, who commanded Marshal Victor's cavalry, turned this circumstance to account with so much circumspection and promptitude, that a most complete victory was soon gained.

When St. Louis, in the battle of Massura, which had taken a turn to his disadvantage, saw his brother, the Count of Anjou, in danger, he placed himself at the head of one squadron, fell violently upon the Turks, routed all that came in his way, rescued his brother already surrounded by the enemy, instilled new courage into his troops by this vigorous and bold exploit, and restored the action.

The gallant Henry IV, at Coutras, attacked with two squadrons (in front of which

thirty noblemen volunteers, armed with lances, were disposed as an advanced guard) the cavalry of his adversary, routed it, and upon this, in order to profit by the impression this heroic gallantry had produced on the enemy, attacked the infantry, and with success.

In attack lies an important advantage, an infinite force. Cæsar, on the occasion of blaming Pompey for having stood still to receive his attack at the battle of Pharsalia, says, "In the souls of men lies a certain natural heat and vehemence, which increases and takes fire by movement—the commander-in-chief should turn this to account."

Cæsar was so convinced of the advantages of attacking, that he courageously quitted even entrenchments, when he had posted himself behind them, and as soon as the enemy pressed him close, passed over from the defensive to the offensive, which constantly was attended with success. The most renowned commanders of all ages have acted upon similar principles.

Frederick expresses himself decidedly upon

this subject in his instructions to the generals of his army: "I allow it is true, that the Prussian troops, as well as others, may occupy advantageous positions, in order to derive advantage from the artillery; but they must promptly quit their positions, and courageously go to meet the enemy, as soon as he attacks in earnest. He will thus, instead of attacking, be himself attacked, and by this means sees his whole plan rendered nugatory. The strength of our troops lies in attack, and we should not act wisely, if we did not turn this to our advantage."

History shows us battles much oftener decided in favor of the assailants than of the attacked.

Force is elevated to the highest degree by attack.

Fortune favours and smiles upon the bold and courageous, and even one's weakness itself is most effectually concealed by boldness and assurance.

The advantages of the assailants consist in—

1. Choosing the points and moments of attack.

2. In being able so to form the columns of attack as to ensure success, or

3. In case of failure, in the power of preventing too great disadvantages.

The advantages of the attacked consist—

1. In the choice of favourable positions.

2. In strengthening these positions by art.

3. In being able to draw the enemy into an ambuscade.

The two first will not bear criticism.

One can seldom find a position, which art and nature render unassailable.

The celebrated lines of Weissenburg were quickly and easily taken by assault. The entrenchments near Essling, on the Danube, 1809, were turned. Those near Borodino, on the Moskwa, were taken and maintained. The renowned Mont-Martre has lost its importance. Gustavus Adolphus found two positions; Wallenstein, Frederick, and Wellington found each only one, in which they could either not possibly be attacked, or only

without success, as for example, Wallenstein by Gustavus Adolphus, near Nurenberg.

The third advantage, drawing the enemy into an ambuscade, is little to be depended upon.

Although Hannibal was fortunate enough a few times to draw his adversary into ambuscades, Sempronius at Trebiæ, and Flaminius at the Lake of Thrasymene, this only succeeded because these commanders were destitute of military talent and experience.

Such a feint can only succeed when one is assured of the thoughtlessness and incapacity of one's adversary.

A skilful leader is not to be led into an ambuscade; and if by accident he is placed in an embarrassing situation, his fertile genius points out the means of extricating himself.

Hannibal avoided the stratagem of Fabius, in the defile of Casilinum, by stratagem. Nothing remained for him but to return by the same way he had come, and which Fabius had blocked up. He caused the guide, who had led him through this valley, instead of to

Casinum in Campagna, to be nailed to a cross. During the night, he caused two thousand oxen, between whose horns little faggots of dry wood, smeared with tar, were fastened and set fire to, to be driven to the summit of a hill. Whilst the Romans, as Hannibal expected, hurried off to this point, on which they thought the Carthaginian army were advancing, and quitted the posts which defended the entrance of the valley, Hannibal reached it unimpeded, and passed through it successfully.

In 1760, Frederick was shut up in his camp at Lignitz by four hostile corps, which meant to attack him on the 15th August. In the night of the 14th, the king quitted his camp, surprised General Laudon, and beating him, opened to himself the road to Breslau.

The Marshal Luxemburgh, deceived by false intelligence, was surprised by the Prince of Orange at Steinkerk. But, although his right wing was already giving way, nevertheless his personal talents and bravery, and

the great capability of manœuvre of his troops, procured him the victory.

The surprise at Hochkirk is also a proof in favour of the personal character of the general, and moral force of the troops. The actions at Krasnoi, and on the Beresina, in November 1812, had but unimportant results.

Vandamme, near Culm, was a victim to his own imprudence.

An engagement is a great operation, where moral force, exalted to the highest pitch, often produces effects which the boldest fancy would not venture to hope for. These effects not unfrequently create as much astonishment amongst those who have produced them, as amongst those whom the weight of this force overwhelms and annihilates. The battle of Jena was such an operation; but that has been far surpassed by that of Waterloo—Belle Alliance. An engagement is a situation, where the human being, freed from humanity, urged on by the desire of glory or revenge, in proportion to the well-grounded or groundless motives for war, breathing only death

and destruction, annihilates every thing which opposes his bloodthirsty courage.

The consequence of a moment not unfrequently mounts to such a height and importance, that it shakes thrones—overturns empires—renders millions of men unfortunate—and interrupts and annihilates the arts and sciences for many years.

Tenth Lecture.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY

TO PROTECT

THE POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.

CAVALRY has two different objects to attain. At one time, when the army is assembled in a small space, or a confined piece of ground, for one of those great discharges of force, which form an epocha in wars, the cavalry, united in masses, renders these explosions more frightful, more destructive, by rushing in *such* moments upon the enemy's lines, when they are already weakened, and gaps made in them by the rain of bullets and cannon-balls.

At another time, whilst the army, either preparing for the great day of battle, is col-

lecting its forces, or refreshing itself after it has taken place, is scattered over a greater tract of the country, the cavalry must take charge of its security.

From hence has resulted the division into heavy and light cavalry. The organization, developed in the Fifth and Sixth Lectures, does away with this distinction, since by that, every regiment and every squadron has line and light dragoons. Each of these divisions forms a total, a firm compact body, supported by its light horsemen hovering round it according to circumstances, whose duty it is at one time to protect their own march, at another, to gain intelligence of that of the enemy.

By this means also, the leader of the cavalry of the army is not confined, but can with freedom apply the talents of his generals and colonels to what they are best calculated for.

He appoints those to the out-posts, who possess the necessary bodily strength and activity, combined with that cunning, that inventive prudence and clearness of compre-

hension, without which, one cannot fancy a good commander of out-posts. He retains those by the reserve who distinguish themselves by that obstinate bravery to which reflection is a burthen. The commander-in-chief has an easy choice, he has only to consider the intellectual force, the spirit; for the organization of all the regiments is the same.

We have already treated of the manner in which the cavalry *en masse* — reserve, united as one grand total, should take up its position, move, and engage, in order to maintain its proper rank in the order of battle, to increase its renown by fresh exploits and decisive effects in the day of battle. The cavalry must also be considered in the operations by which it has at one time to secure the positions and movements of the army; at another, to gain intelligence of those of the enemy. When the army has taken up its position, the cavalry requires the assistance of the infantry in this operation. When the army is in motion, it takes care of it unassisted.

The so called light divisions, composed of cavalry and infantry combined, hinder each other on a march, without being able to support each other.

As in such a combination each arm is too weak to act decisively by itself, so from the same cause neither trusts to the support of the other; and thus whole campaigns repeatedly pass away without these combined light divisions acquiring any glory.

If one mixes the troops of different arms too much, one undermines the confidence of each arm in itself. That confidence, however, in self, is, in whole corps as well as in individuals, that moral force which leads to great actions, and ensures fortunate results.

Motion is the element of cavalry, therefore it is useful on every sort of ground, as long as the army is in motion.

In the year 1692, the French Court gave M. de Catinat the chief command, and an army of one hundred battallions, and forty squadrons, with which he entered Piedmont.

Victor Amadeus had only eighteen battalions, but sixty-four strong squadrons, to oppose

to that army. After this prince had seen through the plan of operations of the French, he threw himself amongst the Alps, passed over the mountains, crossed the Durance, captured Gap, Embrun, &c., and thus compelled his opponent to give up the offensive.

The fine enterprise of General Seidlitz, in 1757, against the town of Gotha, strongly garrisoned with infantry and artillery, which he took with 1,500 horse (so picturesquely described by Archenholtz), is a proof that an enterprising leader may even with cavalry venture on the most hazardous undertakings, when he understands how to take advantage of circumstances and opportunity. By this exploit Seidlitz laid the foundation of his future glory, but it covered Soubise with disgrace.

In 1793, the Duke of York had for a moment the idea of marching upon Paris with one hundred and fifty squadrons.

General Czernitscheff, with about 2,000 horse and four light guns, towards the end of September, 1813, executed a bold, and in its consequences brilliant operation against

Cassel. Arrived before this residence, he caused some infantry drawn up near Bettenhausen, with six guns, to be attacked by Cossacks and the Hussars of Isum. The infantry was dispersed or made prisoners; the guns taken.

The King of Westphalia profited by the moment of this combat to fly with two battalions of the guard, and 1,000 horse.

Czernitscheff caused the Leipsic gate of the town to be taken by assault, granted General Allix a free retreat, but had him accompanied by Cossacks for about two German miles.

The war of 1813 can produce many fine, valuable exploits of partisans. The operations of a Scheitter, Thielman, Mennsdorf, Platow, Czernitscheff, Wallmoden, Tettenborn, Dörnberg, Lützow, &c. &c., deserve to be studied by young officers.

In order to provide for the safety of an army in positions and during movements, the advanced guard must be equally accustomed to taking up positions, to manœuvre, and fight. The Fourth, or Field Service Book

of the Elements of Service, will develop these positions, manœuvres, and actions. The principal operations only will be pointed out here, and in the following order:—

A. Position.

1. Camps. 2. Cantonments. 3. Grand Guards.

B. Movement.

1. Advanced Guard. 2. Rear Guard. 3. Reconnoitring Parties.

C. Actions.

1. By Day. 2. By Night.

A. *Position.*

1. Camps.

The regiments composing the advanced guard encamp in a semicircle before the line of sight of the army; where it is possible, behind natural obstacles, rivers, &c., beyond which, only the grand guards are posted.

With these tactical conditions one endeavours to combine those which facilitate the procuring the means of subsistence. Water for watering the horses must on no account be neglected.

In summer, corn fields, or firm meadow grounds, near a clear running brook, and a few high trees which give shade, are at once the most agreeable and most advantageous places for encampment, since they admit of rapidly drawing out the troops. In the more rigorous season of the year one posts oneself near villages, mills, and farm-houses.

It is a bad custom to take up one's position when the day is quite shut in; and when this is persevered in for weeks together, it operates destructively on men and horses.

It becomes impossible to reconnoitre, and one scarcely knows on which side the enemy is.

One has to seek for wood, water, straw, forage, but often in vain. The greatest disorders and excesses are committed, when at last a body of troops, out of humour at having sought so long in vain, finds a village or isolated house.

If a commander-in-chief wishes to maintain order and discipline amongst his troops, he must confine himself to reasonable time, and cause the camps to be occupied by such

a time of day, that the men's dinners may be cooked by daylight.

This was the custom in earlier times; and on the other hand, the army always marched off by break of day.

Wellington is the only commander-in-chief of modern times who never departed from this rule, so well calculated for the good preservation of the army and its good name.

Engagements and battles naturally make an exception.

2. Cantonment.

Before a regiment or squadron takes up its quarters in any place, the surrounding country must be reconnoitred, the precautions of posting grand guards, sending out patroles, &c., and fixing the alarm post, must be taken, the place divided, and numbered off in as many districts as one has squadrons, and the mode of subsistence arranged with the local authorities.

In 1809, on the evening of the battle of Eckmühl, a division (two squadrons) of dra-

goons was surprised and made prisoners, owing to having neglected all this. If one has artillery, a proportionable detachment must encamp near it.

Whether the troops may unsaddle during the day, depends upon how near the enemy is, and such circumstances as can only be decided upon in war.

The Fourth Book of the Elements of the Service, gives the necessary instruction for conducting oneself when one remains longer than one night in cantonments, and for doubling the precautions by strengthening the grand guards, sending out more patrolling parties, turning out before day-break, &c.

3. Grand Guards.

When troops occupy positions, grand guards are posted in advance for their security; these are only properly placed when they can observe every thing, without being seen by the enemy.

The grand guards again post pickets in their front; and, finally, these form a chain

of *vedettes* (double sentries on horseback), which must be so constructed that it completely commands the surrounding country, and nothing can slip through unobserved.

It follows of itself, that by night this is regulated by quite other principles than by day.

The first care of an officer commanding a grand guard, consists in providing against being surprised, which in stormy weather, and by night, requires the greatest alertness. One requires of him a report which is to be depended upon; consequently a correct eye for guessing distance and numbers, and a sound judgment, are indispensible to him.

It constantly happens, but it is a great fault, that the out-posts, with magnifying eyes, mistake five hundred of the enemy for one thousand. A moderate brigade of cavalry, with a few field-pieces, observed at a distance, often grows, to unaccustomed eyes, into a column in march, 10,000 men strong. An officer once convicted of such a mistake loses every body's confidence. The

danger should never appear greater than it really is. Courage should increase in proportion to the danger.

The giving the army an alarm unnecessarily is a transgression which cannot be atoned for.

The just medium between prudence and temerity is more difficult to describe than to feel. One cannot point out this medium to him who is incapable of feeling it.

The old established standing order for *vedettes* to fire upon every one, even by day, who comes near them, and cannot give the parole, seems to require some explanations: at least one should add, that when a *vedette* clearly discovers, in the person who approaches, an officer well known to him, such a person is not to be shot dead, even although he may have had the great ill-luck of forgetting the parole.

The firing upon every individual man in day time, ought on no account to be tolerated.

It looks a great deal too inexperienced, not to say timid, when a *vedette* gallops at

every poor countryman with a mien as if his last hour was come.

B. *Movements.*

1. Advanced Guards.

The advanced guards, as well as rear guards, are to an army on its march, what the grand guards are to it in position: an advanced guard must move with circumspection.

In 1809, in Spain, the French 10th regiment of chasseurs à cheval, which composed the advanced guard, following the enemy too hotly and incautiously, was annihilated by the Spanish cavalry, which was drawn up concealed behind a village.

The haughty chasseurs à cheval of the imperial guard, under the command of Lefevre Desnouettes, in Spain, were, by the English cavalry, owing to a like want of caution, part cut to pieces, and part driven back into the river which they had crossed swimming, to the satisfaction of the French soldiers, who were not displeased at their arrogance meeting a check. The advanced

guard must divide itself, form a line of flankers, in order to explore the surrounding country through which the line of march passes. Great attention must be paid to the time of day, the nature of the ground, and weather during the movement.

By day, in clear weather and an open country, one can move with greater security and quicker than by night, rainy and cloudy weather, or in broken ground, mountains, woods, &c.

The advanced guard must leave nothing unattended to. In villages — gentlemen, curates, gamekeepers, burgmasters, innkeepers, &c.: in the fields — herds, countrymen, every traveller must be questioned. From a great many answers a conclusion may be drawn.

Has the advanced guard to make a report, — the same man, who has himself seen what is reported, must be dispatched with it, as it thus gains in precision and clearness. This must especially be attended to in all verbal reports, in order that the person who made

the report may be questioned more closely, concerning the circumstances.

2. Rear Guard.

One of the most difficult problems is how to conduct a rear guard well. The strength of cavalry consists in the charge, which during this movement remains very uncertain in its consequences.

In a defilé, the enemy pressing on close is to be arrested by nothing but a vigorous and decided attack.

Such occurrences not unfrequently present the most brilliant opportunities for officers and dragoons, earning great glory by their bravery and presence of mind.

In order to enliven the courage of the troops, and give the pursuing enemy a warning, an army, during a retrograde movement, from time to time engages in little affairs of out-posts.

On the 26th May, 1813, in retiring from Gorlitz to Schweidnitz, Prince Blucher ordered the advanced guard of the French army to be attacked.

Whilst Colonel Mutius, with the real rear guard, retired over the plains behind Hanau, towards Steuditz, Colonel Dolfs stood concealed near Schellendorf with twenty squadrons.

The setting fire to a windmill was the signal that the enemy (General Maison's division at its head) was advancing, about three o'clock P. M. Colonel Dolfs rushed out from his ambush so vigorously upon the enemy, and took him so by surprise, that he had no time to form masses. All that did not, by a precipitate flight to the rear, reach Michelsdorf, were cut to pieces or made prisoners, and eleven guns were taken.

This was all the work of a quarter of an hour. Colonel Dolfs, who on this occasion displayed talents, according to Gneisenau, which entitled him to a place by the side of Seidlitz, was found dead in the midst of the enemy.

On the 25th February, 1814, the Crown Prince, now King, of Wirtemberg, during the retrograde movement of the grand allied army from Troyes upon Bar-sur-Aube—caused the

enemy, who was advancing out of Vendœuvres after mid-day, to be unexpectedly attacked by two squadrons, by which he was driven back the space of a league.

3. Patroles or *avant coureurs.*

The advanced guard, whether stationary or in motion, covers the country in its possession. The range of sight bounds the range of its operations.

But this is not sufficient for the security of an army.

On that account the advanced guard sends out *avant coureurs*, who traverse the country in different directions, in order to increase its security by intelligence obtained on the other side of the range of sight.

Hence it follows, that fighting can never be the object of such *avant coureurs*, or patroles.

A patrolling party must accustom itself to move quickly, see sharply, and make intelligible questions, and to be able to furnish a clear report. It avoids all inhabited places — moves parallel with the main roads, but at

such a distance that these remain in reach of sight. Wherever it is possible, a patrolling party should never return by the same road it had gone out; on account of its own safety. It must not be strong, from three to five men, or at most nine, fulfil every proposed object. The interest of the enemy requires that he should *not* be observed, nevertheless we on our side must do it, but without being remarked, and this can only be accomplished by a few men. Lloyd speaks very sensibly upon this subject, and assures us, that with one thousand five hundred men he will perform this service of observation for an army during a whole campaign.

A strong party cannot march unremarked, and runs a risk of being cut off. A few persons can easily conceal themselves, observe without being observed, and penetrate everywhere by cross roads. He who can patrole well, is master of the country, and superior to the enemy. The enemy has equal pretensions to the country between the two armies. Both sides have their patroles, and their spies.

With respect to spies, one must be very much on one's guard, particularly in an enemy's country, that they do not serve him more faithfully than us: and that one does not give one's money to traitors.

Mistrust, on other occasions a hateful quality, becomes in war, and towards the country people, a virtue.

Young officers must early acquire a readiness in the art of ascertaining their position, knowledge of the points of the compass.

Whoever has not learnt to know the bearings of a country, finds himself in an awkward situation, if separated from the army. Clear day is for him cloudy, every wood a labyrinth. Embarassed and irresolute, he always decides and calculates falsely. Incessantly calling for guides, by whom his march becomes public, and who, not unfrequently, in an unfriendly manner enough, deliver him over to the enemy, he wanders round about in a state of uncertainty. If a report is made to him, or if he receives an order, he judges incorrectly: what is to the right, he thinks is to the left. The reports which he himself makes, are

usually incorrect, confused, and intelligible to no commanding officer.

The art of reconnoitring, a readiness in finding one's way, is the faculty of forming an idea of a district by the force of imagination, and recalling the whole to one's recollection, by the means of some particular points.

The art of drawing, develops that of reconnoitring.

The draughtsman accustoms himself, by the assistance of a skeleton of chosen objects or fixed points, to recal entire positions to his memory, as if he had sketched them into his field book on the spot.

C. *Affairs.*

1. By day.

In a free, open country, cavalry has a great superiority; the flanker on horseback has here such important advantages over the flanker on foot, that the latter cannot stand against him. In broken ground, one must cause the flankers to dismount, and dispose them against the enemy's light infantry, by which the equality in the manner of fighting is re-established.

The flankers of cavalry, even on foot, retain an advantage, as long as the affair is continued with extended files. They are less tired than the light infantry, have no heavy knapsacks to carry, and console themselves with the thoughts of again mounting their horses with the reserve, when the affair is ended; and although the carbine may not carry quite so far as the light infantry musket, it is only necessary to advance upon the enemy within distance of firing, point blank, to be sure of doing him quite as much harm as he can us.

The dragoon flanker has his sabre against the infantry bayonet.

On the 28th September, 1813, General Thielman caused Albrecht's massy manufactory building near Zeitz, which was defended by infantry, to be attacked by volunteers from the cavalry on foot, at the head of whom was the Prince Biron of Courland.

Hungarians, Bohemians, and Prussians ranged themselves alongside of Cossacks. After a short carbine fire, the house was stormed sword in hand, a great many of the

enemy were cut down, and one colonel, fifty-five officers, and above one thousand men made prisoners.

The Scotch infantry use often, and confidently, their long sword, defended with a basket handle, in an attack, instead of the bayonet. In Calabria, on the plains of Maida, in the summer of 1806, where Sir John Stuart, with four thousand English, beat seven thousand French under Regnier; a highland regiment successfully attacked the fourth French regiment, of *chasseurs à cheval*, with the sword raised in the right hand, and the left holding the musket.

When the advanced guard comes prepared upon the enemy it deploys, according as the ground is open or broken, and acts according to the intelligence it may have of his intentions and strength; or discovers those from his movements.

On such occasions, it must not neglect to occupy the commanding heights in its front.

Does the advanced guard stumble unawares upon the enemy, perhaps on an ambuscade, the leading divisions must charge

him with resolution and impetuosity. By this it causes the surprise, which its adversary had prepared for it, to recoil upon himself, a measure which will oftener be successful than not. This is easily explained.

An enemy lying in ambush, generally does not see his adversary advancing upon him, and cannot therefore ascertain exactly his strength. If then the enemy in ambuscade is impetuously attacked, at the very moment he intended to attack, his consternation will get the better of him.

Besides, in a retreat the soldier easily loses countenance, is more apt to think of his safety than his reputation, and believes more readily his own destruction than that of the enemy.

2. By Night.

If a grand guard, in position, or an advanced guard in movement, is attacked, it must rush impetuously upon the assailants, without giving time for reflection. The darkness of the night will crown this presence of mind with success.

Even the most resolute enemy will be

taken by surprise, when, meaning to attack, he finds himself attacked.

Thirty horses will be sufficient to throw an entire column of attack into confusion. The head of the enemy's column, being routed, will get mixed with ours. The disorder will increase. The enemy, put out of countenance, will believe his proposed operation is betrayed, and that all is lost.

Such conduct as this may with the fullest reason be expected from every officer commanding an out-post, on similar occasions. Let us even suppose a case, that the enemy, equally brave, cool, collected, and impetuous, is superior to us in force, and our charge fails (which is scarcely to be thought of, and very, very seldom happens), it still ever remains honourable to have shown an energetic will in the attempt.

The characteristic of bravery consists in this, never to deliberate when honour and duty is in question.

The honour of an officer, in the situation here supposed, is in fact in question, and his duty commands him to attack the enemy,

with all the means in his power, to drive him back, or at least to stop him, in order that our troops may obtain time to form for action.

War is composed of actions; in war the question is no more of right, but of action. The most efficient in action is victorious. Boldness and resolution lead men on to vigorous actions. Nothing therefore is worse than irresolution.

Eleventh Lecture.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY

TO

RECONNOITRE THE POSITION AND GAIN INTELLIGENCE OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY.

A. *Reconnoitring, Exploring.*

These are,

1. Open reconnoitring with strong force, and

2. Secret.

1. The object of an open reconnoisance, is the hostile army or its position as a total. It is undertaken with a division of troops sufficiently strong to place it out of the power of the enemy to hinder its attaining the proposed object.

The commander-in-chief, in person in most

cases, but the commander of the cavalry of the army, is always present.

As soon as one has come up with the enemy, one attacks his out-posts vigorously and impetuously, routs them at the first onset, takes possession of a commanding height, from whence the commander-in-chief, or his representative, can freely make his observations. The retreat must be rapidly effected, and secured by regiments and squadrons advantageously posted.

General Turpin has planned a general disposition for reconnoitrings.

He takes six squadrons; arrived within a league and a half of the enemy, he places squadrons at intervals of half a league, one from the other, on the side of the road. As soon as he has actually reached the enemy, the leading squadron drives back the enemy's post, and throws itself out in a line of skirmishers, whilst the other two squadrons take up a position, and the general-in-chief makes his reconnoisance.

Open reconnoisances are usually undertaken —

a. Before an engagement, in order to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and in case either of awaiting the enemy's attack, or attacking oneself.

b. When the enemy retires without coming to action, in order to observe the direction of his march; or if we mean to retire, in order by these means to conceal this retrograde movement.

2. The object of a secret reconnoissance is only particular parts of the enemy's army or their position; it must be entrusted to an intelligent officer. The fourth part of a squadron, or a division, or two or three squadrons are employed on it, according to circumstances; secrecy of the march is the first condition; one usually marches by night, and through indirect roads, in order to have reached the object to be reconnoitred before day break.

During the march, one avoids inhabited places, goes round the enemy's posts, only feeds in woods, and takes care not to meet any of the enemy's patroles.

Guides to be depended upon are neces-

sary; faithful spies will be of essential service. If one is obliged to obtain intelligence from the inhabitants, one's questions ought to be enigmatical, that they may not guess one's real view. As long as one can be observed by the inhabitants, one marches in a different direction from that one means to take. If in spite of precautions a secret reconnoitring party comes upon the enemy without being able to keep itself concealed, or to retire in good order, it must resolutely attack him.

If one is stronger than the enemy, one deprives him of the advantage of turning about, flying, and betraying us. If one is weaker it is too late to turn about, and of no use, the enemy cuts us to pieces before we can turn our horses. Presence of mind leads us to attack, by which we gain time, and time gained is essential. In the night especially, by attacking, the advantage will be on our side. By day, if one is compelled to quit the field, one turns towards a wood, makes a halt before it with good countenance, and makes believe as if infantry were concealed in it.

One sounds the alarm, lets the horses get their wind, puts the party in order, and breaks off gently—a prudent and careful enemy does not throw himself blindly into a woody district.

Let the worst come to the worst the party disperses, each singly seeking his safety in flight, and calculating that the enemy cannot gallop faster than us. It is therefore necessary to make the party acquainted with the whole district, and at every halt to repeat an observation of the heavens. By rights every officer should carry a compass with him. In this description of highly interesting operations, much address, and many stratagems have at all times been displayed. The old works upon war are full of them.

General Luckner in the seven years' war often reconnoitred, disguised as a country man, often as one of the enemy's hussars. Metamorphoses like this require prudence, and a great deal of address. In reconnoitring one must be on one's guard against optical illusions. A mass, considered from before, conceals all the divisions which are

formed behind it. Echelon positions and those *en echiquier* deceive and are difficult to judge. One counts colours and intervals. In order to observe correctly one must be acquainted with the formation of the enemy's regiments, battalions, squadrons, and mode of encampment.

One judges of the direction of the movement of a column by the glittering of the arms, clouds of dust, &c.

When the gleam of the arms continually falls in the eyes, the columns are moving towards us. Is the glittering interrupted and only visible upwards (the bayonets), the columns are moving away from us.

An officer reconnoitring must endeavour to ascertain whether the enemy's army is well supplied, whether it is animated with a good spirit, wishes for a battle, and so forth, whether the discipline is strict, whether the duty is carried on with zeal, or negligently, and what is the language held by the enemy. One obtains intelligence on these points through prisoners, deserters, spies, the inhabitants, &c.

Although individual declarations deserve

but little credit, yet, by combining many, one may arrive at some conclusion. One must only not be tired of asking questions.

Is the object of the reconnoissance to take a military draught of the country, or to sketch roads practicable for columns, officers of the general staff are appointed for that purpose, and the officer of the cavalry escort only commands the troops.

B. *Surprises.*

When armies remain some time inactive in presence of each other, and the commander-in-chief can obtain no certain intelligence of the enemy's intentions, he orders surprises for the purpose of making prisoners, if possible even amongst the officers.

In order to undertake a surprise with hopes of success, a knowledge of the enemy's posts, which are to be surprised, is necessary, both as to their position and their combination with other posts. One obtains this knowledge through soldiers sent out in disguise, through spies, deserters, &c.

If one can get round the enemy's posts

there is a probability of the success of the surprise. In this case the fright caused by one's appearance in their rear is the most active auxiliary. Many difficulties to be surmounted in a surprise are favourable to its success. The stronger the position the less troops anticipate danger. Bad weather is one of the most favourable circumstances towards a surprise, as it abates their watchfulness.

If one adds to all this the psychological remark, that a man awoke out of his sleep by fright, seldom is in possession of his presence of mind in the first moment; that then confusion and disorder are inevitable, to command and to obey are equally difficult, since the clearness of the moment is wanting to both those who command and those who obey; it is easy to comprehend why surprises are oftener successful than unsuccessful. Whoever has been present at such fear-inspiring moments has materials for many interesting remarks.

The campaign of 1813 furnishes a great number of instances of successful surprises.

The surprise of Freiberg by the Austrians under Scheitter, on the 18th of September, must ever remain a fine operation.

The Italian general of division, Pery, allowed himself to be surprised by General Barclay de Tolly near Kœnigswartha at midday, on the 19th of May, in an inexcusable manner. The Italian division was dispersed, a great part made prisoners, and it lost eleven guns.

The campaign of 1814 also was not destitute of successful surprises on the side of the allies.

The action at Epinal, on the 11th of January, was a regular surprise by day, of which the Crown Prince (of Wirtemberg), to his sorrow, could not take advantage with his accustomed vivacity: the ground on this side of the town would not admit of his making use of his cavalry.

The seven years' war is rich in bold operations of this sort. The successful surprise of the little town of Zierenberg by the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, and of the French corps of General Glaubitz, encamped near

Emsdorf in Hesse, which the Hereditary Prince made prisoners in open day,—were brilliant operations.

Luckner peculiarly understood how to take advantage of the moment, and succeeded in several surprises by day. He himself gives an account of that of Butzbach in Veteravia in 1760. "I gave the order to rush in at the gate at full speed, and if that should be impossible, to galiop round to the side of Friedberg and attempt it there. There was a fatality in our only securing eleven of a patrole, and that the cornet and one man escaped us. It was dinner-time. I gave orders to pursue the cornet and penetrate into the town with him, cost what it might; this succeeded. One saw in the first fury nothing but guards and infantry. My hussars cut down all before them, crying, 'Where is the enemy?' 'At the Friedberg Gate,' was the answer. We galloped thither, and made there also many prisoners."

Bulow, in his "Gustavus Adolphus in Germany," relates a very interesting surprise, both with respect to the quickness of

the previous march, and the excellent manner in which the whole was carried into execution.

"The king was in Würtzburg, Tilly before Oxenfurth. The possession of Hanau was important to the king. He detached Colonel Haubold with six troops of cavalry and about one hundred dragoons to surprise this place, which was fortified and occupied by an imperial garrison. Hanau is ten German miles from Würtzburg. Haubold began his march from thence about five o'clock in the morning, crossed the Mein near Lengfeld, directed his march through the Spessart, and the next morning between five and six surprised and took Hanau. At a bad season of the year, in the month of November, he had marched ten German miles in twenty-four hours, without reckoning the *detours*, taken a fortress with all the means of defence contained in it, and of the garrison, only the Commandant Brandeis continued in the imperial service. The rest, after the manner of those times, entered into the service of Fortune—the Conqueror. The king rewarded

Haubold with the appointment of colonel of his body guard, but must, as often happens, soon have forgotten this exploit, for Haubold, discontented, entered later into the service of the emperor."

Bennigsen relates also an instructive example of a successful surprise.

In the summer of 1794, General Bennigsen was at Trabe in Lithuania. Five (German) miles from him, near the little town of Oschmen, a Polish corps was encamped: Bennigsen resolved to surprise it. At three o'clock P. M. he began his march. About seven in the evening he had accomplished two miles, and caused his party to feed and bait for an hour near the little town of Olschau. After he had recommenced his march, he ordered fifty Cossacks to proceed at a certain distance in front of the advanced guard, and these again were preceded by three men as their advance. The greatest silence was ordered, not a shot to be fired. The fifty Cossacks in front were instructed, if they were attacked or came upon any thing, to set off at full-speed, and gallop forwards to the

distance of a werst on the road, then halt and wait till the advanced guard came up.

By this disposition, the first grand guard of cavalry was cut off, in like manner the second. The march continued through a wood. When the general had reached the edge of it, he saw the enemy's corps about eight hundred paces in front of him. The river Oschmenka ran in front of the enemy's position. His left wing leant upon the town of Oschmen. Two new broad bridges led over the river.

In camp every thing was stirring, the cavalry had saddled and bridled, the Russians could observe every thing exactly. The first beams of morning were breaking. The general formed two columns, and advanced out of the wood upon the bridges.

At length the sentries on the bridges gave fire. Upon this the Russian cavalry crossed the bridges at full gallop and dashed into the camp. The disorder was boundless. Six hundred men were cut down, the rest made prisoners, all the guns, baggage, &c. taken.

The plan for a surprise, like every other,

depends upon the object of the operation, and the lines which lead to it.

Secrecy of one's march is an essential condition.

A safe retreat must be ensured.

Small surprises are best executed exactly at midnight, but great ones a little before day-break.

A general place of rendezvous after the operation, a sign by which to recognise each other, a word, white cloth, or something of this sort, must be agreed upon beforehand.

Firing is forbidden. One falls vigorously on the enemy with lance or sword. The fortunate result lies in the rapidity of execution. The smallest part only, at most the half of the troops destined for the surprise, may be sent actually into the place to be surprised. The remaining part remains in regular disposition for action on the outside, in order to be enabled to act as circumstances may require.

The surprises in several columns are very apt to miscarry, as it rarely happens that all the columns arrive at once, even when one

causes the watches to be regulated every day.

In order not to be taken by surprise in any way, one must allow all the possibilities to pass before one's mind beforehand.

One stands in need of luck for all warlike operations. But Fortune is a lady, and changes frequently, without any reason. One's own perseverance is not sufficient to enchain the inconstant.

C. *Partisan Warfare* (*la petite guerre*).

The strategetic object of war is the defeat of the enemy *.

War is divided into great or small.

Whilst the former has for its object the enemy's army, the latter is directed against its lines of communication.

The great, or, properly speaking, war, consists in operations of the armies opposed to each other. The small war is carried on by partisans, and has the materials of war — the

* Bulow says, but without deep reflection, "The object of war is peace."

necessary stores for fighting and subsistence for its object.

Now, these stores of ammunition and provisions are to be found either amassed together in magazines, or they follow the army, consequently are on the route of the army.

A daring partisan, according to Theobald, a land pirate, does not content himself with falling upon, taking, and annihilating this endless train of military stores, or at least with impeding its progress, and partially surprising and carrying off, but attempts it even against the troops which are following the army as a reinforcement — the depots of the cavalry, the reserve artillery, the hospitals, &c.

One or more daring and prudent partisans can in this manner do the enemy incalculable mischief. They may even reduce an army to a stand-still in its operations, paralyse its movements, and even compel it to retrograde.

To weaken the enemy in all possible ways, is the task of a partisan; and to attain this object all measures are allowable. Partisan war is generally carried on with light troops.

These troops are composed mostly of vo-

lunteers, who only engage to serve as long as the war lasts. Discipline is seldom a quality by which these corps distinguish themselves.

The choice of the leader is of the greatest importance; as here, as everywhere else, all depends on the personal qualifications of the leader.

"It is a great art to discover and select talents; but when once set in motion, they ought to be unshackled *."

The greatest possible latitude must be allowed to a partisan. Upon this choice the rest depends, whether this land piracy, the operations of partisans, are attended with advantageous consequences, and really fulfil the object of the war, or are confined to becoming the terror of the defenceless inhabitants. The former is to be preferred as the means of acquiring honour; but the latter for gaining money.

Man yields but too easily to the seduction of growing rich. The less people have to expect from the generosity of princes, the

* Bulow.

more quickly and surely they seize every other opportunity of becoming rich.

The English prove their knowledge of mankind, by combining honour and riches. All conquerors, all usurpers have supported their interest by these two talismans. They are two passions, against which, a man seldom possesses strength sufficient to defend himself; for the main-spring of action in this world is interest.

Partisans, besides the execution of the operations already mentioned, should direct their attention to gaining intelligence. The carrying off couriers, diplomatic persons, and intercepting dispatches — all form part of their operations.

What is the line of conduct to be pursued in this sort of warfare may be easily studied in many valuable military works; for on this subject a great deal has been written.

Twelfth Lecture.

PRINCIPAL EPOCHAS IN THE HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

The Scolothians, a Scythian nation, are supposed to be the first who had the boldness to tame that fine animal, called the horse, which has furnished mythologists and poets with the fable of the Centaurs.

Since that, according to Buffon, it has had beautiful palaces assigned it as a habitation.

It is impossible to point out exactly when and where horses were first made use of in battle.

It appears, however, probable, that already during the celebrated siege of Troy, cavalry was employed in battle, although

Homer does not pronounce himself very clearly on the subject.

So much is certain, that the valiant Scythians, descendants of the renowned Amazons, conquered by Hercules, on the banks of the Thermodon, who lived before the Trojan war, were already exercised in equitation, and fought on horseback.

The Greeks had but little cavalry. The defeat of the Macedonians, near Messéne and Ithomé, is entirely to be attributed to their want of it. Their wars with the Persians made them remark this; as in like manner the Romans, taught by Hannibal, first discovered the advantages of it.

Agesilaus, king of Sparta, was the first, who, in the wars against the Persians, increased his cavalry.

The Asiatic nations have in all ages had a numerous cavalry; and even in the present time it is quite a common thing for the Mahrattas (whose united force is calculated at 200,000 cavalry), to take the field with 60 or 80,000 horse *.

* History of Tippoo Saib.

Asia appears to be the original native country of the horse; for there only does it arrive at its most perfect and regular beauty. With respect to tactics, the Thessalians and other Grecian people, according to Ælian, formed their cavalry in squares and wedges.

The invention of the cuneated formation is ascribed to Philip, the father of Alexander the Great; but Alexander soon departed from this mode of formation; and with his cavalry, fighting in shallow ranks, conquered that of Darius, drawn up in deep order.

Later, all the other nations of Greek origin disposed their cavalry in shallower order, but never under four or above eight ranks.

Hannibal's squadrons consisted of sixty-four horsemen, who, drawn up in four ranks, made sixteen (single) files.

According to Vegetius, the turmæ of the Romans had eight files and four ranks. Ten turmæ formed a legion. Between the turmæ were intervals equal to their own front.

At the battle of Pharsalia, the ill-fated Pompey formed four turmæ in one, in order

to have firmer and broader masses. But Pompey did not attack, so that his cavalry, though superior to that of Cæsar, was of no use.

The use of gunpowder produced a great reform in tactics. Berthold Schwartz, a Franciscan monk of Cologne, is usually called the inventor of gunpowder.

But long before him, people had made use of combustible materials, to hurl stones and iron bullets by their force; for example, in 1342, the Moors besieged in Algesiras by the Castilians, speaking of which, Villasas says, "The iron bullets had such a violence, that they tore away men's limbs, as if they had been cut off with a knife; and that the powder which they used was of such a quality, that the wounded died on the spot."

The Greek fire, besides an addition of pitch, rosin, and tar, had all the other ingredients of the powder of the present day.

It is therefore erroneously, when the ap-

plication of gunpowder is positively fixed about the year 1380: since it is proved, that the Arabians were acquainted with it much earlier than the Europeans.

During the siege of Ptolemais, in Syria, in 1290, the Egyptians hurled Greek fire by the assistance of three hundred warlike machines. The Moors made the Spaniards acquainted with the use of the Greek fire: from the latter it passed over to the French and English, and from these again into Germany.

According to the Chronicle of Lubeck, the Town Hall of that city was blown up by the carelessness of a powder-maker. Already, in the year 1372, the Augsburghers fired out of twenty metal cannons, upon the besieging Bavarians.

From these facts it is evident, first, that they are in error who fix the invention of gunpowder in the year 1380; and secondly, that the pious Berthold Schwartz, a great naturalist and chymist, is not the first inventor, but in all probability improved it:

he may therefore be absolved from the sin of having invented this mixture, so destructive to mankind.

A hundred and fifty years were necessary to render the use of fire-arms universal.

Since the invention of gunpowder, Tactics number seven grand periods *.

The first commences with its first application to fire-arms, and goes down to Charles the Eighth's expedition into Italy, or from the beginning of the fourteenth to the end of the fifteenth century.

In this space of time, in which the art of war began to raise itself again from out the condition of barbarism into which it had sunk since the fall of the Roman Empire, occur the wars of the Spaniards against the Moors, those of the English against the French, and at last, those of the Italian republics against each other. The cavalry, consisting of the

* History of the Art of War.

nobility, composed the flower of the armies, and was the support of princes and their kingdoms. In assaulting fortifications, or when important posts were to be occupied or defended, as well as on all occasions in general, where a valiant and resolute force was required, the knights dismounted and fought on foot.

In 1340, the count of Normandy did not venture to lay siege to Quesnoy, because the garrison consisted of knights. Besides the knights and squires there were also archers, who were properly the vassals of the knights, and who lightly armed, and mounted on lighter horses, served as light-horsemen. The knights were armed *cap-a-pie*, and rode entire horses, called battle stallions (Streithengste), which were also covered with iron-plate armour. The head coverings of the horses' armour were often very splendid, and inlaid with gold and silver.

At the siege of Harfleur, the count of St. Pol had a head-plate for his horse which cost 30,000 dollars, and the count of

St. Foix, one which cost 15,000 dollars: both were inlaid with precious stones*.

These men of iron carried before them a strong and long lance, with an iron point — a sword, a dagger, and a pistol — a battle-sword, five feet long, hung from the saddle, and a battle-axe, club, hammer, or hatchet.

The order of battle was very simple — they fought man to man. Each armed knight sought out his adversary, and rode against him with couched lance, in order to throw him out of his saddle, or take him prisoner.

The squires, or armour-bearers, followed as a sort of rear rank, as seconds to their knights, whom they assisted in the action, bringing them fresh arms and other horses when the former were unserviceable, or the latter killed, without exactly fighting themselves.

Nevertheless, these squires, inflamed with a noble thirst of glory, were always in search of an opportunity to distinguish themselves,

* French History.

in order by some extraordinary valiant action to obtain the honour of knighthood. Had the enemy, therefore, escaped the knights in the first rank, or was he victorious, he had still to deal with these courageous youths.

Such rivalry, in thirst of glory, developed the most brilliant actions.

Nothing was known of the manœuvres of the art, until Charles the Bold, that warlike duke of Burgundy, prepared a Book of Exercise, in 1473. He taught cavalry to attack sometimes in close, sometimes in extended order, or to link the horses and engage on foot.

An action generally began by some courageous knights advancing singly and challenging an adversary from out of the hostile army, in order to raise the courage of their own side.

The general staff was in those days very simple — the prince himself was the commander-in-chief — he had under him a major-general for the cavalry — a general for the infantry, and a master of the ordnance for the artillery *(feldzeug meister)*. Further,

the princes had a marshal at the head of their household. At this period there were no military writers.

None but the regulations of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, of Louis VII of France, and the well known Ziska, leader of the Hussites, are come down to posterity.

The second period, from Charles VIII's expedition into Italy, down to the wars of the Low Countries, or from the end of the fifteenth down to the middle of the sixteenth century, comprehends the wars of the French, Spaniards, and Germans in Italy.

Chivalry now was declining daily.

The whole education of the nobility of that time was of a military character.

The sons of knights served first as noble youths, or pages, and afterwards as squires, at the courts of princes and the most distinguished knights.

Their whole occupation consisted in making themselves acquainted with the use of arms, and the manners of a knight. The promo-

tion from the situation of page to that of squire was attended with certain solemnities, in which the new squires were girt with a consecrated sword. The conferring the honour of knighthood was still more ceremonious. The most distinguishing mark of knighthood was a pair of golden spurs.

In time of peace, tournaments served to exercise the knights: here they fought with blunted weapons for prizes, which the ladies presented to them. Other knights were appointed to rush quickly between them, when the sportive threatened to change into mortal combat.

By such means was formed that courage, which never calculated the number of the enemy, but only its own love of fighting. Hence arose that equanimity in the greatest and most threatening dangers, that insensibility to bodily sufferings. Hence altogether those warlike virtues, which later generations only wonder at and admire, without possessing the force of will to adopt them themselves. It is to be regretted, that with the faults, the virtues also of that time have disappeared.

From the time that Charles VII had established the first standing cavalry, consisting of fifteen troops "d'ordonnance," in the year 1445, and the other powers had followed this example, the summoning of knights to do service fell into disuse of itself.

The cavalry now was composed of men receiving pay (soldnern), and was commanded by knights (officers).

The heavy cavalry, the lancers or halberdiers, were still clad in complete armour, wore closed helmets with plumes, and gilt ornaments, and still rode the entire horses covered with plates of iron.

The light cavalry appeared under various names and forms—Arquebusiers, Small Horse (Ringer Pferde), Chevauxlegers, &c. they were more lightly armed, and instead of a lance, had fire arms. About the same time the Venetians established a new sort of light horsemen, who furnished plenty of occupation to the French. These were the Albanians: they rode light Turkish horses, were clad in the Turkish fashion, and knew very

well how to use a sort of pike eleven feet long. Their reputation soon rose very high, and Louis XII took two thousand of them into his service when he marched against the Genevese.

In Hungary the hussars appeared, and soon made themselves formidable. By an ordinance about the middle of the fifteenth century, every twentieth man was obliged to take the field. From husz, which is the Hungarian expression for twenty, these horsemen were called hussars; they have changed but little since their first institution.

As the cavalry became permanent, the manner of drawing them up for action was changed.

The German cavalry was the first which passed over from the formation in rank entire to that in mass, which was so long retained, until at length people were convinced that the deep formation is of no use for cavalry.

In order to form a body for action, they formed it as broad as long. The halberdiers stood in the first ranks, and on the flanks of the masses; behind which were the arquebusiers.

For the purpose of beginning the engagement, or reconnoitring, they sent out fore-runners (vorläufer), for which every tenth arquebusier was taken. The infantry also had its fore-runners, who, united with those of the cavalry, formed a line in front of the army, under cover of whom the corps formed in battle array, and armed for the fight.

As soon as the engagement actually began, these fore-runners, by the French called "enfans perdus," formed themselves on both flanks in order to cover them.

The cavalry as yet was not formed into regiments, but was composed of cornetcies, companies, or squadrons (rittschuften), commanded by a captain (rittmeister). Such a squadron consisted of from two hundred to two hundred and fifty horses. Four or five squadrons were commanded by a colonel of horse. The colonels were under the orders of the major-general (feld marschal), he chose from amongst the colonels a deputy (the feld marschal lieutenant). The pay was considerable, and they could live handsomely upon it.

	florins.
A colonel commanding one thousand horse, had monthly	400
The lieutenant-colonel	100
The commissary of provisions...	40
The colonel's secretary.....	24
The captain received for each horse of his squadron a half florin, which made for two hundred and fifty horses	125

This was to induce him to keep his squadron always complete.

The lieutenant received	40
The cornet.....	30
The chaplain and quarter-master each	16
A trumpeter or kettle drummer	16
A serjeant-major (wachtmeister)	40
A serjeant-corporal (rottmeister)	25
A private dragoon	12
The farrier, armourer, and sadler, each	12

Besides this, every colonel was allowed eight trubants* (a sort of armed servant on foot), and every captain two, for the payment

* Called sometimes by old English writers, Satellites. T.

of each of whom he received eight florins. These trabants, or body guards, were very necessary at a time when the soldiers were so inclined to mutiny.

The third period comprehends the great war of independence of the Netherlanders, from 1568 to the universal cessation of hostilities in 1609.

Here on one side fought art, and the old experienced armies formed by more than fifty years warfare, under the governments of Charles V and Philip II; and on the other, the Netherlanders existing only by trade and the arts of peace. To the haughty Spaniards, the Netherlanders seemed a contemptible enemy; but exactly this circumstance, and the continual want of pay on the Spanish side, were favourable to the Netherlanders. The war grew languid: in the same proportion that the Netherlanders disciplined and formed themselves by war, did discipline and bravery slumber on the part of the Spaniards. This war produced great changes in tactics. The Hollanders in this war could

not raise the necessary number of lancers or spearmen, from the circumstance of its becoming constantly more difficult to procure the battle horse (streithengste) fit for service.

Prince Maurice, of Orange, therefore gave the horsemen, recruited in Germany, no lances, and endeavoured to remedy this defect, by giving them greater mobility; he therefore gave them long holster pistols. When the Spanish lancers charged, the German horsemen gave a general volley, opened rapidly in the centre, and fell upon both flanks of the attacking enemy sword in hand. This manœuvre was generally attended with success.

The prince called this cavalry (which had so essentially assisted his victories), from the cuirass which they wore as a defensive arm, cuirassiers. These horsemen had a cut and thrust sword.

The lance disappeared by degrees, but more from necessity, arising out of the impossibility of procuring war horses, than any acknowledged defect. On the contrary, the lance still continued to be called the Queen

of weapons, but they neglected using it for the charge alone.

They gave the squadrons of cuirassiers fifty light horsemen, and named them after the weapon they carried—carbineers; the fire arm—carbine—which they carried was about four feet long, and their principal weapon.

They were exercised in loading at full gallop, and were expected to hit their mark from horseback. They only used the pistol in case of necessity, and the sword only in close combat. Their destination was to annoy the enemy at a distance. These carbineers placed themselves on the flanks of the squadrons, and by their effective fire prepared the way for the charge, or endeavoured to prevent the consequences of an unsuccessful charge. The use of them gave rise later to the establishment of dragoons. In enterprises requiring quickness, the carbineers were often obliged to take foot soldiers behind them on their horses.

There is an instance of this in Count Louis of Nassau's operation against Bergen op Mons, where five hundred horsemen had as

many foot soldiers on the croups of their horses.

Prince Alexander of Parma, in order to avoid the inconvenience of mounting two men on one horse, when he wished to surprise the Duke of Alençon in 1582, mounted several companies of infantry on the baggage horses, and hurried against the enemy.

As it was found advantageous for bringing infantry with promptitude to any desired place, in order by this means to surprise the enemy, they made several divisions of mounted infantry in the armies, and gave them the name of dragoons, probably comparing them to the imaginary monster—the dragon; when, with burning matches and the carbine hanging across their shoulder, they saw them galloping with the rapidity of lightning.

They fought always on foot, and only left a proportionable guard by their horses, which were linked together.

One first finds them mentioned by this name, in the account of a reconnoisance, which Henry the Fourth, as king of Navarre,

made with four hundred light horsemen and five hundred dragoons.

The German cavalry of the Prince of Orange served as a model, and was imitated by all sides. The northern nations were the last to adopt these changes; they still continued for a long time to fight man to man. Indeed the Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians trained their horses to take part in the battle, by biting and kicking. They held horse-fights like the bull-fights in Spain, and the owner of the victorious horse received a prize.

The pay during this war in the Netherlands, of above forty years duration, was very considerable. Amongst the Spaniards, the marshal or captain general received monthly five hundred crowns or six franc pieces; and in addition, as commander of a squadron, eighty-six crowns.

The lieutenant-general	200 crowns
and as captain of a squadron	86
A captain of a squadron	80
and for a boy or servant	64

The lieutenant	25 crowns
and for a servant	6½
The cornet	15
and for a servant	6½
The dragoon	6
and for enlistment money.....	6

The rations were valued at ¼ of a crown, and delivered out half in money and half in kind, *viz.* 16lbs. of hay, 3 measures of oats, and 2 bundles of straw.

A captain-general received	40 rations
and as captain	10
A lieutenant-general.....	20
and as captain	10
A captain	10
A lieutenant	6
A cornet	4

The fourth period contains the thirty years' war—the pretext for which, according to Bulow, was felicity in the next world, but

the real inducement was the good things of this world—from 1618 to 1648.

The exhausted nations had begun to recover by a cessation of hostilities for only nine years, from the great war of the Netherlands, which had devastated the banks of the Rhine for half a century, when a new war broke out, which can only be considered as a continuation of the former.

As in that Maurice of Orange, so in this Gustavus Adolphus, that warlike king of Sweden, was the creator of a new sort of tactics.

The lance had entirely disappeared. When Gustavus Adolphus passed into Germany, the Swedish cavalry was composed of cuirassiers and dragoons.

The Imperial, of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons, and hussars. The hussars were splendidly clothed; not only the horses' headstalls, pistols, sabres, and sabre-taches, but even the buttons of their pelisses and dolmans were of massive silver, besides being richly ornamented. In their caps they wore heron's plumes.

People began to imitate this cavalry. The division into regiments, of German origin, became universal.

In France about this time were established mounted musketeers and fusileers, who were armed with fire-arms with a newly-invented lock. As the French were the first who introduced this lock into the army, it has retained the name of French lock.

Until the middle of the thirty years' war it was still the rule to form the cavalry in from four to eight ranks.

Gustavus Adolphus departed from this, and fixed it once for all at three ranks. In the intervals were placed sections of infantry, fifty and more men strong, also light cannon.

When the advancing enemy was brought into disorder by the effects of the fire of these musketeers and these guns, the cavalry charged him, sword in hand, and generally succeeded in putting him to the rout.

This disposition was well calculated for the imperial cavalry, which, on account of its being heavily armed, moved but slowly. In order to be still more superior to the Austrian

cavalry, which was better mounted, the king ordered his cavalry to charge it vigorously, sword in hand, as soon as it began to move. He did not allow those half wheels, those halts, those caracoles, of which, according to Wallhausen, the cavalry of that time was so proud, and the object of which was to escape the first fire of the infantry; but was of opinion, and with reason, that the quicker a line of cavalry throws itself upon the enemy the less it suffers from his fire.

The imperial cavalry profited by dear-bought experience, and at Pfaffenhofen in 1633 the cuirassiers of Lorraine routed the cavalry of the Elector Palatine at the first charge.

On special occasions, they went back to the deep formation for the charge. At the battle of Jankowitz, in 1645, the Swedish general, Douglas, formed a column of attack, by drawing up three squadrons, one behind the other, for the purpose of breaking a regiment of Austrian infantry which had long resisted the attacks of the Swedes; this succeeded.

No exact accounts exist of the pay received by the troops at this period; only so much is certain, that the cavalry pay was at a higher rate than that of other arms.

The fifth period comprehends the wars of the French in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands, as well as the Northern and Turkish wars; a period of ninety years, from 1648 to 1738.

The two wars, that of the Netherlands and the thirty years' war, after having lasted nearly a hundred years, and devastated in all directions the almost inexhaustible resources of Germany, were at length ended by the peace of Westphalia.

The results of this struggle were,

To the princes, the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates.

To religion, belief shaken.

To the priests, entry into civil life by marriage.

To the people, greater freedom of opinion.

Standing armies were the inevitable consequence of wars of so long duration.

Germany knew during this period two hereditary enemies, the Turks and the French. The former by their aggressions on the imperial house of Austria; the latter on account of their incursions on Germany itself, and their openly avowed object of making the Rhine their boundary.

In tactics the French now took the lead of all other powers.

The war of usurpation of Louis the Fourteenth quickly developed the art of conducting military operations. Generals formed themselves who shine in the annals of war.

To a French Turenne, Luxembourg, and Condé were opposed Montecuculi, Marlborough, and Eugene of Savoy.

Louis of Baden, successful against the Turks, was less fortunate against the French, still he was equal to a Vendome, Catinat, and others.

Louis the Fourteenth, who for a hero devoted too much time to the ladies, fortunately for Germany committed great faults.

The choice of his commanders-in-chief, influenced by a Maintenon, proves very clearly that he did not possess the quality of discovering military talents, and assigning to them their proper place. Fenquieres gives an interesting description of these ill-chosen generals of Louis the Fourteenth.

Rochefort and Humieres obtained the chief command, because the minister of war, Louvois, was their friend; Sourdis, Villeroi, and others were obliged to be recalled.

La Trousse only escaped this fate by death; Feuillade cost the King of Spain his Italian provinces, and the King of France immense sums of money, his heavy artillery, and more than 25,000 men; Boufflers lost Cologne, Liege, the Meuse, Geldres, and Limburg, and retired; Tallard, by the battle of Hochstädt, lost Bavaria, and, luckily for France, was made prisoner; Tessé, who was sent to the assistance of Spain, brought that kingdom to the brink of destruction.

The cavalry, during this period, was but little changed.

Louis the Fourteenth established horse

grenadiers. His brilliant guards appear only remarkable from the immense sums they cost. A captain of the garde du corps had annually 24,000 francs pay. These guards were composed of all arms mixed together, and looked very well on parade.

The rest of the cavalry selected from the squadrons the best shots, who were destined as chasseurs, with rifle barrels, to annoy the enemy at a distance by single, but unerring shots.

The strength of regiments varied in different armies. The Austrians, even at that time, had the strongest regiments, from 1,200 to 1,800 horses. Amongst other nations the establishment varied between 400 and 900 horses.

The Swedish regiments alone numbered throughout, under Charles the Twelfth, 1000 horses.

In the north of Europe the torch of war flamed, during this period, at various intervals.

The Swedes, Poles, Brandenburghers, and Moscovites fought alternately on the plains

of Poland and the deserts of the Ukraine. Charles the Twelfth, this chivalrous king, discarded all defensive arms, so that his cavalry consisted almost entirely of dragoons, with which he produced such great results.

He, whose restless warlike character constantly pressed forwards, he was not satisfied with causing his cavalry to charge the enemy's at full speed, without firing, and, totally independent of other arms, *to trust to itself alone*, he led it equally against infantry, entrenchments, and batteries, and always with success.

Charles the Twelfth knew, that through rapidity of motion the natural vivacity of the majority of mankind increases, mounts to a blind delirium, and madly-brave enthusiasm, and leaves no time to deliberate or ponder over danger; that in such moments death loses its terrors, and victory alone with glowing colours presents itself to the soul of the combatants wildly rushing on to attack.

The Turks, who by their incursions into Hungary created a great sensation, had a numerous cavalry, which never attacked other-

wise than in swarms of five or six thousand horse.

Dexterity in the use of their crooked sabres, combined with the highest degree of activity and speed in their horses, gave them a decisive superiority, and often victory; nevertheless troops learnt how to resist them, and at present they enjoy but little consideration.

The sixth period comprehends the three Silesian wars, namely, from the beginning of the first Silesian war to the first campaign of the French revolutionary war, or from 1740 to 1790.

The other wars, which occur in this period, are unimportant as far as regards the history of cavalry.

Prussia appeared during a century to have only been preparing herself for the brilliant part she acted under Frederick the Second.

The Prussian military power owes its origin to Frederick William, the great elector.

Under the pretext of forming him for a commander-in-chief, but only in order to be

freed from a dangerous observer, the Count of Schwartzenburg kept him at a distance from court. The prince grew up, as it were, in a camp, and while little more than a boy was present at the siege of Breda and Fort Shonké.

Having succeeded to the government, the elector endeavoured to create a new spirit in the army, was enabled to furnish the Dutch Republic 20,000 men as auxiliaries, and left behind him at his death a well-organised army of near 30,000 combatants. When Frederick the Unique ascended the throne, he found the army about 80,000 strong.

With this army, which Leopold of Dessau had brought to a till-then unaccustomed exactness in evolutions, and an uncommon readiness at loading and firing their muskets, Frederick in 1740 advanced on the scene of action.

The two first wars soon passed over: Frederick also had powerful allies.

But the third Silesian war, which broke out in 1756, deserted by almost all his allies, the king stood alone, unshaken, like an oak braving the tempests.

On one side, his natural quickness of eye, the unity and force of his will, the manner in which his troops were accustomed to stand firm in every situation, to execute every movement, even in the confusion of a battle, with an astonishing exactness; that unshaken confidence in their royal commander-in-chief, the enthusiasm produced by having such a king at their head for a leader, whose brilliant genius comprehended every thing—on the other side, the divisions, wavering, and want of unanimity in the enemy's plans of operation, the partial, lake-warm manner of carrying them into execution—enabled Frederick II to come out of the bloody seven years war, crowned with glory, and without loss of territory.

These remarkable events form a particular and ever-memorable period in the history of war. Frederick rose above all prejudices, was the creator of new tactics, and made his army a model for all the rest.

He began with the mode of formation. The infantry was drawn up in three, the cavalry in two ranks. Between the squadrons were intervals of from nine to eighteen paces.

In forming on perfect plains, the king often would not allow them to take any interval, on which occasion, what are called charges " en muraille" were executed. At the opening of the seven years war, the regiments of heavy cavalry contained eight hundred and eighty-one effective horses, those of hussars one thousand six hundred and fifty-three horses, the former divided into five, the latter into ten squadrons

With respect to formation and equipment, every nation followed different principles. The hussars alone, like their original model, the Hungarians, remained the same everywhere. Nevertheless all other cavalry retained carbines and pistols. The straight sword was the usual side arm, that of the Prussian cuirassiers and dragoons weighed two pounds three-quarters without scabbard; the blade was thirty-eight inches and a quarter long. The side arm of the imperial cavalry weighed two pounds three eighths, the straight blade was thirty-six inches long.

The armour of the cuirassiers, grown lighter

by degrees, had at last dwindled into a more breastplate.

The Hanoverians established, in the seven years war, mounted huntsmen (chasseurs á cheval), who carried rifles with conical touch-holes, invented by Godfrey Hantch of Nurenberg, and rendered important services in the army of the Duke of Brunswick.

Marshal Saxe had, in the first half of the eighteenth century, re-introduced the lance, which had long disappeared, and named the cavalry which was armed with it hulans.

The king of Prussia, in order to oppose a similar species of cavalry, particularly against the cossacks of the Russians, established, in 1745, spearmen or lancers, and called them Bosniacks.

The hulans had indeed already, for a long time, composed the only cavalry of Poland; but the middle of the eighteenth century is the exact period when the lance (which had for a long time lost its consideration, but only because it was imagined, that none but a horseman in complete armour could use a

lance, and on which subject one hears at present so many conflicting opinions), was again reinstated in its good old right. From this time it became constantly more universal, and with reason, it being understood that it should never be used otherwise than for a charge in close order. During this sixth period, great importance began to be attached to bringing the cavalry to a great state of perfection.

Since the disappearance of the knights, the art of riding had been very much neglected. Count Melfort in France, and Seidlitz in Russia, directed their attention to the bad state of this branch. After the peaces of Hubertsberg and Dresden, they began to establish a riding school, and appoint a riding master and rough riders to every regiment. People were convinced that nothing but good horsemanship could produce perfection in manœuvre. Seidlitz, who after the second Silesian war in 1747 was still only a major in the Natzmer hussars, occupied himself particularly with the officers. He got over the prejudice, that education injured their consideration, and soon convinced them, that

by that alone could they rise in estimation. Seidlitz, distinguished by his great king, rose from rank to rank without regard to seniority, and in spite of increasing envy, which, according to custom, attaches itself to talent like lead, in order to impede its ascent.

Seidlitz soon saw himself placed in a sphere of action where his great talents could move unshackled, where the Prussian cavalry, raised by him to a lustre as yet unknown in history, could contribute so essentially to the successful results of a severe war of seven years, fortify the king's crown, and help to raise his high military reputation.

Seidlitz taught the cavalry not only the use of arms, but also to execute the manœuvres of infantry: never equalled since that time, he remains the most exalted model, which an officer can attempt to equal.

During the autumn manœuvres, which, after the peace of Dresden, Frederick had annually, whatever had been newly learnt was put in practice, and judgment passed upon it. Here the talents of officers of all ranks had an opportunity to develop them-

selves, and the king to become acquainted with them.

The praise of their universally admired king animated those who had distinguished themselves to redouble their zeal. The idle were severely taken to task.

The manœuvres ended, the king worked with Seidlitz, Saldern, Gaudi, and others, to point out the defects that had been observed, and these generals were obliged to bring the king's new ideas to perfection.

In the order of battle the king departed from the general prejudice of placing cavalry on the flanks.

Whether, in the two first Silesian wars, he had not entirely discovered the strength of cavalry, or did not employ it in great operations, which, however, may be attributed to its unwieldiness at that period,—the king, in the third Silesian or seven years war, when Seidlitz was at its head, acted upon quite different principles.

Already in 1756, at Lowositz, Frederick placed his cavalry in two lines behind the infantry, and established it from hence as a

fundamental principle, always to unite, on the day of battle, the cavalry in one great mass on one point.

In other armies, during this war, are to be found exploits of individual corps and regiments of cavalry, worthy of coming down to military posterity; but nothing on the grand scale—there was but one Seidlitz!

The conduct of the Austrian general, Von Römer, at the battle of Mollwitz, makes an exception, and is an additional proof in support of the assertion so often repeated in these lectures, that the secret of producing great results with cavalry, lies in the personal qualities of its leader.

The brave and highly talented Römer fell too soon for the glory of a cavalry, which has always been distinguished by a most excellent "materiel."

At the battle of Minden, in Westphalia, which the Duke of Brunswick gained, Lord G. Sackville neglected the favourable moment. It was in his power, with the Anglo-Hanoverian cavalry, to have driven the French into the Weser. His pride, and his jealousy of

the duke, restrained him from annihilating the enemy, and earning great glory. Lord G. Sackville renounced his own glory, because he would not assist in raising that of the duke.

The custom of the cavalry firing a volley before the charge, disappeared during the seven years war.

The example of the Prussians carried other nations along with it, each endeavoured to surpass the other in rapidity.

The French had two modes of attack—compact, and only in a trot, "en muraille," or at speed, and scattered, "en fourageurs."

It is remarkable, that, in proportion as the European cavalry exclusively confined itself to the sword, the Turkish went over to firing. One might almost believe that each mistrusted his own mode of fighting; and, in fact, it is a great proof of consideration for the enemy, when one adopts his formation or his tactics.

In the wars against the Russians, and after them against the Austrians, the Turkish cavalry formed a compact line of skirmishers

in front of their pulks. These skirmishers mostly carried rifled guns, and by means of their excellent horses, displayed an uncommon dexterity in the use of them. The pulks remained behind this line of skirmishers, as if lying in wait, and only then first dashed upon the enemy with incredible rapidity, when they saw them thrown into disorder by their fire*.

This was an excellent method of fighting, which deserves to be appreciated, and in fact the advantage was almost always on the side of the Turks.

The seventh or last period of the art of war, from 1790 down to our time, comprehends the war which lasted a quarter of a century, has torn Europe to pieces from east to west, and north to south, and ended by changing the relations of all nations, but has left them unsettled.

In that country alone, where the flame of

* Count Veterani's campaigns in Hungary.

war and rveolution first blazed out, have pains been taken, immediately after the catastrophe, to cause every thing to re-appear as it was previous to this period. There, for some time, people endeavoured to persuade themselves and others, that such monstrous revolutions were only dreams.

It is true, the real consequences of a war, which has made such an impression, may only appear later, but liberal ideas continue to strike deeper and firmer root.

The old hereditary enemies of Germany of the fifth period, in the first place, are not dangerous. The prayer against the Turks has silently fallen into disuse.

As long as the august and peace-loving Bourbons rule over France, the white banner of peace, as far as depends on them, will wave. Every force has a term, and is under the control of established laws; the maximum of exertion is followed by that of exhaustion *.

* Principles of Strategy. This truth is established: would France otherwise ever have been overcome?

The south of Europe has, by too long a use of her physical forces, disburthened herself of them; the mighty north, sensible of her great force, stands strategetically drawn up in line.

Although old, yet an important observation is by these wars reduced to a mathematical certainty; namely, that a war against the French must be conducted offensively.

The Frenchman, full of courage, impetuous, dreadful in attack, does not possess on the other hand the indispensible cold-blooded coldness, presence of mind, and endurance for a defensive war.

A prudent, but nothing less than an uninterrupted offensive must be the predominant principle in all plans of operations against the French.

At the end of this long struggle — which whilst it lasted assumed such various forms and names, in which all European nations have been entangled, and which still exists on the other side of the sea (South America) in its original form, as a war of liberty, as it began there (in North America) — opinions

are more than ever divided, whether formations in lines or columns are to be preferred.

Had Folard still lived, he would have had the pleasure of seeing that the French, in the first years of the revolution, following the natural instinct of man, at the sight of danger, closed themselves in the deep formation, and on most occasions attacked in solid masses. These masses, under cover of the name of columns, were often nothing but heaps of men huddled together in disorder.

In the retreat from Moscow, the French army marched in masses of this sort. When Marshal Ney after the battle of Dennewitz was driven back upon Torgau, the troops without orders formed themselves in masses.

General Morand wishing to escape the danger of being crushed in one of these masses, remained hanging on a pallisade by the hinder part of his trowsers.

Rogniat, and after him Decker, have quite recently, in excellent works, published their ideas upon columns. The second lines according to circumstances, but the reserves al-

ways in the order for battle, may be most advantageously placed in columns. They are easy to move, and can be easily disposed of.

At the battle of Foksan, 1789, the Austrian army was drawn up in battalion squares. The Turks suffered a complete defeat; in Egypt, Buonaparte formed his infantry six deep, in order to resist the Mamelukes.

At the battle of Lutzen, Napoleon formed oblong squares to oppose the numerous cavalry of his adversaries.

Generals of commanding talents do not depend blindly on settled regulations, or debase themselves by becoming the slaves of particular systems, but levy contributions on the whole dominion of tactics.

Since Louis XIV began to increase the establishment of officers, this example has been followed on all sides. The natural consequence of this increase was a diminution of pay.

The superior officers, the real leaders, still indeed retained high pay, but the subaltern officers scarcely received as much as would furnish them a miserable existence. In later

times, the pay also of the higher ranks has been diminished.

Before Louis XIV's century, when an officer always meant a leader, there were only the following leaders of the army.

Major generals, colonels, captains, and their deputies (lieutenants). As assistants to these officers, there were also as under officers, quarter masters, serjeant majors, and squad masters (rottmeisters).

Louis the XIVth was a Conqueror, and sought by the enticement of promotion to give new wings to ambition.

A conqueror stands in need of, and excites, ambition; a defender, patriotism.

Napoleon filled up the place of every officer, who fell sick, or was made prisoner. Whoever was not present with his troop was not reckoned as belonging to it, and lost his promotion. Thus the number of officers increased beyond all bounds.

Napoleon was able to do this, as he did not think with Montecuculi, "that money was the sinews of war," but with Cato, that "war nourishes war." He was compelled to do this,

since the conscripts, led on, and as it were bordered by great numbers of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, could only by these means be brought up against the enemy, as what Bulow calls "food for cannon."

Young soldiers, and old officers, the latter experienced, ambitious, blindly devoted to their commander-in-chief, and to be trusted amidst all the vicissitudes of war, form the best regiments of a conqueror. The cavalry in this seventh period remained almost entirely in the form with which one has been made acquainted in the previous one.

The French *chasseurs à cheval* are nothing but light cavalry, and differ only from the hussars in their clothing. This is also the case with other nations, whatever names they may have given their cavalry.

The Hungarian hussars, the Polish hulans, and the Russian cossacks, are the only remaining *national* troops.

The cossacks have gained a certain degree of reputation, and the experiment of employing them for a charge, has occasionally met with success. At the battle of Leipsic the

cossacks of the imperial Russian guard made a fine regular attack in compact order. The dragoons have lost their original destination, that of also fighting on foot. Examples are only to be found amongst the English and French of sending this sort of cavalry, on foot, in order to be mounted only on their arrival at the theatre of war.

The French re-equipped their heavy cavalry with entire cuirasses of polished iron: this cavalry, which charged only at a trot, has excited astonishment. Napoleon frequently employed them to take batteries, field works, and even strong redoubts. Their reputation was raised so high in the French army itself, that "brave comme nos cuirassiers" became a proverb.

The French dragoons, degenerated for some time, had in Spain regained their moral position, and secured to themselves consideration in 1813 and 1814.

The Austrian cavalry, whenever commanded by a leader of talents, has always instilled new life into its glory, acquired in the bloody battles of so many centuries.

At the battle of Wurtzburgh, 3d September 1796, Wartensleben passed the Mein with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, attacked the cavalry of the French under Bonneau, routed them, and thus decided the battle.

At the battle of Leipsic, the Austrian cuirassiers under Nostitz covered themselves with glory.

It was one o'clock, p. m. on the 16th October, when Nostitz, scarcely having crossed the Pleisse by Gröben, attacked the lancers and dragoons of the French guard, completely routed them, and afterwards rode through several squares of the guard.

The English cavalry surpasses, with respect to "material," all that is known, and unites fine appearance to every qualification for service.

The Duke of Wellington is endeavouring to give it, what is still wanting, a greater facility of manœuvring in great lines.

Colonel Ponsonby, who displays talent, is forming himself for a leader of cavalry. He commanded a regiment of lancers in the

army in France, and accompanied the duke in his tours of inspection. By such preparations, the consequences of which lie in futurity, a genial leader announces himself.

Thus Frederick the Great formed his general of cavalry for the seven years war, in the interval of peace between the second and third Silesian war.

The Russian cavalry may, with reason, pretend to the reputation of the first cavalry in the world, when, at some future time, it combines the intellectual with the physical and moral force which it already possesses.

The Polish cavalry stands on an elevation as a model.

Prussia feels the importance of a good cavalry, and applies at present great sums, and much attention to the material.

The Bavarian cavalry, by means of Polish remounts which it has obtained for some years past, is in an excellent condition.

The king of Wirtemberg, acknowledging the spirit of his time, has given his cavalry

a new organization and new regulations. Good remounts are still wanting *.

The Baden cavalry consists of fourteen squadrons, whose detail and individual formation is excellent.

The cavalry of the kingdom of Saxony is shaken by the political tempests which that country has experienced.

The Hanoverian cavalry has brilliantly mantained its old well-established reputation, by the exploits of the German legion.

The cavalry of the Netherlands has as yet had no opportunity of making itself known.

The Swedes and Danes, in modern times, seldom find themselves on a theatre of war favourable to cavalry.

* This cavalry is armed with lances eleven feet long, with the exception of the flankers—fifth divisions, which have long carbines. The dragoons in the line, armed with lances, have rests, which are fastened on the right pistol holster. Flankers and dragoons have a sword, equally to be used to cut and thrust, and only one pistol, all as described in the fifth and sixth lectures.

The Italian nations make no pretension to cavalry.

The Spanish and Portuguese cavalry, share the fate of the nations to which they belong — languor.

The Turks have given up the part of conquerors, and since then the empire is in a declining state.

The Mamelucs, a peculiar cavalry, gave the French plenty of occupation in Egypt. It remains to be asked, whether they will still long fight for the Grand Porte?

With respect to the higher branches of the art of manœuvre, cavalry, since the sixth period, is rather remarkable for a retrograde than progressive movement — very little genius, very little intellectual force has developed itself.

Napoleon formed his cavalry into independent corps. Generals full of talents were to be found amongst the commanders of these cavalry corps, who have performed individually brilliant exploits; but a general-in-chief of the cavalry, possessing that high talent which sheds its rays on all around.

was wanting. They could not comprehend in the French army, that cavalry can only produce great effects by manœuvres. The physical elements, its united masses, its moral elements, raised to so high a pitch, was of no use to this cavalry. Owing to the want of the talent of moving it for manœuvres, it was drawn up in engagements as food for cannon; and only after it had given proof of the greatest calmness and steadiness, were individual regiments of cuirassiers taken to charge batteries at a short trot, as if it was glorious to gain every victory with the greatest possible loss.

These faults were repeated in all engagements; and at Waterloo, to the faulty method of drawing up the French cavalry, exposed from the very commencement of the battle to the effects of cannon fire, it is alone attributable that its exertions were fruitless. This want of talent to move great masses of cavalry, when victory was declaring for them, is to be found in all the European armies, during the last wars, and therefore so few decisive exploits.

On this account it was said with great reason, in the Second Lecture: "Seidlitz was a consummate leader of cavalry: but a century often elapses before a second is formed in the same army."

This is a truth; and a truth once established does not cease to be truth, whatever may be said to the contrary.

The father who has outlived his own age, seldom understands the mode of action of the son; and is always finding fault with him. The son is not perplexed by this — he continues to act on his own system, but is indulgent to his querulous father's whims; and above all things, will never lose sight of the respect and obedience which is his due.

The young officers will find, in the Regulation Book indicated in the Third Lecture, the new movements circumstantially developed, and rendered more comprehensible by drawings.

May they not hurry too rapidly, either over these Lectures or that book of regulations.

THE END.

NOTE.

In the preceding Lectures our Author has so frequently mentioned the brilliant exploits of the Prussian cavalry, that it may not be amiss to point out here some particulars in which they differ from us. Their regiments are divided into *squadrons*, like most foreign cavalry; and during the late manœuvres in September 1826, near Berlin, they generally brought four squadrons of forty-eight files into the field.

The squadron is divided into four divisions, as with us, but is sized and told off by threes, *from the right*, not the centre, and a non-commissioned officer placed on the right of each division, who is, however, not told off with it. A non-commissioned officer is also placed on the left flank of the left division of each squadron, and when the dressing or squadron of direction is to the left, he has to preserve the interval. This, however, rarely occurs; the dressing and feeling in squadron, is in most cases to the right, and the non-commissioned officer on its right flank is answerable for its interval. Where his squadron is that of direction, he takes the points and advances upon them; the squadron dressing by him. Each division has its leader, usually an officer, who is on all occasions in front of it; and when the regiment breaks into column of squadrons or divisions, the non-commissioned officer on the right

flank of either is answerable for preserving the proper distance. They never form a closer column than that at quarter distance, always keeping sufficient space for making a deployment or movement to either flank, by the *wheel of divisions;* by which, indeed, they execute all their evolutions, seldom using threes. The going about by threes, unless absolutely required by particular circumstances, is distinctly forbidden.

The increasing or diminishing the front, is almost invariably accomplished by inclining right or left, according to which ever is in front. All wheels are made with a moveable pivot, but with this difference from our method, that the outer flank continues at the pace directed, whilst the inner diminishes its pace: thus at a gallop the inner flank drops into a trot, and at a trot into a walk.

They move entirely without markers. The four officers in front of each squadron appear to facilitate the quick dressing of the line; and during the advance, the squadron officer, not being exclusively occupied, with either looking to his points, if leading the squadron of direction, or preserving his interval, if commanding any other, is enabled to look to every part of his squadron, and correct faults in time, in which he is also assisted by an officer placed in rear of the squadron. In line, the squadron interval is only four paces. The interval between regiments is twelve.

When a swarm attack is to be executed, the men advance at a light gallop, without attention to order or

dressing, and increasing their pace as they come near to the enemy, execute their charge; the squadron officer, in the mean time, with the standard, and three files to the right and left of it, follows at a moderate distance, in order to mark the rallying point for the men.

On the signal to rally, the men wheel about to the left, and each rejoins his own squadron as quickly as possible: but the regiment or squadron does not at that moment stop to re-form, according to its original tellings off, as from thence loss of time would arise, and the main object is to form a compact body, and show a front immediately; it therefore advances some short distance. Whenever a convenient opportunity occurs for resuming the original formation, the commanding officer gives the necessary order, on which the front rank advances three paces, every individual resumes his original telling off, and at the word *dress*, the rear rank closes to the front.

The manœuvres in September, 1826, near Berlin, were executed by twelve regiments of cavalry (divided into six brigades) and twenty-four guns. They were generally drawn up in three lines (treffen). The first consisting of two regiments of light dragoons and two of hussars; the second, four regiments of cuirassiers; the third, four regiments of lancers. The first line or light troops usually began the affair by skirmishing, and perhaps charging, thus clearing the way for the second line, which advanced, followed by the third, the

lancers, who were generally formed in column of squadrons or divisions in rear of each wing of the cuirassier line. Those regiments in rear of the right wing moving left in front, those rear of the left right in front. A very favourite movement, both in brigade and regimental field days, was that of advancing in double column of divisions *from the centre* of wings, or, as they are called in German, "regiments divisions." The division (fourth part of a squadron) being in German, "zug." This sort of column is called the column of attack. When a line was to retire, it formed this same column by the divisions wheeling about *from the flanks*, marching off in succession, and inclining inwards, till quite close to each other; on arriving at its proper distance, the divisions wheel about again, and each regiment then stood in its original formation, that is, advanced from the centre of wings in double column of divisions. By this movement most changes of front were effected.

I cannot close this brief and imperfect sketch without observing the great advantage to be derived from witnessing the movements of such large bodies of troops, and feel convinced that any officer, who can obtain leave of absence, will be well repaid by attending the autumn manœuvres in Prussia. To the military man the recollections of Frederick the Great render Berlin, Potsdam, &c., almost as classical as Rome and Italy can be to the man of letters. Nothing can exceed the friendly disposition which the Prussians

evince to the English officers; and I should not be doing justice to my own feelings, if I did not particularly mention the kind attention I met with from Lieutenant-colonel Von Barner and the officers of the Garde-dragoner regiment; and am happy to take this opportunity of expressing my grateful sense of the kindness I experienced from that distinguished corps.

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